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The implementation of MBO in the government organizations failed as a way toward the improvement of effectiveness and better results. To release the pratical logic of government organizations, an analysis of their quasi- objectives and determinant conditions may be useful. A change in the results will come from a change in the state variables that determine the quasi-objectives. The case-study of the French National Employment Agency is given as a test for the operating validity of the concept of quasi-objective in the field of public management.

This article is an attempt to evaluate, theorically and empirically, the economic effect of a public policy of stabilization through public employment. Using the theorical framework by Bacon and Eltis who refer the economic problem of western world to the excessive spendings of public administrations and following their division of the economy into a productive sector and an unproductive one, we show that a shift in public employment involves a double cost for the productive sector : a "financial cost" equal to the ressources unproductively absorbed and a "real" cost corresponding to the opportunity cost of the value non generated in the productive sectors by workers transfered. Nevertheless, the empirical measurement of these both costs for years 1969-1978 in France, shows that this burden is not likely to be responsible for the slow down of economic growth, at least in the short term : the financial cost is in fact much inferior than the "apparent cost" (wages) of public employment since public employees assume a share of their own financing. Moreover, in a situation of excess of supply in the labor market, the opportunity cost tends to decrease near zero.

In most LDCS, especially in those which are actually industrializing, the public sector is very large and plays a key role in the development process. The article focuses on large public enterprises, and puts a particular emphasis on the relationship between corporate strategies and national policies. It stemms from a survey of four major sectors of Brazil and Mexico : electricity, oil, steel and telecommunications. The first part shows that beyond their ideological and historical differences Brazil and Mexico follow very similar economic models of development, which are centered on three actors : private national companies, multinational (foreign) corporations, and public enterprises. The first ones are too weak, the second ones are faced with strong nationalism, and thus the last ones inevitably account for a very large part of the overall economic activity. The second part analyzes the strategy of public enterprises and shows how national policies interface with them in a dialectical process. The outcome of that process is seen as largely determined by three different logics : the development stage of the country is more important in the determination of general strategic objectives and of the financing of investment, whereas the particular characteristics of a given sector of activity influences more the product-market and the technological and industrial strategies, social relations and social legitimacy being determined, last but not least, by the specific national culture of each country. In conclusion, the article asserts that if public enterprises know best what the right technico-economical choices should be for them, and if governments should be responsible for the major political choices, the interface between the two is poorly organized, due to a lack of managerial skills in both countries. It therefore suggests that new tools, such as the french «contrats de plan» and others, be experimented over there.

This article aims at clarifying the internal logic and processes of «non-market corporations». It presents an approach that should strengthen and enrich the relationship between public corporations and the national community, and help build a management framework better suited to the specificity of public entities. The traditional management framework of capitalist enterprises is built around the «maximization of financial yield for shareholders». But usually public corporations refuse to be locked in this deterministic and ill-suited model. Yet their trustees generally fail to set a different and more relevant objective and management framework. Hence they often become the center of political power games between their stakeholders, which seriously weaken their effectiveness. The author recommends the application of the proposed «stakeholder accountability framework» to public monopolies, but it can also be used fruitfully by public corporations that provide goods and services in the market place. This essay primarily seeks to generate a technical debate rather than provoke discussions on the diagnosis, which is based on a broad international experience and does not refer explicitly to the precise situation of any specific public corporation in any specific country.

The incorporation of economic approaches into policymaking requires special skills on the part of the economist. This article examines the use of economics in government as illustrated by the experience of the natural resources agencies. It presents ten guiding rules for the practicing policy economist : (1 ) be economical about the use of economics ; (2) discount for political demand ; (3) dare to be «quick-and-dirty» ; (4) think like a manager ; (5) analyze equity as well as efficiency ; (6) know your market ; (7) pay your organizational dues ; (8) profit from action-forcing events ; (9) do not oversell economic analysis ; and (10) learn policy economics by doing it.