Contenu du sommaire : Israël après les élections

From Iranian nuclear issues to consequences of the Arab uprisings, the Israeli authorities do not have to look far to find serious concerns. The Palestinian issue, avoided for some time, could come back as the hot topic of 2013. In Israel, the cost of the status quo with respect to the Palestinian issue is considered negligible. This perception is erroneous for several reasons, including the fact that the prospect of a new Intifada is not improbable.

The Israeli army is preparing to carry out various operations, some at the gates of the country, and some thousands of miles away. Israeli technological superiority, however, does not guarantee invulnerability. The IDF faces sociological changes that could weaken it, potentially unreliable antimissile devices, the emergence of new – particularly cyber – threats, and more strained relations with the U.S., its main arms supplier.

Despite instability in the Middle East, the Israeli economy is doing well. Since the right came to power in 1977, a liberal policy has been implemented. Successive governments have privatized dozens of public operations, lowered employers' costs, and taken steps to foster innovation. Israel has become a “start-up nation”. The brazen economic success of the country, however, has not failed to create strong social imbalances.

Has the Israeli electorate shifted to the right, as a number of commentators have suggested over the past few years? It is probably less a move to the right and more a dissatisfaction with the inability of the parties on the left to manage the peace process and fully address the issue of security for Israeli people. Right-wing parties do not actually attract fundamental memberships: it is simply that the left has hardly anything to offer. The reconstruction of a democratic left party is certainly possible but it will take time.

Israeli elections in January 2013 resulted in a decline of the right, a failure of the left, and a major breakthrough by the center. This election showed the depth of the divisions cutting through Israeli society. The opposition between secular and religious groups is particularly acute when it comes to the question of military service, from which Orthodox Jews are exempt. The Palestinian issue, however, played a marginal role in the campaign.

Looking beyond the basic interests of power, Russia's present position in the Middle East can be explained by a rejection of Islamism and Westernism. As radicalism directly threatens the Federation, Moscow has been persuaded to reach out to regimes that fight against it. As a manifestation of the ethnocentrism of democracies which attempt to ensure their domination, Occidentalism pushes Russia to oppose interventionism in the region of Western powers, all the while affirming a civilizational mission.

Its relationship with the Middle East is a central element of Russia's energy calculations. The power held by OPEC in determining oil pricing has pushed Moscow to strengthen its ties with countries dominant within the cartel – Saudi Arabia, for example. The uncertainty of the regional situation (development of the Arab Spring, crisis in Syria, problems in Iran, etc.) could still disrupt Russia's strategy and its position in the Middle East.

Russia has varied interests entwined in the Syrian conflict. The supplying of armaments has easily survived beyond the collapse of the USSR. On the other hand, Moscow has also traditionally defended Christian minorities in the region, while at the same time supporting the Alawite regime of secularism that stands up to Islamist temptations. More broadly, Russia has reinserted itself into the Middle East, while reaffirming its divergence from the West's principle of non-interference.

The end of the USSR has allowed Moscow to radically redefine its relationship with Israel. Russian immigration into the country, continued economic exchanges (even in armaments), and shared concerns about the consequences of the Arab Spring explain the development of an ongoing relationship. Moscow seeks dialogue with all stakeholders in the Middle East. At the same time, Israel is pushing a policy that aims to deal with Iranian threats to the Caucasus.

Though they have historically been close, Moscow and Tehran have had to redefine their relationship following the demise of the USSR. This relationship entails, among other things, different approaches to political developments in the Middle East, ambiguous cooperation on nuclear and conventional weapons and a shared perspective on the Syrian crisis. Both capitals should nevertheless take care to make sure that their positions on the latter do not alienate major players in the region.

Coming out of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party, China has a new management team. This group will walk in the footsteps of Jiang Zemin and pursue economic reforms. At the political level, the ultimate goal remains maintaining the stability of the system. Chinese leaders, however, have learned from the Arab Spring and know that they must make some guarantees to the population, especially concerning the fight against corruption.

Though the EU and Russia perpetuate the appearance of cordial relations, neither is satisfied by the frameworks of their cooperation. In areas formerly controlled by the USSR, they have competing interests that threaten to crystallize into political and economic rival blocks. The EU and Russia will not get past this impasse unless they radically redefine the common goals of their cooperation, for the sake of the development of the continent.

Pakistan supports the work of insurgent groups in Afghanistan in order to sever ties between New Delhi and Kabul and to ensure strategic depth in the event of a possible conflict with India. To do this, Islamabad has accepted a certain permeability with respect to its Afghan border and has taken the risk of reevaluating the dispute of the Durand Line: Kabul has always denounced it as a legacy of colonialism, while the Taliban has always refused its legitimacy.