Contenu du sommaire : Matignon

What can the history of Number Two teach us about the emergence of the function of prime minister? While this position, submitted to the pressure of Number One and of the Parliament or the Court is particularly difficult to occupy, it proves necessary so long as a process of division of labour is being implemented. Number Two is often the backbone of elaborate political organisations, acting as a linchpin between the different powers. The prime ministers ofthe Fifth Republic are therefore, to some extent, the heirs of the Super Ministers and Vizirs of the past.

Since the beginning of the Fifth Republic, much has been written about the relationship between the president and the prime minister, and the five-year term has changed little about this. Before and after the year 2000 reform, the Élysée remains dependent on Matignon. And while, after the law, the heads of state have the power to pick their prime ministers, in fact this choice is constrained by the political situation and each president's own history. However, loyalty toward the president no longer seems as important as in the past: being obliged to control political communication during a reduced mandate, presidents have preferred to reinforce their own control over the government rather than to rely on the voluntary servitude of the prime minister.

The article analyses the ambiguous role played by the prime minister as “majority leader” under the Fifth Republic, a title that is often referred to but is not mentioned in the Constitution. Although this role is frequently attributed to him in political speeches, its recognition depends on the political balance of forces, on the political capital of the prime minister and on his ability to mobilise his majority. With the strengthening of presidential power in 1962 and, more recently, the establishment of the five-year mandate, the leadership of the prime minister has become a complex power game influenced by the relations with the president and the changing institutional arrangements.

The prime minister plays multiple roles in the parliamentary chambers. First among ministers, he is also the major political actor in Parliament and is deeply involved all along the legislative process. Having major control over the content of bills, he makes every effort to impose his own rhythm of reforms to the chambers, at the expense of parliamentarians. While the latter should be in a position to monitor accurately the government's action, it must be noted that this monitoring does not measure up to the key role played by the prime minister.

The prime minister and the Constitutional Council have a privileged relationship in the exercise of constitutional justice. Since the 1970s, both institutions have established, through the intermediary of their general secretaries, close links in the process of a priori constitutionality review. Through the voice of the Government's General Secretariat, the prime minister is the self-proclaimed defender of the law and, what's more, he enjoys a privileged status vis à vis the other actors involved in the procedure. The instauration of the preliminary question of constitutionality in 2010 has not challenged the solidity of this institutional couple: while the head of government is a party equal to others in the new institutional procedure, he remains faithful to his paradoxical yet traditional mission of upholder of the law before the Constitutional Council.

Has the prime minister become the first among ministers? To answer the question, one must first follow the process of emergence of a preeminent yet contested prime minister within the government, and then question the new decision-making architecture which grew out of the reforms of the state introduced since the 1980s and contributed to reigning in the ministers and their departments.

In governmental law, the prime minister is the first normative and disciplinarian authority. On the one hand, he is the chief administrator of the government's inner order that he manages daily through decrees, by-laws, circulars, interna acta corporis (everyday small deeds) and unwritten rules replicated over time. On the other hand, he is the first guardian of the implementation of governmental law, whose action he controls thanks to his administrative power of initiative, coordination and organisation, and whose non-implementation he can penalise given his political powers of instruction and decision.

Since 1958, the directors of the Prime Minister's Cabinet have been usually recruited within the higher civil service. This means that among their multiple tasks, the most important one is the coordination of governmental action, which implies a good knowledge of the procedures and of the administrative milieu. Benefitting from the trust of the prime minister, it is up to them to validate the government's members communication, to take multiple decisions and, on many occasions, to stand for the head of government who is assured of their loyalty.

Following the emergence of Matignon over successive Republics, the prime minister's office represents a heterogeneous, complex, and ever-changing galaxy. Between the offices needed by the prime minister to perform his own functions and those that need to be attached to the prime minister to perform their own obligations, we can see the wealth of missions and the strength of the institutional foundation of the head of government, who benefits both from the overhang of an inter-ministerial position and the confidence provided by his prime ministerial position.

It is a fact of the French Constitution that almost all those who have reached the last step before the summit, i.e. prime ministers, openly or secretly strive to aim even higher and reach the Presidency. Since 1959, very few have succeeded in doing so and, as a consequence, many of them have had to find a new role after “Matignon's inferno”. Before the banning of multiple mandates, several chose to withdraw in their region where they became undisputed potentates. Today, things must be reinvented, which is not easy.