Contenu du sommaire : La France, acteur stratégique ?

France still sees itself as a top-rank strategic actor, and yet the facts show a distinct loss of influence. An aim of the 2022 presidential campaign should be to require a genuine in-depth review of our defence model and definition of a real strategy to confront the challenges of the future and not those of the past.

Europe is unable to cope with current geopolitical changes that have been accelerated by the health crisis. Although the country continues to make considerable effort on defence, France needs a stronger and more willing Union which must take into account the importance of security through investment to preserve its freedom.

Europe is discovering that it needs to affirm its independence, and thus that it needs a less peace-oriented diplomatic policy, yet France remains wary of European foreign policy initiatives. There is an urgent need for Paris to demonstrate its confidence through more European political moves.

Since the very beginning of the Fifth Republic the relationship between France and Europe has been complex and ambivalent. The appeal for a powerful Europe has been seen as calling NATO into question. The Covid-19 crisis has forced Europeans to take a new look at their sovereignty, for which a more overall approach is essential.

In a world undergoing rapid geopolitical development transformations have become complex and necessitate better understanding of the mechanisms at work. That means we must have access to powerful tools for analysing the movement of the tectonic plates of strategy.

Does France still have a grand strategy ? Is it still recognised as a credible actor on the international stage or is it, to the vexation of its leaders, no more than a largely downgraded power ? Such questioning is needed today if we are to be better able to confront tomorrow's challenges.

Defence, and particularly aeronautics, are areas of intense industrial competition in which Europe faces the United States and China. In the face of this competition, French and European companies can have clear advantages but only if there is a genuine political will to invest in preparation for the future.

September's German elections will set Berlin's foreign policy and defence decisions in stone for a long time to come. The probable establishment of a coalition will weigh upon the projects to be supported at a time when Europe needs the well-founded commitment of the top economic power of the Union.

Since the beginning of his five-year term, President Macron has expressed his strategic ambitions for Europe, though not without difficulty in getting lines to move and in overcoming European inertia. The overall diplomacy he would wish for requires long-term effort and considerable asset support.

Industry contributes directly to defence, and more than ever requires strong political will driven by the state. That means a long-term vision to prepare for the future. That also means a strategist state and a genuine European ambition.

The Sahel is confronted by a many-sided war in which inter-community conflicts become enmeshed with the fight against Jihadism. France is committed within this complex environment, yet there is growing strategic divergence between Paris and its partners in the Sahel. French strategy in the region needs to be reviewed.

Traditional instruments for conflict management have shown their limits in the crisis in the Sahel : lack of adaptation, excess administration and pointless competition are all difficulties that must be overcome through a new approach. This implies that African players and their partners have to build a genuine project.

The Béarn squadron has been present in all theatres of war and operations since the advent of military transport aviation. Its re-establishment, planned for the near future, and the arrival of the A400M means it will open a new chapter of history with this remarkable new aircraft, whose capabilities and performance are continually improving.

A second operational squadron equipped with the A400M, the Béarn squadron, will soon be entering service. It bears witness to the increasing use of the aircraft, whose operational capability is undergoing constant development. The A400M crews are fully committed to operations, and draw full benefit from a remarkable aircraft.

Saudi Arabia has taken note of its bad image and the need for reform. The heir apparent, Mohammed bin Salman, considers that progress has been made since his Vision 2030 plan was launched five years ago. There nevertheless remains much to do to consolidate this Saudi project.

The working time directive currently being studied by the EU court of justice is nonsensical and an aberration insofar as it affects military matters. Quite out of the question as regards operational issues, such a text would only serve to weaken our forces as well as the legitimacy of the court in a matter in which it is not competent.

Military establishments are increasingly constrained by environmental issues, which oblige them to adapt to new requirements. The story of Camp Century, an American base in Greenland, is a prime example of what might happen if the environment is not taken into account.

Medical advice to the command is an essential activity though one little known to the forces' medical service. It relies upon a relationship of confidence between doctor and commander and draws on experience, mutual respect and knowledge of each other's specialisation—all of which require consolidation in order to improve effectiveness.

The European Union has taken note of its total dependence on globalisation regarding economic issues and of its very weak strategic independence, given that its security is assured by NATO. It is therefore urgent and necessary to redefine what might be meant by such independence and therefore to propose a political objective.

Recent examples of naval operations have shown the use of information warfare for political ends. We need to think actively about this and to integrate the use of information in manœuvres right from the command's initial planning phase.

The war in Indochina was seriously disadvantageous for the Air Force, which had to begin essential modernisation in order to conduct its NATO mission to defend the European continent, and at the same time support the troops committed on the Indochinese peninsula with outdated materiel and limited personnel.