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The Sociology of Law was present in the R.I.T.D. published by Kelsen, Duguit and Weyr since 1926. But this matter was considered the same way it was understood in Europe at that time, that is to say like a matter strictly linked — or in an absolute dependance — to philosophy and legal Theory. From this paper, we easïly understand that Kelsen kept his fidelity to the anathema started against the Natural-Law doctrine. Moreover, Kelsen gave, in negative, good contributions to the study of nature and duties of the Sociology of Law : he particularly helped the further development of a sociology upon the idea of Justice.

Dworkin's success in anglo-saxon countries can be explained by the function of his theory : against realists and positivists he insists that judges do not make, but only apply law and he thus provides a justification for juridical review of legislation against the background of the theory of democracy. On the other hand he seems to reniew the debate between natural law and legal positivism and represents a legal philosophy for the benefit of practicing lawyers. It is a probability that this success will extend to continental law countries.

Professor Dworkin criticises legal positivism, concentrating particularly on the version provided by Professor Hart. According to Hart, law is a system of rules. In reality, Dworkin argues law also consists of other standards which cannot be assimilated to the category of a rule. Principles are a particular example. Positivists also argue that when there is no clear rule to guide them, judges must make new law in the exercise of their discretion. Dworkin argues, on the contrary, that judges are usually bound by existing principles in the law and don't have a creative role that positivism seems to assign to them. He examines the way in which these principles are in fact deployed in legal decisions.

In this chapter, Professor Dworkin compares judges to writers who are collaborating on the production of a collective work. Each of them, one after the other, contributes a chapter to the growing whole. At each stage the author has to take account of preceding chapters, doing his best to add to the work so that its best qualities are brought out. In the same way judges, in interpreting the body of legal rules and institutions, must place this corpus in its best light while adding to it.

Lawyers are typically concerned with propositions of law. How are we to understand their meaning and how is this related to their truth conditions ? After criticising the answers offered by positivism to these questions, Dworkin argues that propositions of law must be grasped as interpretations, the object of which is to justify the settled law. They are true to the extent to which they provide an adequate justification of that body of law.

The authors compare their points of view in order to attempt to express what, in their opinion, is the exact situation of the contemporary sociology of law, the nature and its production. They endeavour to point out the obstacles the discipline is confronted with. First, they note that this discipline is, from its origin, in quest of an identity. They attribute this difficulty to the dual approach of the discipline, which by definition is at the boundary of two learnings, of two fields of knowledge... of two fields of influence. After going through a rational and comprehensive evaluation of the produced literature, the authors try to show that the duality, which has been brought into light, is not necessarily a failing but rather an essential component, a characteristic linked to the nature of sociology of law which cannot work out validly (be validly effective) without going through a double approach, such as Janus who, despite his two faces... is, by no means, a monster.