Contenu du sommaire : AUKUS, un an après

Whilst the Indo-Pacific may appear far from European preoccupations, the strategic dilemma now imposed upon Europe needs to be emphasised. Because of their interests in the region, Europeans cannot isolate themselves from the competition between the United States and China, which means that Euopean presence there should be increased.

The war in Ukraine has major implications for the Indo-Pacific. Japan is keeping a close watch on lessons being drawn from the conflict with a view to strengthening its own defence and deepening its military relationship with the United States. Tokyo has also to build the resilience of its country to continue to operate in case of crisis.

The South China Sea is the object of intense covetousness and claims, particularly by China, which is conducting a legal war—lawfare—to justify its actions apparently without great success, given the lack of international support.

The wars of influence taking place in the Indo-Pacific zone result from the confrontation of distinctly different societal models and opposing objectives. Growing regional bipolarity between China and the United States raises the question of the role of France. The latter must reaffirm its position and re-enter the game.

The announcement of the AUKUS alliance was presented in France as a strategic surprise, not to mention the humiliation caused. And yet isn't the question more one of over-estimation of French power? This power needs to be reinvented in the Indo-Pacific zone if it is once more to become credible.

Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait are the focus of the strategic divergence between China and the breakaway island supported by the United States. The US has SSNs which conduct a deterrent mission against the Chinese Navy, hence the Australian decision to acquire SSNs in the framework of the AUKUS alliance.

Rapidly-increasing developments in the Indo-Pacific strategic situation led to the Australian decision to acquire nuclear-powered attack submarines and with it the cancellation of the programme agreed with France. AUKUS demonstrates Canberra's ambition to be more active in the region.

The Australian decision in the AUKUS framework to go for nuclear propulsion in its new submarines poses new questions for the non-proliferation regime, which is associated with the NPT. The precedent created risks opening up a breach for other countries with varying levels of ambition in the military nuclear field, including Iran.

China plans its conquest of emerging technologies with exceptional effectiveness. The merging of research in civilian and military sectors allows acceleration of investment and a winning position on definition of standards, a stake in international competition dominated by the United States.

The American Grand Strategy in Indo-Pacific is evolving and adapting to take account of threats, and in particular those posed by China. Cyber deterrenceis one element of the strategy, with the development of resilient digital infrastructures which benefit regional partners. Nevertheless, competition is strong.

The hypersonic weapons currently available or under development open new strategic perspectives by conferring operational advantages on those nations which possess them. They increase uncertainty and disrupt traditional balances between powers. New power balances are rendered possible.

A characteristic of the Indo-Pacific is its extent, leading to areas over which it is difficult to maintain surveillance. The arms race is leading to ever-greater use of both air borne and maritime drones which act as effect multipliers, and which in turn risk increasing tensions in the absence of any real international cooperation.

The Indo-Pacific zone is a major area for maritime operations and is seeing a significan tincrease in maritime power, particularly with the use of submarines, a first-rate military asset. The number of programmes is increasing:some may lead to the use of nuclear propulsion.

The European Union adopted its Strategic Compass with the desire to be able to respond better to challenges posed by powers such as Russia and China. This implies an even greater level of ambition, in turn necessitating greater commitment by member states—all with the aim of strengthening our sovereignty.

The United States is developing a strategy of integrated deterrence which associates its allies in an approach based on coordination, innovation and cooperation. This goes beyond a purely military framework and aims to serve proactive diplomacy supported by a credible military force.

The Antarctic has a special legal status which provides for international civil cooperation. The area is nevertheless much coveted for geopolitical and economic reasons. China is more and more active there, and risks upsetting the status quo, which explains the Australian reaction and the affirmation of French ambition to maintain presence there.

AUKUS and the war in Ukraine might be leading to a significant rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. China, it is clear, has reaffirmed its support for Russia albeit without any material action, particularly military. That is not to exclude a deepening of the relationship in the future.

Vietnam maintains complex links with China and benefits from Beijing's help, especially in anticipating possible social unrest. There is also the question of preserving the Hanoi regime's national independence whilst managing its partners—be they China or the United States.

Indonesia makes great effort to maintain a reasonable balance in its relationships with the great powers, the United States, China and Russia. Jakarta's aim is above all to reinforce its strategic autonomy through modernising its defence and establishing stable and lasting cooperation.

ASEAN, which was founded in 1967, is now confronted by an AUKUS with a distinctly different approach to the role of regional pivot. Relations between the United States and the regional organisation continue to lack depth in both security and economic domains and must now be strengthened.

Russia has returned very actively to the African scene, benefiting in particular from exploitation of anti-French feeling in Mali. The Wagner Group is Moscow's strong arm, ready to support regimes without scrupules whose principal objective is to maintain hold on power.

The United States has long had diverse approaches in the region without being recognised as an independent player in the various forums. Despite a presence in Micronesia, Oceania and the Indo-Pacific zone, now confronted by Chinese competition Washington needs to re-establish an ambitious policy that respects regional sovereignties.