Contenu du sommaire : La sémantique logique : Problèmes d'histoire et de méthode

La sémantique logique : Problèmes d'histoire et de méthode. Frédéric Nef [Dir.]

• Articles

  • Présentation - Frédéric Nef p. 3-3
  • Conspectus de Sémantique intensionnelle, suivi d'une bibliographie - Frédéric Nef p. 5-18
  • Sur la sémantique frégéenne des énoncés - Philippe de Rouilhan p. 19-36
  • Théorie de la signification et théorie de la nomination - François Clementz p. 37-68
    Meaning Theory and Naming Theory. It is the contention of this article that Russell's views on meaning and reference should be approached from the standpoint of the nomen/ nominatum relationship, which The Principles of Mathematies regarded as paradigmatic for · the more generalquestion of how language is tied to reality. At the same time, Russell's twofold account of naming provides a good illustration of the kind of espistemological requirements the principle of acquaintance places upon the philosophy of language. The final section of the article tries to appraise Russell's contribution to the semantic theory of proper names, beyond his well-known thesis that «ordinary» proper names are truncated or telescoped descriptions.
  • Counterpartese, counterpartese*, counterpartese D - Fabrizio Mondadori p. 69-94
    Counterpartese, Counterpartese*, Counterpartesen · «Counterpartese, Counterpartese*, CounterparteseD» is a c. ritical examination of some aspects of David Lewis' Counterpart Theory. 1 first briefly discuss the main points of Lewis' theory, and examine, and dismiss, two superficially convincing, but in fact unsatisfactory, objections to it. Then 1 take up the question of how the notion of a counterpart and that of possibility de re are related, and of whether or not Lewis' theory provides a correct interpretation of ordinary modal discourse: my conclusion is that it fails to account for what 1 calI the literal de re status of modality de re, quite independently of whether it is evaluated inside, or outside, the context of realism about possible worlds. 1 discuss, next, a rather intriguing trait of the notion of possibility that realism about possible worlds involves: i. e., that «possible» in «possible world» expresses a relative, and not an absolute, property of a world. 1 show, finally, that, depending on the notion of an essential property it employs, Counterpart Theory can easily accommodate such divergent metaphysical doctrines as indeterminism and superessentialism.
  • La logique intensionnelle et l'héritage de Frege en sémantique - Pascal Engel p. 95-116
    Intensional Logic and the Fregean Heritage in Semantics. Although Frege's logic and «semantics» inspired most later developments, neither Carnap nor Church, who used fregean ideas to build their systems, were faithful to these. The fregean heritage has been distorted in two ways: intensional logic obliterates the distinction between concepts and objects, and Frege recommends an extensional · treatment of logic. This paper tries to restate the fregean doctrine of functions by using combinatory logic, and defends the «neo-fregean» point of view of a logical semantics based on Tarski's theory of truth and Davidson's programme for the semantics of natural language.
  • Did Montague invent "Montague Grammar"? - William E. McMahon p. 117-137
    Did Montague Invent «Montague Grammar»? Is Montague Grammar a variant of categorial grammar? After a careful examination of Ajdukiewicz's, Bar Hillel's and Bochenski's categorial theories, the author says in conclusion that Montague Grammar is not reducible to Ajdukiewicz categorial grammar and that it is not simply a categoriaI grammar. There is in Montague Grammar a synthesis of recent developments in logical theory which transcends categorial theory. But we have to make a distinction between assessing its originality and accepting its empirical relevance.
  • La "logique intensionnelle"est-elle vraiment intensionnelle ? - Jean-Pierre Desclés p. 139-151
    Is the «lntensional Logic» Truly Intensional? Starting from an analysis of a concept as «course-of-values» in Grundgsetze (the Basic Laws of Arithmetic) of Frege, the A. proposes a new characterization of intensionaI equality vs extensional equality. This opposition belongs to a project for defining clearly the duaiity intensioniextension by means oÏ mathematical anà logic tools (combinatory logic and topology -theories of topoi and sheaves -). This approach is closely connected with an adequate formalization of traditional and classic viewpoints in logic, for instance with Leibnitz's views. It is not clear that the actual «intensionallogic» constructed from the works of Karnap, Church and Montague is connected with the classic and old problem of the intension. The linguistics needs an intensional approach for treatinf examples with negation in natural languages.
  • Présupposition et intension - Pierre-Yves Raccah p. 153-162
    Presupposition and Intension. ln this paper, I argue for the adequacy of formal approaches to the description of meaning, even in cases of expressions conveying conventionaI implicature. By formal approaches, I mean frameworks intended to account for sentence meaning, and meeting the conditions of compositionnality, autonomy towards knowledge and beliefs about the world, and modularity. I first show that presupposition, instead of being considered as a relation between a sentence (or an utterance) and another sentence (or, at best, a proposition), should rather be seen as a relation between a sentence and a meaning. Besides avoiding the presupposition-entailment paradox, this position is shown to allow a compositionnal treatment of presupposition, using, for instance, Karttunen and Peters' tools. 1 then give the bases of a «representation al semantics», that aims at freeing semantic description from both speakers» intentions and truth conditions. 1 conclude with a couple of examples of semantic analyses for sentences containing intensional verbs such as «savoir» or «espérer», and show how these analyses fulfill the task they were ascribed. Some questions are left open as to the generalization of this treatment to other intensional cases, and as to the exact shape meaning representations should have.
  • Les expressions déictiques en théorie des modèles et en théorie de la vérité - Daniel Laurier p. 163-193
    Indexical Expressions in Model Theory and in Truth Theory. 1 defend Davidson's truth-theoretic approach to the semantics of natural language as against the form of model-theoretic semantics exemplified in Kaplan (1979b). First 1 question Kaplan's assumption that the actuality operator is an indexical, on the ground that it · is irnproper to speak of the world of the utterance. 1 then point out sorne properties of genuinely indexical utterances that Kaplan's logic of demonstrative seems unable to account for. It turns out that these properties, as weIl as Kaplan's basic insights, can be captured in a truth-theoretic framework without assuming an ontology of possible worlds.
  • La sémantique des situations - Paul Gochet p. 195-211
    Situation Semantics. Situation semantics is set off against the historical background provided by former important contributions to formai semantics such as Frege's, Russell ' s, Camap's, Hintikka's, Kanger's and Montague's. Føllesdal's distinction between opacity and intensionality is brought to bear on the issue. The traditional problem raised by the search for identification criteria for propositions is examined in the light of recent work done in model theory.
  • L'opérateur intensionnel "savoir" - Robert Martin p. 213-227
    The Intensional operator «savoir» (to know). It is undertaken to explain that the following forms * Je ne sais pas que p (I do not know that p) * Je sais si p (I know if p), which present difficulties of reception, may however be used under certain conditions, notably in connection with the verb «dire» (to say): Je ne sais pas que p = «Je dirai/tu diras que je ne sais pas que p») (1 do not know that p = «I will say /You will say that I do not know that p») Je sais si p = «Je le sais, mais je ne le dirai pas» (I know if p = «I know it, but I will not say it»). The notion which is used is that of the universe of belief, and it is attempted to demonstrate that it is more advantageous in linguistics than a plurality of epistemic worlds. The difference between (ne pas) savoir/ dire que p «not) to know/ to say that p) and (ne pas) savoir/ dire si p «not) to know/ to say if p) lies essentially in the fact that the conjunction que (that) signifies the explication of p in at least one universe of belief (either taken into account or rejected) whereas the indirect interrogative si (if) leaves the value of p inexplicated.
  • Logique de programmeset sémantique intensionnelle - Eric Audureau, Luis Farinas Del Cerro p. 229-240