Contenu du sommaire : L'Asie de l'Est face à la Chine

When dealing with China, Japan has assumed a position that protects its economic cooperation with Beijing, ensures Chinese aggressive strategies are deterred and guarantees its overall economic security: security of supply, autonomy in technological development, etc. The US-Japanese alliance, which has been reinforced and is based on regional agreements, aims to provide a systemic counterweight to China. The worsening in US-China relations could make Tokyo's balancing act more difficult to maintain.

Relations between Seoul and Beijing have long been marked by alternating rapprochement and friction. Beijing is attempting to distance South Korea from the United States. Seoul intends to maintain its relations with China, its largest trading partner, while retaining the US security guarantee. The South Korean balancing act could prove difficult to maintain in the near future, and Seoul would benefit from relying on other partners in addition to Washington.

In recent years, the People's Republic of China's policy towards Taiwan has become increasingly aggressive. Economic pressure has escalated and displays of military force are now very common. The Chinese stance has led to increased international support for Taipei. The Taiwanese issue is now more central than ever to US-China confrontation that has been worsened by the COVID-19 crisis.

China is exerting pressure on its surrounding area in South-East Asia to implement its concept of a “community with a shared destiny”. An increased presence, numerous dialogs and joint projects play a part in restricting the margin of maneuver for ASEAN members with reduced effectiveness. The health crisis has enabled Beijing to deploy its diplomatic resources. By coordinating diplomacy and military pressure in the China Sea, China is marginalizing the other – Western – actors in the region.

China has been Australia's largest trading partner since 2007, and is looking to extend its influence in the country by using three methods: co-optation, corruption and coercion. However, Australian political leaders are not naive. They have introduced a series of measures to curb foreign interference, sparking anger among Chinese politicians. The standoff between Canberra and Beijing may provide the Europeans with useful lessons.

Moving beyond current debates, measuring public debt is complex. It cannot be likened to household debt, as the refinancing capacity of States is not limitless and is particularly dependent upon growth. The return of inflation is not an immediate threat. Debt, which inevitably grows in times of crises, should be used for long-term, socially relevant spending and this requires not just political, but economic assessment.

Public debt must remain sustainable and adapted to changes in the economy, otherwise there is a threat of risky borrowing conditions. Its stabilization depends on growth, control of public expenditure and the ability to raise taxes. Central banks can lend to States, but they must be careful not to let inflation weaken companies. The cancellation of public debts by the European Central Bank could initiate a cycle of inflation and uncontrollable spending.

Mass vaccination against COVID-19 identifies several groups of countries: rich countries with rapid vaccination; countries that develop and produce vaccines, but do not prioritize vaccination of their own population; and poorer countries that will only achieve herd immunity by 2022 or 2023. The choice of vaccines is also a differentiating factor. The pursuit of herd immunity through vaccines reveals a real global geopolitical hierarchy.

The end of the Trump presidency has demonstrated both the strength of institutions and their weakness. The US political scene is undermined by at least three factors: the influence of money in the electoral process; the hysteria of the debate on various media; the dysfunction in the electoral system itself: an inequality of the voting weight and an increase in impediments to voting. The Democrats want to reform the system, but it is not clear they have the institutional resources to do so.

In the event of a major conflict, Iran could decide to close the Strait of Hormuz, which would cause a global energy crisis. The Islamic Republic has the military resources to temporarily enforce such a blockade, but its ability to sustain this in the long term is doubtful. It would probably have to resort to other aspects of its “deterrence triad”: terrorism and regional unrest by its proxies to deal with the resulting escalation from such a decision.

Although it is the showcase of the United Arab Emirates, Dubai has not been able to return to the growth it experienced prior to the 2009 Financial Crisis. The double health and economic crises are a new challenge. Dubai must now rely more than ever on the Emirate of Abu Dhabi's support, which is the Federation's political and security center, with 92 % of its hydrocarbon reserves. The current phase confirms Abu Dhabi's political dominance in the Federation and requires Dubai to redefine its development model and narrative.

Over the last five years, there has been a succession of periods of openness and tension on the Korean peninsula. Donald Trump thought he could achieve North Korean denuclearization through his personal relationship with Kim Jong-un. He failed. The Biden administration is more realistic and systematic. It could choose more modest, intermediate options, while maintaining the distant goal of dismantling Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal.

Finance has become a key part of power. Its importance has increased with the significant investments required by the energy and digital transitions, or even by the need to support economies hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. In terms of financial power, the European Union has many advantages, starting with its single currency, but it also suffers from real disadvantages, that were particularly evident during the Trump presidency.