Contenu du sommaire : La guerre du Golfe (1991) : continuités et ruptures dans l'art occidental de la guerre

Many tactical and strategic trends come into play with the 1991 Gulf War. Using pgms and advanced sensors in innovative ways, it brought forth a modernized and enduring version of air power. However lopsided the overall military result, Desert Storm also exhibited several operational shortcomings: the air campaign failed to shut down the Iraqi regime and its communication systems, or to destroy scud launchers and the Republican Guard. Even less appreciated were the strategic characteristics of the war and their implications: a coalition entirely directed by the United States, denying its allies most of their responsibilities; an unequal combat that drove future adversaries to rely on asymmetric techniques and wmds; and finally, a strange inability to capitalize on the military success and turn it into a lasting victory. The new paradigm of war that emerged in 1991 has thus proved a blessing and a curse, whose legacy is still with us today.

During the Gulf War (1990-1991), the French Navy participated actively in the building of the coalition against Iraq, but when the enforcement operations had reached their limits, it was excluded from combat operations even in the liberation of Kuwait. For the entirety of the French Armed Forces in the Gulf War, their response to the triple challenge of the magnitude of the conflict, the nature of new combat operations, and the need to operate within a joint allied command brought into question the efficacy of the French model in staging overseas operations in the aftermath of the Cold War.

In the history of amphibious warfare, the Gulf War provides a perfect model for naval action: the Marines afloat and cruising along the Saudi coastline, holding in place a large number of Iraqi divisions and thus contributing to the success of Desert Storm in terms of ground manœuvres. Detailed analysis leads to this conclusion: the Iraqi defence forces were over-estimated, and Allied anxiety about heavy casualties, especially as a result of the minefields, had the effect of limiting amphibious operations to raids and feints. But the leading virtue of this operation lies in the fact that an active reserve, led by the commander of an integrated Allied force, could be redirected. This will also result in a transformation of US naval doctrine.

The Gulf War is essentially an air-and-land operation in which the air factor is decisive. This unprecedented situation results from a series of factors related to the characteristics of the theater, to the morale of the Iraqi forces, to the introduction of a number of new techniques in the field of communications and weapons, but also to the imagination of the Joint Chiefs, who understood the advantages they could take by using this third dimension of the air. Desert Storm also marks the revival of the doctrine of victory through air power.

The two operations, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, are the first to prove beyond doubt the operational value of space systems. Indeed, space systems, ranging from military to civilian and commercial satellites, were involved in the operations from the planning stage. The use of space resources then took on a totally original role in the form of “amplified efficiency.” This war has thus produced a revolution in military planning, showing that the use of space systems can be applied not only to strategic operations but, possibly at least, to tactical operations too. It has had the effect of a catalyst, broadening the tasks assigned to satellites and accelerating the process. Finally, one can argue that the Gulf War has paved the way to a space doctrine leading to a new concept of warfare.

Following the Gulf War, the French Minister of Defence commissioned the Contrôle général des armées to examine the formation and operations of the Daguet division for the purpose of drawing lessons from the French commitment. The mission was entrusted to Inspector-General Ricalens (Contrôleur général des armées) and a team of a dozen other inspectors. General Hervouët (Contrôleur des armées) was given responsibility for auditing the part played by the Air Force. His report, issued in July 1991, was recently declassified. After an analysis of the context in which this investigation was carried out, the report studies the performance of the aviation elements of the Daguet division, in France and in action in the theater.

Pierre Naville, a member of the New Left in France and a specialist on Clausewitz, provides a precise study of the different strategic, political, economic and diplomatic mechanisms governing the wars in Indochina and Korea, and shows how US power, face to face with the Soviet and Chinese blocs, tries to exert control over most of Southeast Asia, from Japan to the Philippines, from Indonesia to Vietnam, an expression of super-imperialism both insular and peninsular.Ancien surréaliste, dirigeant du mouvement trotskiste de 1929 à 1939, Pierre Naville au sortir de la guerre se tourne vers la nouvelle gauche, déterminé à renouveler le courant socialiste et à servir la cause des travailleurs aux prises avec le système capitaliste et son impérialisme dominateur. Directeur de La Revue internationale, membre du comité directeur du Parti socialiste unitaire, P. Naville s'applique dans le cadre de la guerre d'Indochine et de la guerre de Corée à distinguer les mécanismes de lutte politique et militaire de chaque camp et à dessiner les grandes lignes d'affrontement géostratégique des deux blocs au cœur de l'Asie du Sud-Est.

This article re-examines the book by General Mangin, La Force noire, by recounting, in a very succinct manner, the debates over the conscription, prior to the First World War, of native peoples, as well as the armed resistance in French-occupied Algeria, between 1914 and 1918, that resulted from the four phases of conscription, the economic punctures, and the role of Blaise Diagne (whom Clemenceau appointed Commissaire de la République). It reveals the ways in which 200,000 Senegalese Tirailleurs were put into action on the European, Oriental and African fronts, draws up a balance sheet of their casualties, and probes the effect, in the collective subconscious, of countless propaganda efforts based on race.