Contenu du sommaire : L'indépendance des cours des comptes en Europe

Reflections upon the Independence of Public Bodies. Control over public finances is very revealing of changes affecting our political systems because it provides a terrain, which is particularly apt in demonstrating certain aspects of these changes. Public power, which has greatly increased, essentially in favour of the government, has pursued a policy of rationalisation. This requires new formulations of the separation of powers not only concerning the normative and legal functions of the state, but also its entrepreneurial activities regarding management and control. The granting of an independent status for certain authorities is unfailingly justified by the specific nature of the function exercised. It is noteworthy that the improvements, which it is necessary to make to the controlling bodies, such as ensuring their independence, represent characteristics, which traditionally belong to the judiciary.

Relations with Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers. The rules, which apply to high level institutions carrying out control functions generally, have a constitutional foundation, which guarantees their independence with respect to the three state powers. Beyond the guarantees provided by these rules, the institutions generally enjoy autonomy in their financial and personnel management and a large degree of budgetary autonomy. Finally, the supreme audit institutions collaborate, to a greater or lesser extent depending on the country concerned, with the judiciary which ensures that the controls are effective, and also with the legislative power, which is the principal addressee of their work.

Means of Independence. In Europe, the normative guarantees which apply to supreme audit institutions are numerous and very often are contained within the Constitution or organic laws. Autonomy of budgetary management is widely respected and is also a factor ensuring independence. However, some expenditure may be subjected to particular restrictions. While the heads of these institutions enjoy their autonomy, this does not always correspond with that of the rest of their personnel, particularly those employees who assist in applying the control mechanisms. Generally speaking, there is a notably persistent tendency of the administration to intervene indirectly in order to influence matters.

Relations with the Media. Analysis of the responses of 34 supreme audit institutions to a questionnaire on their relations with the media has enabled a somewhat qualified table of these reactions to be drawn up. On the one hand there are a number of frequently identifiable differences between countries, relating to the status of these relations, to the type of report published, to the strategy adopted with regard to the media, or moreover with respect to the media coverage given. On the other hand, there is a general tendency towards a growth in public and media interest in the work of the supreme audit institutions. This increased sensibility is accompanied by tangible advantages, but also presents a more important risk of criticism of these activities

The Accountability of Supreme Audit Institutions - Who Controls the Controllers ? Most institutions have recognised the need to establish specific units in order to carry out internal audits. Whatever their organisation and their competencies, the existence of these units improves the quality of work. Evaluations are generally extremely thorough. External checks are carried out usually by Parliament and the president of the institution is responsible for the budget. Administrative management is generally not subjected to external checks. The publication by most supreme audit institutions of reports of their activities and their budget allows for public debate.

Supreme Audit Institutions in a Changing Environment. The wide-spread slicing-up of central administration, which is represented by a trend towards decentralisation, privatisations and the development of administrative bodies with a certain amount of autonomy vis-à-vis the central administration, has the effect of transforming the role of supreme audit institutions. In the light of these changes, these institutions must adapt, agreeing to carry out second or even third level checks, and striving to be sites of excellence. These transformations are being realised via an increasing desire for transparency, wide usage of new information technology and the assimilation of control and communication methods used in the private sector.

From Independence to Freedom. The ultimate goal of supreme audit institutions ought not to be independence, but freedom. Independence requires working autonomously beyond all influences. Freedom, on the other hand, implies close but honest collaboration between the supreme audit institutions and their interlocutors ; close collaboration with the media too, who are an effective means for giving weight to the exercise of controlling public finances. The development of a more managerial and less economic or legal perspective is desirable.

The Adventure of Administrative Reform is about Professionalism too. Professionalism, which is indispensable to the success of administrative reform, implies a savoir-faire based upon knowledge of the particular context in which one wishes to act. It is not simply a question of seeking internal efficiency – and this is a particularity of the public sector – but also an external effectiveness which is akin to a form of management of public policies. To these two requirements must be added that of the legitimacy of the public sector, and a reconciliation of the three must, therefore, be sought.

Decentralisation in England, France and Germany -From Historical Divergence to Convergence ? The comparative study of the evolution of local authorities in England, France and Germany since the 19th century, reveals the importance of historical institutional heritage in each of these Systems whether this be as a result of the influence which it still exerts, or by the reform initiatives which it has provoked. Successive usage of three typologies facilitates the revelation of the essential characteristics of decentralisation in the three countries and the identification of broad tendencies towards convergence.