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Titre Choix de mécanismes incitatifs dans les contrats agri-environnementaux
Auteur Michel Trommetter, Alban Richard
Mir@bel Revue Economie et prévision
Numéro no 145, 2000/4
Rubrique / Thématique
Économie Publique Appliquée
Page 145-155
Résumé anglais The choice of incentive mechanisms in agri-environmental contracts by Alban Richard and Michel Trommetter In the light of economic and environmental objectives, agri-environmental measures seek the incentive mechanism best suited to reduce the level of negative externalities or to generate positive externalities in farms. The objective of this paper is to build a model of the interaction between public authorities and farmers. This model of the sequential-behaviour type (possibility of revising some decisions), indispensable for tackling dynamic interactions between governmental decisions and farmers, by making allowance for unforeseen events and for a learning process in the course of the contract. The simulations show the respective influence of the variables, in the model, on the optimal level of incentive for heterogeneous farmers.
Source : Éditeur (via Persée)
Article en ligne http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6120