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Presentation of the Metrics Model, in collaboration with the Inséé and Direction de la prévision. The Metric model built jointly by the Inséé and the Direction de la prévision has been used regularly since 1976 to forecast the economic evolution and to evaluate the economic policy. In the recent years, however, the economic outlock has turned more complex so that it became necessary to rewiev the most important behaviour patterns. This article is an introduction to Metricx, the quarterly reference model currently used by the Inséé and the Direction de la prévision. The basic structure of the original model has been conserved, but the overall coherency has been improved, particularly with regard to factor call-up and the price-wage loop, while the dynamics of the equations has been refined. After defining the Keynesian structure and the main equations of the model, the article analyses the functioning of the different blocks and compares certain results with those obtained using the Metric and other French economic models. JEL: 132-122

Analysis of the Metricx devaluation variant, by Patrick Bœuf, Pierre Ralle. The re-estimation of the Metric model has led to a considerable modification of the profiles of certain variants and of the quantitative information to be had by comparing them. The differences are particularly marked in the case of the devaluation variant, which raises the question of the how this economic policy device should be appreciated normatively. It was thus considered necessary to identify the sources of uncertainty and explain how the two models diverge. With this in mind, sensitivity tests were carried out for the main parameters considered in this variant, with a description thereof. JEL: 122-431

Study of call for tender procedures with regard to price-quality combinations, by Dominique Bureau, Michel Norotte, Patrick Rey. Recent experience has given rise to an extension of call for tender procedures linked to changing trends in public service management methods or the redefinition thereof: although they are of very different types, operations such as the sale of television broadcasting channels, transport services to and from Orly or the Channel tunnel are all cases in point. Although it is common practice to leave a certain amount of leeway in terms of technical characteristics, theamount of technological leeway given to bidders in these cases seems quite exceptional. In fact this trend towards the introduction of quality parameters in the competitive allocation of public contracts appears very general and leads for example to preference being given to the call for tenders to the detriment of "adjudications", which only take into account the cost variable. Thus the value of systematically stating the consequences of grouping price and quality in the same contract offer extends beyond the exceptionnal cases mentioned above. A study of this kind leads to some finely shaded conclusions. In the first analysis, the procedures in which the bidders offer a combined price-quality package appear preferable, for they afford less opportunity for them to avoid competition as seen by Bertrand. This reasoning can be proven false in certain contexts, however, for example when the buyer's criteria are vague, or when various calls for tenders of the same type are called for. In this last case, the broader spread of possible gain in the case of combined price-quality offers may create the ideal conditions for collusion between buyers. This collusion is thus brought about purely and simply by the threat of punishment entailed in their strategies, in the absence of any illegal institutional cooperation. Basically, therefore, the appropriate procedure must be chosen by examining the merits of each case as it arises. JEL: 132-431