Contenu du sommaire : Ukraine : entre deux paix ? Algérie, de l'indépendance au Hirak

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 did not have the outcome Vladimir Putin expected. Russian troops met strong resistance from the Ukrainian army and the wider population. The extent and effectiveness of this resistance can be explained by Ukraine's growing sense of nationhood since 2014 and the simultaneous establishment of a network of volunteers linked to the Donbas conflict.

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Moscow's initial plan was to use a “shock and awe” approach to conquer Kyiv quickly. However, the Russians had underestimated the cohesion of the Ukrainian nation and the effectiveness of the Ukrainian army. When it found it was unable to make further progress, the Russian army chose to concentrate its operations on the Donbas and the Black Sea coast, where it now faces stiff resistance.

Security architecture is an institutional framework of principles regulating a security system that is more or less stable. Whatever the outcome on the ground may be, the war in Ukraine will result in a new dividing line running through Europe, located much further East than the one created by the Cold War. Even if the powers manage to agree on stabilization measures to reduce the danger, a new security architecture is therefore not imminent.

The concept of the sphere of influence is as old as international politics. Its popularity boomed during the era of rival empires in the center of Europe and with twentieth-century schools of geopolitical thought. The end of the Cold War banished it from the European continent. Yet Putin is attempting to restore it with his fantasies of the return of the Russian Empire and regional hegemony. The West's response to this dangerous retrograde step will stand guarantor for the security of Europe.

The outbreak of war in Ukraine dealt a shock to energy markets. The European Union has suddenly grasped the true cost of its dependence on Russian hydrocarbons and, since then, has been trying to accelerate the diversification of its supplies and its energy mix. It will also have to learn to reduce its consumption. Outside Europe, the imperatives of energy security seem to be taking precedence over climate targets.

The election of President Tebboune, followed by the Covid-19 pandemic, marked the end of the road for the Hirak movement that had failed to establish itself as a political alternative despite its massive popularity. However, repression cannot disguise the lack of renewal within the ruling establishment or the persistence of economic problems. Algeria's relationship with Morocco has worsened since the latter's rapprochement with Israel, while its relationship with France remains marked by conflicting memories.

Algerian diplomatic power, once a beacon in the developing world, has waned considerably since the end of the 1980s. Despite the efforts made at the start of Bouteflika's presidency, Algeria has found itself sidelined when it comes to the conflicts in its region: the Western Sahara, the Arab Spring, instability in Tunisia, anarchy in Libya, and the destabilization of the Sahel. It is initiating regional reengagement, but beyond its rapprochement with the United States and the European Union, its position remains unclear, and its relationship with China, ambivalent.

The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco dates back to Algerian independence and the debate over the drawing of postcolonial frontiers. The issue of the Western Sahara has been added on to this geopolitical opposition. Following a relatively calm spell, the rivalry resumed at the start of the current decade, impelling both countries to seek external support in the forms of diplomacy and weapons. As a result, we may see this local rivalry being played out on a larger stage in years to come.

Now that the long Bouteflika interlude has come to a close, Algeria—which has conflict on its doorstep in both Libya and the Sahel—is attempting to redefine its role in the region. A regional power that cannot be ignored, Algeria is drawing on its heritage of dialog-based diplomacy and, increasingly, affirming its own choices of establishing bilateral cooperative relationships, organizing a regional response to instability, and carrying out economic diplomacy, while at the same time remaining distrustful of actors from outside the region.

Algeria and the European Union (EU) are linked by an association agreement that came into force in 2005 but has not yet given rise to the reforms expected by Brussels. The EU's neighborhood policy nevertheless offers advantages and opportunities. Even though the recurring tensions between France and Algeria cannot fail to affect the latter's relationship with the EU, the technocratic and pragmatic side of the neighborhood policy may still permit the EU to keep a cool head when setting up cooperation.

Some nations deploy influence strategies so they can impose their wishes on other actors without the use of force. They will use seduction, appeal, pressure, inconvenience, or payment, to greater or lesser extents, depending on the nature of their regime. The channels used to implement these strategies include the media, culture, education, entryism, and digital technologies. European nations are becoming increasingly aware of these challenges, but they owe it to themselves to take more vigorous action.

The reduction in levels of violence in Syria might make the outside world think that the war is coming to an end. In reality, the conflict is temporarily frozen, but the conditions for resuming hostilities are unmistakably present. The country is currently divided into four zones, controlled respectively by the regime supported by Moscow and Tehran; the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, supported by Washington; Turkey; and the jihadist group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. The status quo is not likely to last, however.

China is promoting the concept of the Third Pole, consisting of the Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau, to legitimize its interest in the governance and resources of the Arctic. This concept is depicted in original cartographic representations that place China in the center of the world, between the Arctic and the Antarctic. These representations, which form part of Beijing's soft power, contrast sharply with the Eurocentric maps that predominate in Western countries.