Contenu du sommaire : La Russie

Russia's economy is intertwined in global markets, but is increasingly controlled by a patrimonial authoritarian Russian state that allows elites to use and maintain political power for distributing wealth among patrons and clients. Transimperialism is the Russian leadership's attempt to access the fruits of globalization and yet sustain patrimonial authoritarianism at home. Europe and the United States should not isolate Russia, but neither should they allow the Kremlin to participate in globalized markets without following the rules of free enterprise. The best path to an integrated Russia is a transatlantic strategy of engagement with free market economy that involves Russian society and business and maintains high standards for investment and trade.

Russia's foreign policy is powered by interests rather than ideals or ideologies. Big money and supreme power are closely intertwined. The Kremlin considers Russia's energy abundance to be its principal comparative advantage in the global competition. Within the former Soviet Union, it seeks preponderance rather than integration; with the European Union, Russia seeks a relationship of equals built on mutual interests; toward the United States, it asserts its independence and is prepared to work on a quid pro quo basis. In the longer term, the quality of the relations will depend on the depth and speed of Russia's modernization efforts. Russia's capitalism, rather than Russian democracy, is the thing to watch.

A close study of what is a wide reaching foreign policy leads to a number of contradictory conclusions. It is necessary to acknowledge that Vladimir Putin, despite having to overcome a number of hurdles, has managed to expand Russia's options, even if his strategic choices have not always made sense. This has resulted in a measure of uncertainty which favors tactics over strategy. The Russian president has defined a policy which could be encapsulated in the following play-off: maintaining freedom to maneuver so as to do nothing. This play-off will be analyzed through the prism of historical constants (an outline of the theaters, strategic constructs, and energy resources) and of current issues (Iran, diplomatic positions, and regional integration projects).

The latest developments in Russia – the crack down on independent media, the attack on Mikhail Khodorkovsky who built the most profitable and most transparent companies in Russia, and finally the results of the December 2003 Duma elections which brought about the disappearance from the Douma of liberal democratic parties – all demonstrate that post-communist Russia is settling in for a long, grey period of semiauthoritarian rule. This essay outlines the evolution of Vladimir Putin's regime, his attitud toward Yeltsin's legacy, his perception of his own mission and his strategic agenda for Russia. The author's goal is to demonstrate that Putin's regime within the Russian historical context is yet another version of personified, monolithic, traditional power. How is Putin going to reconcile his two opposite sides – that of economic reformer and pro-Western leader – and democratic backslider? How sustainable is his pro-Western choice? What does Russia have in store during Putin's second presidency – these are the questions raised in this essay.

Vladimir Putin's Russia is evolving in contradictory ways: its impressive economic progress, fueled by oil and gas exports, is counterbalanced by retrograde political trends. These ambivalent vectors, combined with Russia's increasingly assertive regional conduct, will pose major policy challenges in 2006. The US and the EU have important security interests vis-à-vis Russia but declining leverage, making Transatlantic coordination imperative.

This article examines the transformations which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The author analyses the functioning of institutions and new developments within Russia (the issues of alternative elections, separation of powers, decentralization, and “pluralist” media). He at the same time looks at the transformations which the old institutions have undergone (the institutions of the army, the security services, the judiciary, education and research). He also considers new phenomenons specific to a highly bureaucratized Russian market economy (the “oligarchs”, the “clans”, the “teams”, “privatized” state areas of action and structures). According to the author, the Russian regime distinguishes itself from that of developed democracies not only through the existence of “superfluous elements”, but also through the presence of “institutional gaps” which exist between the State and society as a result of the latter's inability to organise itself politically and defend its interests.

This article examines the impact of natural resource wealth on Russian political life. Viewed from a political perspective, what is striking is not how well Russia conforms to the stereotype of a resource-based political economy but how well it has (so far) resisted many of the institutional and political pathologies associated with the “resource curse”. There is little reason to think that Russia's policy would be much healthier if it had less resource wealth. Nevertheless, it seems that Russia's resource wealth does pose dangers to its political development. The crucial issue is not the nature of the resources themselves but the location of those resources in an institutional environment that is ill-equipped to cope with the pressures and problems that such wealth can create.

Russia's relationship with China is complex and contradictory. Bilateral ties are more substantive and multifaceted than ever before, the two countries agree on most regional and international questions, and China is a major customer of Russian arms and energy. However, Moscow is increasingly uneasy about China's transformation as the next global power and its implications for Russia's security and rank in the world. Balancing delicately between strategic convergence and suspicion, Sino-Russian partnership faces an uncertain future.

Since 2003 and after centuries of geopolitical competition, Russia and Turkey have drawn together in a new bilateral relationship. Expanding trade has been a major driving force behind this, but shared disillusionment with United States and European policies and attitudes, as well as increasing common ground on issues in the broader Black Sea region and further afield in the Middle East, have all played a role. At this juncture, the main impact of this new relationship is in Russia and Turkey's joint border area of the South Caucasus - with potentially negative implications for the fragile state of Georgia and for the European Union's new “Neighborhood Policy” in the region.

Since early 2005, Chechnya has become like the eye of a storm that has been gathering force across the region. Growing social anger has been the main source of energy for this storm and it is increasingly channeled through clandestine Islamic networks. Moscow was obviously taken by surprise with this escalation and its reaction was intended to suppress “terrorist cells” by a massive use of force. The swift resolution of the October 2005 crisis in Nalchik was interpreted as a victory for this policy; however, a brush-fire of criminalized violence and an underground fire of Islamic radicalism have continued to spread. The issue is not that Russia could fail to defend the North Caucasus against an Islamic uprising; it is whether there is enough survivability in its own body politic.

Increasing the number of actors participating in the daily dialogue between Russia and the EU can not only contribute to solving important issues surrounding these bilateral relations but also, more broadly speaking, those surrounding the integration process within Europe itself. The inclusion of business representatives and nonprofit organizations in this process would make it easier to gage the different social, economic, and political behaviors within “Old Europe” and overcome the “democratic deficit” resulting from the absence of citizen participation in the management of Russia-EU relations, and its monopolization by state bureaucracies.

The relationships between the EU, NATO and Russia are of great significance for all their actors and for regional security more broadly. And indeed good progress has been made – formal relationships have been established and there has been some practical cooperation in a number of areas. However, there is no “triangle” – ambiguity and contradiction mar all the relationships, which are dogged by a number of conflicting interests. Moreover, it is clear that a number of constituencies on all sides do not seek similar developments, for a number of reasons. EU-NATO cooperation therefore remains problematic, and the West's relations with Russia are by no means past some “point of no return”, to the confrontation of the past half century.

Russia and the European Union have clearly entered a new stage in their energy relations, defined by a growing asymmetry between a strengthened national monopoly on the supply side and a gradual opening of markets in Europe. A multitude of new approaches to EU-Russia relations have been voiced recently: many of them involve “defensive” solutions, driven by lack of mutual trust on both sides. Competition is a key universal value in the development of a new and sustainable energy relationship. EU competition regulators should take the lead in setting up a new framework: its success will not only determine the security of energy supply for European consumers, but also that of the Russian and Eurasian energy markets.