| Titre | Asymétries d'information, coûts de mandat et financement des entreprises françaises (1890-1936) | |
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| Auteur | Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur | |
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Revue | Revue économique |
| Numéro | vol. 50, no. 5, 1999 | |
| Page | 1053-1087 | |
| Résumé |
Asymmetric information, agency costs and the financing of french firms, 1890-1936
The period from 1890 to 1939 is characterized by a paradox: on one side, high agency costs should hinder the development of a market for private securities and especially for shares, since information is seldom and highly asymmetric between savers and firm's managers, and a very unrestrictive regulation allows the owner-managers to appropriate easily the firm's assets. At the same time, the capital market registers an important growth of private quotations and issues. This paper presents this paradox and examines the influence of agency costs on individual Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Résumé anglais |
This article studies, within the matching model of equilibrium unemployment, the macroeconomic consequences of discriminatory recruitment decisions. Unemployed workers can be distinguished according to an extrinsec characteristic which does not affect their productivity (the impact of unemployement exposure on mental-health for instance). A discrimination against some of the unemployed individuals leads to higher real wages and a higher unemployment rate. The welfare of employed workers is improved. At the opposite, discrimination is harmful to both firms and long-term unemployed. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/reco_0035-2764_1999_num_50_5_410131 |
