Contenu du sommaire : Europe/États-Unis : 50 nuances de dépendance

The Biden administration's geopolitics is beginning to be noticed. It aims to build on a reconciled nation willing to see its foreign policy objectives as a defense of its own interests. It is making China a high priority in keeping with the previous administration's example, and banking on its allies to re-establish leadership of the democratic nations. The domestic issue remains unresolved, and the necessary political reconciliation could prove difficult to accomplish.

The United States and the European Union (EU) are now both in agreement regarding China, long viewed benevolently, as a systemic rival in the international order. Despite this consensus, their interests differ with regard to Beijing, with the European Union intending to maintain a degree of a partnership approach in its relations with China. However, the EU will only have an impact in Indo-Pacific if it develops long-term strategies there, backed up by tangible means.

The use of secondary sanctions by the United States is not new, but Donald Trump has taken it to an unprecedented level. The Republican President has shown a great deal of defiance towards Washington's traditional allies, that has been particularly evident with regard to the Russian and Iranian issues. The Europeans have introduced a new mechanism – called INSTEX – to try to bypass US sanctions, but this has quickly shown its limits.

Edward Snowden's revelations, the Cambridge Analytica affair and the digital transformation accelerated by the Covid-19 crisis have all shown Europe's technological dependence on foreign powers. The European Commission wants to be the leader in “digital decolonization”, but investment capacity in the Old Continent is much lower than in the United States and China. Nevertheless, Europe has some advantages it can exploit.

The fight against climate change has a major economic dimension. With climate neutrality as their new objective, the major powers are counting on green industrial policy, and trying to contain the emissions related to their imports. This approach increases domestic support for climate commitments, but it risks stirring up conflicts and therefore slowing down the global transition, unless new rules in international trade are agreed upon.

The amount of money invested in sustainable finance – or Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) – is constantly increasing. It should help to finance the energy transition necessary to mitigate the effects of climate change. However, its development proceeds along different models in various parts of the world, and the battle over extra-financial norms is raging on. A real schism in international finance cannot be excluded in the absence of leadership and cooperation.

Underneath the rhetoric of commitment to a multilateral order, Germany's policy seems to be mainly structured around its national interests. Whether it is a question of energy supply from Russia, exports to China, trade surpluses with the United States or the Europeans, or the inadequacy of its military budgets, Berlin seems fairly far from the image that it wants to project of a power guided by rules.

Angela Merkel is ending her fourth term as German Chancellor. Although she has made a number of statements demonstrating her commitment to the European project, her record in this area nevertheless appears to be mixed. During the Covid-19 crisis, she helped maintain the European Union's (EU) cohesion and accepted the principle of a common debt, but it lacked a broad vision and the leverage that would have made the EU a stronger actor on the world stage.

The effect of the Second World War continues to have an impact on Germany. The use of military force is viewed with caution, both by the political elite and by a large part of the public. However, the worsening strategic context is prompting leaders to rethink the Bundeswehr's role. The defense budget is increasing, and the number of armed forces personnel is expected to grow considerably in the coming years.

Twenty years after 9/11, the assessment of the “War on Terror” is mixed: heavy financial and human costs, weakening of Al-Qaeda central and the Islamic State in the Levant, but creation of affiliates in different locations, fatigue of endless wars, etc. The Western powers have never been able to deal with the political problems that persisted after their military successes. A new hierarchy of security challenges seems to have put terrorism in its rightful place: a strategic problem among many others.

Joe Biden began his term as President of the United States with the firm intention of breaking with his predecessor, Donald Trump's, practices. In the Middle East, this stance is particularly evident with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The new Democrat administration seems to be placing greater emphasis on regional stability and respect for human rights.

Barelvism was founded in the early 20th century by Ahmad Riza Khan. Originally, it was a Sufi religious movement that has gradually become politicized. Its members advocated for the Islamization of society, while opposing other Wahhabi-inspired groups. After the 9/11 attacks, Sufism was presented as an alternative to radical Islam. Nevertheless, a minority of Barelvis turned to terrorism and this violence eventually affected Europe.

The Georgian elites see Russia as an enemy that has occupied part of their country since the 2008 war. They are constantly trying to strengthen Georgia's European-Atlantic connections to deal with this threat. Nevertheless, the rationale of this victimization stance deserves to be questioned. The country would undoubtedly benefit from developing a more peaceful relationship with Moscow, while maintaining strong ties with the West.