Contenu du sommaire : Les crises du Cambodge et de L' Afghanistan vues de L'Asie

The Cambodian crisis is only one aspect of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. The acute feeling of the threat that the combined pressure of China and Pol Pot's Cambodia put on Vietnam brought it to try to improve relations with ASEAN, to link itself by treaty to the USSR, and to fight back decisively the Khmers. In the beginning of 1979, Cambodia thus went from Peking's orbit to that of Hanoi, under whose aegis a solidary Indochina was re-shaped. The withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces depends on the way in which Thailand will be able to guarantee Cambodia against an offensive return of the Khmers Rouges. While Hanoi refuses to envisage Cambodia's becoming again a buffer state (as China and ASEAN would like), it nevertheless proposes a global Indochina/ASEAN negotiation on pending problems.

In 1975 the five countries of ASEAN proposed to the communist countries of Indochina to join in the creation of a " zone of peace, liberty and neutrality " in South-East Asia. They then refused to accept the Cambodian regime resulting from Vietnam's armed intervention in Cambodia in 1979. ASEAN members are now working to maintain a Khmer Rouge representation in the UN and to isolate Vietnam internationally, but they are much more divided on substance when it cornes to a dialogue with Vietnam : Thailand and Singapore support China's policy against Vietnam, the ally of the USSR, but Malaysia and Indonesia continue to see Peking as the "principal danger" and consider it possible to cooperate with Vietnam, which has shown ils ability to resist China, for the purpose of set limes up a new regional order. These differences do not, however, appear likely to lead to a break. The key to the problem will be the evolution of Bangkok's and Hanoi's positions.

isolate Vietnam and to bleed it to death. What forces are they relying on to carry out this policy on the international level, in their relations with the ASEAN countries and in Cambodia, and in their relations with the various components of Khmer resistance ? How can the motivations which guide Chinese strategy be defined?

For the Chinese leaders theCambodian and the Afghan conflicts are the identical consequences of the same cause: Soviet hegemonism. But this discourse does not correspond to the reality of Chinese policy. China is implicated ? historically and geographically ? in thé Cambodian conflict much more than in the Afghan one. The only parallel which remains in her policies concerning these conflicts is that she is more interested in perpetrating them than in ending them. Her management of these two conflicts is thus the same as that of the United States. But she is beginning to realize that this is not a realistic policy. And in fact, since the beginning of 1982, many signs of a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations have been noted. It should be realized that if Peking-Moscow relations were to deteriorate, the Cambodian and Afghan conflicts might degenerate into a conflagration which would affect most of Asia and even spread to the whole world.

India's apparently similar policies on Cambodia and Afghanistan, two crises on which she took positions either in the général Soviet policy Une or at least acceptable to the USSR, mask in fact a difference. This difference, justified by India's interests as a regional power is manifested by a strong support of Vietnam concerning Cambodia but a more subtle policy concerning Afghanistan. Although the deteriorated nature of Indian-Pakistani relations makes the search for a political solution somewhat chaotic, it is nevertheless clear that by not opposing the USSR directly, India seeks to increase her freedom of action. This relative distantiation concerns an isolated problem and is limited by the view of the world of the main actors of India foreign policy as well as by the obvious interest India has in preserving Indian-Soviet friendship as an aspect of her "grand" foreign policy, which is supported by public opinion. Even though contested from within, India's definition of anti-imperialism does not seem likely to change significantly.

L'Asie du Sud-Ouest et l'Asie du Sud-Est constituant directement ou indirectement pour le Japon des zones d'importance stratégique pour son approvisionnement en pétrole (et pour ses investissements à l'étranger en ce qui concerne la seconde de ces régions) on pouvait s'attendre à ce que Tokyo réagisse aux crises cambodgienne et afghane. Effectivement, le Japon, jusque-là avant tout «animal économique» (faute de vouloir assumer pleinement la responsabilité de sa propre défense) est devenu un animal politique dans la mesure où, renonçant à la politique d'équidistance qu'il avait adoptée en 1977 en Asie du Sud-Est, il s'est résolu, à la suite des interventions vietnamienne puis soviétique de décembre 1978 et 1979, à opérer un choix entre le Vietnam et les pays de l'ASEAN. Mais les moyens de ce choix (qui ne s'est pas exercé avec la même netteté entre l'URSS et la Chine) sont restés principalement économi­ques. En dépit de certains signes annonciateurs d'une évolution possible, l'opinion japonaise dans son ensemble n'a pas encore été suffisamment ébranlée pour prendre conscience des dangers qui menacent le pays et accepter une augmentation de la part du revenu national consacrée à la défense au-delà du 1 % fixé en 1975. As South-West and South-East Asia constitute, directly or indirectly, strategically important zones for Japan's oil supply (and for its foreign investments in the latter region), it could be expected that Tokyo would react to the Afghan and Cambodian crises. Japan, until then an "economic animal" more than anything else (because of not wishing to take the responsibility for its own defense), became a political animal. Giving up the equidistant policy it had adopted in 1977 in South-East Asia, it resolved, following the 1978 Vietnamese and then the 1979 Soviet interventions to make a choice between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries. But the means of this choice (which was not made as explicitly concerning the USSR and China) remained mainly economic. In spite of a few signs presaging a tentative change, Japanese public opinion on the whole does not seem shaken enough to be aware of the dangers which threaten the country and to accept an increase of the slice of the national income devoted to defense beyond the established in 1975.

India's and Japan's Communist parties reacted very differently to the events in Cambodia and Afghanistan. This diversity reflects both each party's spécifie history and the variety of viewpoints stemming from different national situations and regional contexts. The Communist parties not in power in South-East Asia have, on the contrary, the same policies as either the Soviet or the Chinese communist party. The clandestine conditions of ail these parties with their effects on the representativity of the groups acting in their name from host communist countries can help explain this behavior.

The Afghan crisis should have triggered off concrete manifestations of Islamic solidarity, recommended by the sacred texts and still very much alive among Muslims. Yet an analysis of the positions taken by the member-states of the Islamic Conference, at ils meetings or at UN sessions, shows that individual states' interests take precedence over the proclaimed solidarity. Solidarity should nevertheless not be minimized for it operates fully in certain conflicts deemed of primary importance, nor should the more discreet currents irrigating the whole of the Muslim world be ignored.

La crise de l'Afghanistan et celle de l'Indochine ont, toutes les deux, donné lieu à des mouvements massifs de réfugiés. Ces mouvements des peuples, qui ressemblent un peu aux grandes migrations qui caractérisaient traditionnellement l'Asie, constituent cepen­dant des phénomènes nouveaux dans leurs causes et dans leurs effets. Dans un continent historiquement livré à la conquête par occupation et fondé sur les frontières arbitraires de l'époque coloniale, les phénomènes de réfugiés deviennent'd'abord une menace à la solidité des pays qui les reçoivent, notamment aux zones frontalières. Ensuite, les réfugiés peuvent facilement être transformés en instruments de politique irrédentiste, en enjeux des grands marchandages internationaux et en armes politiques de la guerre froide. Ainsi, les réfugiés afghans au Pakistan sont utilisés comme instrument géopolitique par l'Afghanistan et ses alliés. Ce sont, d'autre part, des foyers de résistance contre le régime afghan. Ce qui a pour conséquence de resserrer les liens militaires et économiques entre le Pakistan et ses propres alliés. Quant aux réfugiés indochinois, ils représentent une menace pour divers gouvernements asiatiques, à cause de multiples raisons politiques, socio-économiques et culturelles. Dans les deux cas, les solutions aux problèmes de réfugiés dépendent des décisions des Etats, et en particulier de celles des grandes puissances. Both the Afghan and Indochinese crises brought about massive refugee movements. These movements somewhat similar to the great migrations which traditionally characterized Asia constitute, however, new phenomena in their causes and in their effects. In continent historically given over to conquest by occupation and founded on the arbitrary frontiers dating from colonial times, the refugee phenomenon is becoming a threat to the solidity of the host country, particularly in the border areas. Moreover, the refugees can easily be transformed into instruments of irredentist policy, into stakes for major international bargaining, and into cold war political weapons. The Afghan refugees in Pakistan are thus used as a geopolitical instrument by Afghanistan and its allies. Refugee settlements are also centers of resistance against the Afghan regime. The result of this is to strengthen the military and economic links between Pakistan and its allies. As for the Indochinese refugees, they represent a threat to many Asian governments for political, socio-economic and cultural reasons. In both cases, the solution to the refugee problem depends on decisions made by other countries, particular by the great powers.