Contenu du sommaire : La Méditerranée stratégique

‘Territorialisation' of sea areas results from increasing pressure on coastal nations to ensure better control over their economic and strategic areas of interest. This is even more true for the Mediterranean, given that the discovery of oil and gas deposits is leading to increased tension in the area. There is an urgent need for governments to find solutions.

The eastern Mediterranean is rich in hydrocarbon deposits. This economic advantage is gradually becoming a factor of risk, increasing the discord and rivalry between nations on the littoral, each of which—Turkey in particular—is attempting to broaden its areas of exploration in parallel with increasing militarisation of sea areas.

Protecting the Mediterranean environment is not an option but an urgent and absolute necessity, given how the ecosystem is being attacked by the 450 million people living on its shores. Thankfully, protection effort has been underway for a number of years but it needs to be progressed further and broadened to cover new environmental risks.

North African economic markets are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of international monetary policies. The impact of jolts on the financial systems of economies in transformation has consequences in particular on the social level: populations are now manifesting their discontent.

Jihadism has long stamped its mark on Mediterranean countries, with a degree of violence that has attracted much of the youth in search of sensation for the current millennium. The break-up of the Sunni world makes establishing a vision of the future more complex, such are the rivalries and the schisms that divide the players—even those who claim jihad.

The return of combatants from Syria poses some difficulty, since apart from the legal aspects there is a need to set up a form of psychological support for those individuals affected by brutality and violence. These returning people represent a danger if they are not taken in hand: there is therefore a need to keep a step ahead of this unavoidable movement.

The eastern Mediterranean sees all forms of geopolitical tension arising from power challenges. On land, Russia and Iran have increased their influence to the detriment of the United States, which nevertheless remains powerful on the sea with its Sixth Fleet. Among the major absentees is Europe, incapable of showing any real presence.

The current instability of countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean is witness to the fragility of those states which are having trouble facing up to the challenges of demography and economic development. Then often-present strategic rivalry means that those on the northern shore—in other words, Europeans—need to be aware of the scale of the situation.

There are indications that the Levant could be making its way out of the crisis in which it has been drowning for many years. Regional and international players have been moving their pawns about this complex chessboard, yet there are many matters that influence strategic decisions including the irreversible marginalisation of Europe to the benefit of Russia, the main winner of the game.

Libya post-Gaddafi is once again in crisis with Field Marshal Haftar's offensive on Tripoli. The country is divided among players preferring military solutions to political discussions. Matters are at a total impasse, since the protagonists continue to confront each other in defence of their own interests to the detriment of broader negotiations.

The Balkans is a strategically pivotal area, too often neglected by the European Union and controlled by regional players that include mafia, nationalist parties and Turkey. Ancestral hatred remains, despite suspension of war, and only a coherent development policy will be able to obviate a return of tension.

The Maghreb is complex and beset with rifts and yet it has remarkable potential—an asset not only for the southern part of the Mediterranean but also for the northern, in which France is a favoured partner that understands and respects the current dynamic.

The Franco-Algerian relationship has been complex since independence, with some periods of rapprochement and others of mutual defiance. Despite that, the bonds are strong and do not leave the governments indifferent, since developments in Algeria have an impact on France and the future of the relationship will depend on decisions to be made about it.

The United States, which once had a strong presence in the eastern Mediterranean, has reduced its effort in view of other priorities. The return of Russia to the region, and the Chinese activities there, could nevertheless lead Washington not to withdraw and to seek new forms of partnership and of presence.

Russia has re-established a highly active position in the Mediterranean that combines military hard power with the soft power that comes from increased presence, in Cyprus in particular. Moscow could increase its influence through adoption of effective stances, including with Turkey, and through long-term presence—in military bases in Syria in particular.

China is pursuing an ambitious policy in the Mediterranean with actions combining economic projects with the new Silk Routes and naval deployments from its base in Djibouti. Beijing's presence in Piraeus is concrete evidence of the value to China of this maritime dimension.

China is developing a carefully thought-out strategy regarding the countries on the northern shores of the Mediterranean, with commercial alliances and partnerships to boost its commerce. Beijing is playing a crafty game: its easily established bilateral relationships risk weakening a henceforth more vigilant European Union.

Since the return of democracy in 1978, Spanish foreign policy has been boosted by a multilateral approach intended to give Madrid a role on the international stage. Following an economically difficult decade from 2008 to 2018, Spain needs to revisit its aims and take on new ambitions.

Italy is by nature a Mediterranean power with a will to play a central role in the area, to the extent of risking rivalry with partners such as France. Because of this, the Italian Navy is an essential asset even if the battle against migrants seems to have eclipsed other matters, in doing so risking a degree of isolation.

Turkey has a complex relationship with the Mediterranean because of historic, strategic rivalry that continues to develop in a conflict-ridden region. Recent elements of its foreign policy are calling into question previously-accepted practices. Hence uncertainty and ambiguity reign.

Cyprus, a member country of the European Union, faces an aggressive attitude from Turkey. Ankara seeks to bring its weight to bear on the economic potential of the hydrocarbon deposits. The European Union—and France in particular—cannot ignore this and must face up to its responsibilities.

The discovery of hydrocarbons in the eastern Mediterranean is shaking up regional balances with new perspectives for discussions and regional cooperation. This oil and gas manna ought to improve the resources of some countries in the area, yet Turkey appears to be marginalised in this geopolitical reorganisation.

Under President Sissi, Egypt is gradually recovering a central position on the regional map with its willingness for dialogue, often discreet though it be, with the majority of its neighbours. The fight against Islamic terrorism is fairly effective in the country, but economic recovery is the other major challenge for the regime.

The Mediterranean represents for Israel a major challenge for many reasons, not least the strategic depth it affords. The discovery of hydrocarbons has added a further dimension of economic advantages but also of constraints related to the protection of the assets used for exploitation of the resource. Israel should take greater account of this maritime approach.

The Gulf States are present and active in a number of countries around the Mediterranean Sea, a penetration that calls upon Islam and financial support. Nevertheless, effort is dispersed and subject to national objectives, which in turn result from rivalry between the same Gulf States, each of which is attempting to establish its own client base.