| Titre | Réglementation des monopoles et coût social des fonds publics | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Dominique Bureau | |
 |
Revue | Economie et prévision |
| Numéro | no 119, 1995/3 | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Régulation des entreprises de réseaux |
|
| Page | 127-136 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Regulating Monopolies and the Social Cost of Public Funds by Dominique Bureau
The new regulatory economy has brought to light the conflicting objectives faced by all regulators endeavouring to promote the efficiency of a natural monopoly without leaving it excessive rents. The arbitration between these two terms depends on the chosen social cost of the public funds. The apparent dispersion of the regulatory mechanisms that are actually used, in terms of rents left and thus of incentive, suggests that this social cost is not determined purely by tax biases. The risk of these rents becoming dissipated in the form of capital accumulation to discourage potential competition from unregulated substitutes could explain why, in some cases, regulators are apparently reluctant to leave rents. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_1995_num_119_3_5735 |
