Contenu du sommaire : Géopolitique du Sahel et du Sahara

This first text retraces the major events that have affected the Sahel and the Sahara space since 2011 by ordering them around the analysis of the poles of conflicts, the external actors involved in one of them (Noth Mali) and the commercial circulations (trans-Saharan trade) and human (international migrations) as well as those related to Saharan artisanal miners. The author shows that if the region is going through a serious crisis, hopes exist through the resilience of the populations which is manifested by their willingness and their ability to exchange, to move and to engage in new activities such as the artisanal gold mining.

Networks of Libyan actors in exile, networks of external actors exiled in Libya: like all wars, the conflicts in Libya create new actors, new groups, and new social ties. This article assesses the regional repercussions of the Libyan crisis through the lens of the social networks that form amidst the power struggles in the country. If we measure the importance of these transnational networks by their weight in the Libyan conflict itself, Libyan elite networks in Middle Eastern capitals play a preponderant role. From their exile, they put to use their media empires, financial power, and their relations with key players in their host countries. By contrast, if we assess their importance by their potential regional consequences in the future, we should focus on the networks of foreign combatants in Libya. Sahelian fighters who are being socialized, battle-hardened and armed in Libya are likely to pose a challenge to their countries of origin throughout the coming decade.

Concerning the violent crisis in Mali, we often read geopolitical or geostrategic analyses that focus on labeling the main armed forces or some emblematic individuals. These are generally identified, at least implicitly, in two irreconcilable camps of « good » or « evil », depending on the points of view. This article proposes another approach, closer to the daily realities experienced by the populations living in the region of Menaka. Some of the armed forces and well-known personalities are mentioned, but with the desire to reinstate them in their social environments, in local long-standing stories and alongside other groups of people that are less known. The purpose here is to understand the underpinnings of the relationships of violence that have been increasing since 2012. We will discover, in fact, that the logics of rivalry, protection and retaliation, all common aspects of « ordinary » life, are being exacerbated, partly because of the intervention of external armed forces.

Boko Haram is rooted both in the ancient past of the Muslim kingdom of Sahel, Bornou, and in the more recent postcolonial history where regional power struggles turned to Bornou's disadvantage. Boko Haram then bloomed following the long religious Muslim incubation experienced in the lake's region. But the transformation into a radical salafist mass unrest was caused by the execution of the leader Mohammad Yusuf in 2009 by the Nigerian police, followed by the repression of its followers. Unable to put an end to it, Nigeria has to call its neighbors for help. In 2015, a coalition of the states around Tchad frees the cities but the brutality of the counter insurrection reinforces Boko Haram's hold among the population. After seven years of sedition, the movement could not be shut down. It survives in stronghold refuges, lake Tchad in particular. Governments still struggle to administer the zones gained by Boko Haram and to allow the displaced people to return.

The recent rise of jihadist movements in West Africa has puzzled many observers. The easy spread of the jihadist ideology, the jihadist movements success in massively recruiting followers among the local population as well as their ability to conquer territories are unprecedented in the region's contemporary history. This report attempts to shade light on the factors and processes that contribute to the emergence of these movements. It argues that the phenomenon of jihadist insurgencies in West Africa emerge as a result of a series of processes at the global, local, and individual level. At the global level, there is the formation and dissemination of the global ideology of Jihadism, conceptualized by Muslim activists and scholars based on a particular understanding of Islam and the challenges that are facing contemporary Muslim societies. At the local level, the appropriation of Jihadi ideologies by local « Islamic activists » who then use it to formulate a discourse that taps into local social and political demands to mobilize followers is key. For a wide range of reasons, areas of Africa have experienced weakened state capacity and increased local conflict, and it is in these areas that Jihadi insurgencies have emerged. And at the individual level, the process by which African individuals decide to enroll in Jihadi groups include ideological, situational, and strategic motivations, and these have all been facilitated by deteriorating conditions of life in marginalized areas.

This article follows, from a chronological perspective, the evolutions of the relationships between the Maghreb (Algeria and Libya) and the Sahara-Sahel (Mali and Niger) since the fall of Gaddafi's regime in 2011. It analyzes both the contentious behaviours of local stakeholders and the diplomatic responses to them formulated especially by Algeria. If Algiers's strategy was originally designed to fill in the political void left by Libya, it is now trying to combine security constraints and political involvement through mediation. As a result, the country's foreign policy regarding the region is today torn between old practices derived from its past experiences and their necessary adaptation to the current internationalized context of the Sahara-Sahel.

The Sahel region is just below the Sahara, but many specialists consider that it is composed of the Sahel G5 created in 2014: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad. The G5 was created because these five nations are facing the same major problems in terms of security and development. The fact that the terrorist movements took control of two-thirds of the Malian nation resulted in an international awareness: the situation might become irreversible. And to prevent this very situation from spreading to the whole Sahel, which would turn it into a destabilization zone, was a major concern. From the very start, France played a major role by quickly sending its troops in order to help the Malian nation, with the hope that the Sahelian countries will take control of their own destiny.

This article analyses France's security policy in the Western part of the Sahel and Sahara, from Tchad to Mauritania. It shows that it lies on three principles: an overestimated importance of Islam in the production of revolts that are qualified of jihadists; a very military vision of gigantic interconnected spaces; an assimilation of the war on terrorism to war on poverty and illegal emigration.

This text which focuses on the central Sahara (Algeria, Libya, Mali, Niger), traces, first of all, the evolution of trans-Saharan trade since the pre-colonial era until 2011, this year being a pivotal date, because marked by major political events: Arab Spring, fall of the regime of Colonel Gaddafi which has paved the way to a civil war still ongoing, beginning of a new Tuareg rebellion assisted by jihadists in northern Mali. The authors then analyse the impact of these political events on trans-Saharan flows (since 2011) and underline the pervasiveness of informality and fraud due to the corruption of state agents and the weakness of these states. Finally, this text deals with the criminal nature of some flows through the examination of drug and arms trafficking and concludes on the incapacity of States to restore their authority in these marginal and lawlessness areas.

Circulation space between the north and the south of Sahara, Niger is becoming since the end of the 2000s, the main crossing point for West African migrants to Algeria, Libya and even Europe. In addition to this crossing position, Niger is also a departure space for circular migrants, who leave in search of a temporary activity in North and West Africa. This particular position, as well as the instability in Libya since 2011, contribute to make it a key country for European externalization policies, that was put in place from the Valletta Summit in 2015. In just a few years, the interventions of European and international actors (IOM, UNHCR) have led to the implementation of devices articulated around security, development and protection. Firstly, the border and movements control, secondly projects aimed at stabilizing populations, and thirdly the building of a protection space in Niger, contribute to make it a contention and blocking space for people on the move.

The Saharo-Sahelian area is currently experiencing intense extractive dynamics linked to the discovery of gold along its desert margins. These zones are also known for their political instability and conflicts. This article aims to describe the diffusion of this vast « pioneer gold front » by highlighting its modalities and the reasons of its magnitude. It also aims to explain the ambivalent consequences of the development of gold mining, particularly in terms of the stabilization or the increase of conflict in the region, by shedding light on the various actors involved in controlling this new windfall.