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The Hungarian Economy: Redeployment or Renewal? An "Outsider's" View. Can it be said that the changes initiated in Hungary in 1979 and 1980 represent a modification in economic policy designed to adapt it to the international market, or do they amount to a radical reform of the economic apparatus set up in 1968? It would appear that despite the strategy of export promotion (since 1976) reinforced by the recent austerity policy (since 1979), a "quasi-developed" economy such as Hungary's has problems in adapting its industrial structures to world market trends, while at the same time maintaining external equilibrium and containing the rise in prices. The 1980 institutional reforms (e.g. the creation of a single Ministry of Industry, renting of certain state shops to private individuals, etc.) seem unable to bring about any shift in the powers of economic decision-making, or to put a stop to bargaining among the different echelons of the economy (ministries, enterprises) or to reintegrate the "second economy" within its official counterpart. The investment cycle is increasingly dependent on the development of external constraints, so that the policy of industrial redeployment, however modest, is becoming rather "extraverted"; it is dependent both on exchanges with the West and, above all, on the privileged relationship with the U.S.S.R. and Comecon. There is what might be described as a "Comecon effect" influencing both the structure of production and the management of enterprises in Hungary. This redeployment policy creates certain stresses in the employment sector; employment is still guaranted for every Hungarian citizen, but workers must be prepared to accept movement from one place of work (or one enterprise) to another. Finally, attention is drawn to many similarities between the industrial policy of Hungary and the French experience, and between the Vlth Hungarian plan, and the VHIth French plan.

Reform in the Reform? The New Hungarian Economie Policy on the Threshold of the 80s. During the years 1979 and 1980, the Hungarian government introduced a set of measures which had two aims. The first one, in the short run is to stabilize the economic cycle by introducing a deflationary policy. The second one intends to modify the productive structure of the Hungarian economy and to orientate towards the more competitive sectors especially the ones which are linked with hard currency markets. The deflationary policy consists of the following measures: to reduce the volume of investment, the rate of inflation and to stabilize the level of personal incomes. The structural policy consists of two sets of decisions: the first one is concerned by the introduction of a new price policy and an important change in the price structure. Particularly more than 70% of domestic prices are now set according to the world price level in view to make the Hungarian economy more sensitive to the external competition. The second one deals with a wide institutional reform which has been undertaken at different levels of the decision- making system: Party, Government, Ministries of Branch, Trusts, Enterprises. The main idea on which the reform is lying is that a macro-economic guidance and micro-economic efficiency must be substituted to the remaining administrative guidance. But, both important internal and external contrainsts still remain.

Romania and the Multinationals. Having chosen to increase their participation in the international division of labour, can the socialist states, with their planned economies and formal control over foreign trade, direct the activities of multinational corporations and banks toward national development priorities with more success than Third World governments? The experience of one less developed socialist economy, Romania, is examined in this article. After a brief review of the role of foreign capital in Romania's development, current development strategy is summarized, giving special attention to the motives for cooperation with capitalist enterprises. Analysis of different joint ventures permits an evaluation of the effectiveness of Romania's collaboration with multinational corporations and multinational banks, judged in terms of whether or not the party's proclaimed objectives of technology acquisition, export promotion and self-financing have been satisfied.

Relations Between Romania and OECD (1970-1980). The specific features of the Romanian model show up clearly in the realm of politics. The mutual interaction of politics and economics have furnished the pretext ? when indeed the pretext was not itself the reason ? for Romania's particular commercial relationships both with its Eastern partners (Comecon) and its partners of the West (OECD). The level of Romania's trade with the countries of OECD may be considered from two angles, either according to the results of these exchanges and their prospects for future development, or from the standpoint of Romania's membership of the "77 Group". At first sight, it is evident that recourse to Western technology has changed the pattern of Romania's external trade in favour of quantitative as opposed to qualitative factors, their competitive impact being the result, essentially, of low costs of production, a situation which would make the prospects for improvement of Romanian terms of trade uncertain. This state of affairs may, however, be compensated for by Romania's participation in the "77 Group", which is regarded by the authorities not so much as its appropriate position as a developing country, as a means of acquiring an individual political stance and ensuring more advantageous trade flows for itself.

Lawyers and the Right to Defence in the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. federal law governing the organization and operation of the Soviet bar was published on the 30th November 1979. This article briefly summarises the history of the Soviet bar from its creation in 1922 to the present day. It goes on to consider the legislation pertaining to the right to defence, and examines the application of this fundamental right, laid down in article 158 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. of 1977, in ordinary legal cases and in political cases.

Polish Workers: an Awakening Class. Blue collar workers in Poland have grown since the interwar period to a half of the total population and took over the numerical place of peasantry but with much more strategic location and at a definitively higher level of sophistication. During the 1950s and the 1960s still the peasant origin prevailed among blue collar workers but later on this has changed in favour of their own category plus the growing number of arrivals from the white collar stratum. Four basic factors: transformation of social mobility, failure of the industrial modernization based on the growing trade with the West, the food shortage and the developing sophistication of blue collar workers (especially the young generation) have contributed to the establishment of a free trade union movement and a considerable reform of the whole socio-economic model of the country. "Solidarity" has become a major innovative force in Poland but it does not have the ambition or power to seize full power from the ruling party. It does not want even to occupy the position emptied by the previous progovernmental trade unions and to take co-responsibility for running the socialized enterprises. The genuinely blue collar leadership of "Solidarity" defends primarily the workers' rights and avoids any such commitments which would redirect the whole movement from its original goal. The awareness of "Solidarity" leadership of the dangers and responsibilities related to the promotion of blue collar workers' cause under state socialism shows the maturity of the movement represented by them, that has its foundation in the relatively good learning gained by the young generation of workers. This learning comes from the formal schooling, the experience gained in the previous demonstrations of workers' strength (1956, 1970-71, 1976), growing mutual contact between various social strata, concentration of workers in big enterprises, travelling abroad, etc. The return in Poland to the previous authoritarian set-up is always possible due to the external pressure exercised by the U.S.S.R. and the other Soviet bloc members. However the results achieved by organized blue collar workers are big enough to remain as a historical phenomenon of a permanent importance.