Contenu du sommaire : L'Algérie, nouvelle force régionale ?

When President Bouteflika came to power in 1999, he sought to liberalise the country's economy. But these reforms were reversed after only a few years. The rise in the price of hydrocarbons meant increased investment in infrastructure, but such large projects have above all benefitted foreign companies who have not brought productive investment to Algeria. The drop in hydrocarbon prices is causing fears of a major crisis, which could have political repercussions.

Having been formed in large part by the legacy of the post-independence diplomatic process, by forced withdrawal during the civil war and fixation on a few regional issues, Algerian diplomacy has to redefine itself in a rapidly changing world. Unrest at its doorstep (Libya and the Sahel, among others) and further afield (Near East) are bringing questions about Algeria's security to the fore at the very moment when its oil revenue appears to be on the decline.

Given its colonial history, Algeria does not want foreign powers involving themselves in internal affairs. Likewise, Algiers refrains from military intervention outside its borders. Non-interventionism has even been written into the country's constitution. However, given how serious the region's situation has become, marked by the rise of different jihadist groups, this principle could be reconsidered.

During the Cold War, Algeria was one of the Soviet Union's favored partners. Ties between the two countries deteriorated during the 1990s before going through a renewal around fifteen years ago. Although the trade relationship remains rather weak, this is not the case in terms of military and energy cooperation. Algeria is the second largest importer of Russian arms and has called on Russia to build its first nuclear power station.

At the close of World War I, denial of the Armenian genocide became a central point in Turkey's official doctrine. Up to the mid-2000s, intellectuals have been denounced for having spoken about the genocide in public. However, there are signs that things are changing, both in government circles and in wider society. Eventually, Ankara will recognize the Ottoman Empire's responsibility in this genocide.

The 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide will not mark a great historical moment in Armenian-Turkish relations. The two countries are standing firm on their positions. Armenia is trying to extend the list of countries that recognize the genocide and has made some significant progress – the declarations made by the Pope, for example – but is still coming up against strong resistance. Turkey's stance of denial has hardly changed. The Armenian diaspora might be able to help redefine the lines.

The current crisis in the Mediterranean is a part of an unprecedented global migratory movement. The three areas of the Mediterranean: the Maghreb-Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East, each present particular characteristics of population displacement. But whether they are refugees – whose numbers are constantly increasing – or economic migrants, Europe's mechanisms for dealing with them remain essentially national and are failing to adapt to the demands of this new situation.

The European Union has been trying to establish a common European asylum system for fifteen years. This project has been stalled by disagreements between states, each looking out for its own national interests. Europe is very ill prepared for the kinds of situations brought about by instability in the southern Mediterranean, which is causing refugee movements that are considerable but not unprecedented. The EU's current systems appear poorly equipped to bring about necessary solidarity between member states.

The way in which bargaining mandates are granted to the Commission for the purpose of leading the European Union's commercial negotiations make it a unique negotiator. Press coverage of the negotiation instructions has tended to play down their value and to report the actual oral instructions of the mandate, which are more complex to interpret. The contents of mandates revealed at the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015 show a Commission that is concentrated on broad offensive goals to the detriment of its “red lines.”

China's “One Belt, One Road” project, also known as the “New Silk Road”, aims to create a vast infrastructure network connecting three continents, with China playing the central role. It constitutes a central element of Beijing's regional diplomatic strategy and will be used as a laboratory for a future new Asian order. It has been presented as a purely economic initiative, yet this project has an underlying strategic side to it that aims to weaken America's presence in Asia.

Since gaining independence in 1960, Somalia has enjoyed only a few periods of stability. Wars with neighbouring countries – Ethiopia in particular – have persisted, causing serious internal issues, especially since the fall of dictator Siad Barre in 1991. Four causes explain this chronic instability: the incapacity to create a strong state, the battle for resources, the rise of radical Islam, and the high frequency of external interventions.

Piracy and armed robbery at sea are a threat to security in the hydrocarbon-rich Gulf of Guinea. None of the states in this region have the means to take action alone. A framework of maritime security is being drawn up in the region, but there are still plenty of obstacles. Western countries and China are trying to bolster the capacity of local navies and coast guards. However, this is avoiding the real source of the problem, which is of a socioeconomic nature.

Successive attempts to institutionalise Islam in France have not resulted in an entirely satisfactory outcome. Among the factors making the emergence of a representative body more difficult are oppositions between Muslim states – Algeria and Morocco in particular – who are using the religious issue for leverage. The states of the Gulf are trying to exert influence on French Muslims too, although their impact should not be overestimated.