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Local referenda in france. Variations in practice around the law The 1992 law - supposedly a recognition of local practice - codified municipal referenda, thus making public and official an exceptional and unusual procedure. It is possible to assess the relations between law and local practices in a twofold di­rection, by measuring on one hand the impact of practice on the negotiation of law, and on the other that of codification on subsequent practice. While codification is more a process of confining than of authorization, it is not alien to the municipal referenda becoming somewhat banal in the local landscape. It remains delicate, however, to apportion the role of the law and that of the circumstances of its adoption.

The recent evolution of the british conservative and labour party members Individual party members play an important role in British politics as candidate selectors, fundraisers, opinion-formers and electioneers. Using data from recent national representative surveys of Conservative and Labour party members, informa­tion is provided on their social characteristics and their political attitudes. Differences are revealed in their underlying ideological beliefs. By using panel survey data, the article shows that there has been a significant decline in activism in both parties, but the decline has been greater for Labour than for Conservative members. If this decline in party activism continues, it will have serious implications for the British political system.

Although elected by universal suffrage and granted major constitutional powers, the Presidency of the Austrian Republic has been completely neutralized since its creation. This neutralization is based on the political parties' clear desire to let the parliamentary system produce its full effects, with a government positively chosen by the parliamentary majority.

L'analyse des résultats des élections municipales en France fait apparaître l'existence d'une prime électorale au maire sortant. La présente étude, fondée sur l'ana­lyse des résultats des quatre dernières élections municipales (1977, 1983, 1989, 1995) dans les communes de plus de 30000 habitants, montre que la dynamique électorale personnelle du maire sortant suit toujours la même loi d'évolution: maximale à la fin du premier mandat, elle régresse par paliers par la suite. Cette loi d'évolution est mise en évidence en comparant la performance d'un maire sortant par rapport à la performance moyenne de ses collègues de même étiquette politique, la performance électorale d'un maire sortant étant définie comme l'évolution du résul­tat de son camp (droite ou gauche) entre l'élection présidentielle la plus proche et le premier tour de l'élection municipale. Les maires les plus populaires se caractéri­sent à la fois par une prime électorale très forte à la fin du premier mandat et une résistance à l'usure de cette prime, supérieure à la moyenne. The analysis of municipal election results demonstrates the existence of an electoral bonus for the incumbent mayor. The present study, based on an analysis of the results of the last four municipal elections (1977, 1983, 1989, 1995) in cities of over 30,000 inhabitants, shows that the personal electoral dynamic of the incumbent mayor always follows the same law : it is at its height at the end of the first term, and then regresses. This development law becomes clear if one compares the score of an incumbent mayor to the average score of his/her colleagues belonging to the same party, the electoral score of an incumbent mayor being defined as the change registered in the score of his/her camp (right or left) from the nearest presidential election to the first round of the municipal election. The most popular mayors are characterized both by a very high electoral bonus at the end of the first term and a higher-than-average resistance to attrition.