Contenu du sommaire : Les privatisations. Un état des lieux

In a first part, this paper presents a discussion of the concept of performance applied to public enterprises and shows the limits of traditional approaches designed to evaluate the performance. In a second part, it focuses on the notion of technical efficiency and presents a survey of some significative empirical studies. Finally, it discusses the main factors allowing for efficiency gains ; among these factors, it is argued that competition and deregulation matter more than ownership.

We discuss the application of the usual arguments in favor or against privati­zation, in the case of a natural monopoly. Then, we give two classical examples of trade-offs -public - private ownership - in specific contexts of contractual incom­pleteness. Finally, we sketch a theory of privatization based on political economy considerations.

This paper aims at identifying the french model of corporate governance, on a théorie level as well as on an empiric level. First, we will demonstrate that we should rank the french model among «non standard» theories rather than « standard theories ». Indeed, in France, corporate governance is related to parti­cular organization of the property rights : la propriété circulaire (circular property). In the second part, we explain how this specific model has been used at the time of the last privatisations. The way, the financial core has been reorganized is the main consequence of that choice for the french economy.

The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of the gradual process of libe­ralization of the Community air transport market. The european airlines networks have mainly a "hub and spoke" structure inherited from geography and previous regulation. It is argued that nose-to-nose competition between the major Commu­nity flag carriers is rather unlikely. Two network effects are analysed. The first one is a "supply-side" network effect arising from cost complementarities. The second network effect is a "demand-side" one. Due to their preferences on time schedule, frequency and quality of the service, travellers face some arbitrage for the choice of the carrier and of the type of routing in some intra-european markets. These two network effects are used to analyse the consequences of a merger and of a coo­perative agreement between two airlines.

The purpose of this paper is first an overview of the problems which emerge with the liberalization of telecommunications. Then, we focuse on the liberalization of infrastructures, and more precisely on the reciprocal access pricing problem. In a simple model, we show that cooperation between operators may induce nega­tive access charges and increase welfare compared to competition.

Since political elections in m id-1993, successive French governments have embarked on an ambitious privatization program. In three years, nine major State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been at least partially sold, with other companies among the largest in France are to be sold in the coming few years. This paper analyzes how privatizations since 1993 have intertwined with changes in both the mechanisms of corporate governance and the market for corporate control in France. Three questions lead the analysis : what have been the main motives for selling SOEs ? What assessment, albeit only preliminary, can be made of the pri­vatizations completed so far ? What factors, other than privatizations, are driving changes in French corporate governance ?

The extent of government intervention in production appears to be roughly the same in all member states of the European Union. However, processes of econo­mic development that have been broadly similar have generated such a degree of heterogeneity amongst national public sectors in Europe that it is hardly possible to define a European model of the public sector, as well as to establish undisputa-bly the superiority of one or another national variants. The European integration process, especially since it is been aimed at completing the single market, has been altering the conditions and challenging the appropriateness of national governments'intervention, insofar as the latter is seen as an obstacle in the way of free competition and a level playing field ; but it does not offer any alternative solu­tion. This paper argues that it is necessary to precisely define the competences of national governments and of European institutions in order to rebuild efficient intervention tools that could supplement well-known insufficiencies and failures of market mechanisms.

This paper underiines the main objectives and trade-offs faced by Central and Eastern European countries. It describes the strategies adopted by Poland, Rus­sia and the Czech Republic as being dominated respectively by three objectives : enterprise restructuring, depoliticization of the economy and the emergence of market institutions.

Most of the existing literature on the impact of privatisation discusses microe-conomic aspects. However, in the case of "mass privatisation", a macroeconomic approach has a particular interest. In an environment of a protracted economic crisis, privatisation may play an important role as a signal of a regime change in public policy. In Argentina, privatisation is extensive and rapid. Under extreme monetary disorder and after the experience of hyperinflation, privatisation shows a significant positive impact on public finance, strongly contributing to price stability. In Chile, privatisation has been gradual and state enterprises' restructuring has taken place before divestiture. Hence, the impact on public finance is negligible. Econometric evidence shows that privatisation leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate and has a positive impact on growth.

African countries have launched a process of privatization (lato sensu) of their public utilities. We suggest that where there is no transfer of management the strengthening of the private sector may not be sufficient to induce improvement of organizational efficiency. Privatization may apply to a monopoly ; we thus discuss the role of a regulating agency, as well as the importance of trust that stems from reputation effects. Privatization may also involve measures that introduce compe­tition which some African countries have already experienced.