Contenu du sommaire : Firmes et géopolitiques

Although mentioned in the Treaty of Rome (1957), the European Transport Policy only came to life much later, as a result of demands by the European Parliament and in the context of the Single European Act (1986). This policy gradually took on a strong liberal dimension. During the 1990s, several European packages were introduced into national legal systems that tried to end the spatial monopolies within each state's control. In this perspective rail seems to be a latecomer compared with the other transport modes. After decades of institutional stability, railway companies have had to adapt their strategies to a new European context. The present paper tries to demonstrate how a national context deeply embedded in history and national geography continues to dictate priorities. A geopolitical reading of a liberalized rail transport suggests the unlikelihood of any simple, footloose industry prevailing within the single European market, without any reference to former national identities. On the contrary, vanishing national borders introduce new challenges and insecurity for the rail companies, which have to be interpreted in a territorial dimension.

The paper analyses how Bulgarian authorities respond to the Lisbon Strategy targets on both demands in increasing European competitiveness and in strengthening cohesion. In Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEEC), these demands raise up a dilemma between competitiveness -at the risk of increasing territorial disparities- and, cohesion through territorial equity in redistributing growth benefits. By studying FDI and mid-term financial implementation of the European Structural funds in Bulgaria, we show their spatial impacts regarding this dilemma. The paper also focuses on regional and local levels, as far as they are more and more concerned by the integration process at both global and European scales.

Foreign direct investments (FDI) have a major role in the British economy. In the political, cultural, social and economic context of the United Kingdom, the settlement of foreign firms also has major geopolitical implications on different scales. Nevertheless these effects have also changed over time, when the perception of FDI has changed in the representations of the British. If they were highly sought after in the 1980's and 1990's, the British are increasingly hostile to the takeover of domestic firms by foreign capital. Some disillusionment following the installation of "bounty hunters", restructuring imposed by foreign firms and the context of economic crisis, cause reactions of economic nationalism in the United Kingdom.

Situated at the borders of the Brazilian Amazon, the Jari river region has been until the 1960ies almost exclusively populated by small communities scattered in the forest and living on the extraction of natural resources (rubber, Brazil nut). The arrival, in 1967, of the American businessman D.K. Ludwig, who had been invited by the Geisel military government to « valorize » a part of land in the Brazilian Amazon, provokes an important regional turnover: in the middle of an intact rain forest, the American businessman sets up an enormous economic development project, based on several large-scale agro-industrial (rice, cattle) and mining (kaolin) activities centered around the production of cellulose from monoculture plantation. Socially controversial and economically unprofitable, this project, who gained fame under the name of " the Jari project ", has nevertheless subsisted until our days and claims more than 1,2 millions of hectares in the Jari river region. However, the XXI century project has essentially evolved from a strongly criticized enterprise that « inexorably devoured human and natural resources » to a modern, highly technologized business that includes several companies and activities certified by the FSC (paper, cellulose, and tropical wood extraction). Moreover, the new management team at the head of the project since 2000 (the Orsa group, a holding with domicile in São Paulo), stands out in the Amazon context as an innovative business model, based on the principles of sustainable development and inspired by the idea of corporate social responsibility (CSR). As such, the new Orsa management has indeed succeeded to make a profitable enterprise out of the indebted Jari project, and has engaged in transforming the company's social and environmental liabilities into economic assets. In order to mitigate the contradictions of economic development provoked by the clash of two contrasting socioeconomic models – agro-business and traditional forms of agriculture and forest resource extraction- the Orsa group has created a company-intern Foundation that aims at the conception and implementation of social and economic development projects with and for the benefit of the local populations. This article discusses the potential but also the limits of CSR as a key strategy for the new company's management of its huge territory in the Amazon, in the context of the region's and the project's historical evolution.

The enormous increase of the world demand of some metals since the end of the twentieth century leads to the multiplication of great mining projects which concern very coveted and scarce minerals as gold. In the same time firms that want to develop new great mines with huge environmental impact risk to encounter a determined opposition from communities with the support of environmental NGOs. The influence of the NGOs on the public opinion through media campaigns can exert pressure on States and conduct them to reject mining projects. If conflicts between mining firms and environmentalist groups grew in numbers in the last years, particularly in developing countries, there are not systematic, or they don't collect the same support in the communities. Some firms, aware of the stake which represents their environmental identity, have success better as others to develop a strategy, a communication and tasks to make more acceptable their mining projects, also when these projects have a huge environmental impact. The study of different gold mining projects in process or fruitless allows to analyze the strategy of the firms to become environmentally acceptable. It allows to discuss the impact of mining projects in regard of sustainable development.

Geopolitics appears to be increasingly back in fashion, and geoeconomics is gaining the limelight in the form of state competition for natural resources. While the security implications are diverse, and the doctrine is divided about the consequences in term of likelihood of conflicts, it has resulted in increased international tensions on strategic materials. China is at the very centre of this scramble, and there is quite an amount of attention devoted to China's economic growth as well as its possible imperialistic aspirations in today's world. This article explores resource-seeking Chinese corporations, especially the ones involved in the oil business, and the consequences in term of security issues at a geopolitical level.  While the duality conflict / cooperation is taken into account, this research focuses on oil corporations from China and India, which aggressively try to secure markets and resources. They generally compete against MNCs both from the OECD countries and from other emerging players. In order to illustrate the challenges this phenomenon involves, the analysis will use a specific case-study, PetroChina (and its parent CNOOC), showing the way they are involved in acquisition of resources abroad and how this has put them on a collision route with ONGC and ONGC Videsh Ltd, Indian companies involved in the same activity. Finally, it will look at the rivalry between India and China in economic and geopolitical terms as well within the context of broader global economic issues.

Within the framework of global financial integration, cross-border listings enable firms to raise capital and to list their shares on foreign markets. Despite both the deregulation of financial markets and the widespread illusion of a so-called « global marketplace » spread by an intensive use of IT, corporate issuers are not indifferent to the location of their listing place(s). On the contrary, they manoeuvre astutely in order to benefit at best from the resources, networks and opportunities provided by the different places throughout the financial world. Firms not only select markets meticulously to list their shares, but some of them raise capital and quote their equities on major markets through their subsidiaries, dummy entities or legal headquarters incorporated within tax havens as well. Tax havens thus fit into the worldwide networks of cross-listings. Which actors and powers use and benefit from tax havens?  Based on the study of the worldwide matrices of cross-listings -- built thanks to a data compilation of the stock markets' listings in 2007 -- this article proposes to lift the veil on the listing strategies of transnational firms and to observe the position of tax havens in the networks of the global integration of financial markets by replying to the question:  what are the relational preferences within the group firms-states-listing places?

While the European Union aims at developing a common foreign policy and a common arms market, European states still collaborate poorly in the field of actual defence procurement. National firms (each furtively supported by its national government) often compete with each other as much as with American ones, European initiatives compete with Transatlantic ones. At the same time the relations between the European Defence and Security Policy (EDSP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remain a much debated issue. While the positions of the larger member states (France, UK and Germany) are well known in this field, the views and practices of the smaller member states are hardly discussed in the literature. This paper explores the geopolitical and geo-economical dimensions of policy making regarding military technology and production in the Netherlands. A neutral country until German invasion and occupation (1940-45), the Netherlands is a founding member of the European Communities and NATO, and a close ally of the US and the UK. Around 2000 it was in absolute terms the sixth spender in the EU regarding both military Research & Development and Equipment Procurement. What are the geopolitical and geo-economical arguments of the Dutch government to procure a new generation of jet fighters and to participate in the Joint Strike Fighter programme to develop and produce the Lockheed Martin-F-35 Lightning II rather than to purchase the French Rafale or the Eurofighter? What does this mean for the further development of the EU as a territorial actor in international affairs?