Contenu du sommaire : Le Sud contre l'Occident ?

The idea of the “Global South” was prominent throughout 2023, across multiple summits including the G20 and BRICS. A concrete instantiation might be the notion of active non-alignment: emerging nations setting their policies in line with problems as they arise and their own best interests. The rise of this Global South, which cannot but elicit some resistance among the old powers of the North, is evidence of a changing world and the necessity of new governance.

The process of globalization has appreciably reduced the poverty of the Global South, although in a very unequal manner. China's economic takeoff has ushered in a new era. China is now attempting to bring its influence to bear on the way the world economic system operates, through new financial institutions and by developing its New Silk Roads. The Global South remains divided, resorting primarily to economic regionalization strategies, and sometimes weakened by the trap of Chinese debt.

Initially limited to the financial domain, the term BRICS is gradually becoming established in global economic governance. Its influence, due largely to the proportion of global wealth held by BRICS countries, primarily takes the form of the demand for a new role within international institutions. New financial institutions are coming into being. The group's latest expansion, at the Johannesburg summit, will doubtless improve neither the real global influence of BRICS countries—except as regards oil—nor their cohesion.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in 2001 by China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries. Over the years, it has come to resemble a sort of Eurasian OSCE. In 2017, it expanded to include India and Pakistan. This expansion increased its influence, but reduced its internal coherence. It has become the main post-Western regional organization, operating in a complementary fashion to the BRICS forum.

Faced with the boom in demand for metal resources generated by the latest technology, the United States and Europe have been forced to revise the geography of their supply networks, which is synonymous with strategic dependency. China, which plays a central role throughout the supply chain, poses a particular problem in this regard. It is therefore necessary to diversify supply, but the idea of managing in the future without a deal with Beijing is undoubtedly wishful thinking.

Climate change makes it imperative to decarbonize both our production methods and our lifestyles. Critical minerals are at the heart of the energy transition. Among them, lithium plays a central role in electrifying transportation. The increased importance of this metal is currently redrawing the map of energy geopolitics. Australia and Latin America—home to the “lithium triangle”—are taking on an unprecedented central role.

The Russian economy is weathering the war and Western sanctions: it has maintained its exports, its business sector has shown marked dynamism, and the population is managing in part thanks to state spending. The fact remains that in the long term this economy may risk going into real decline, as a consequence of isolation, aggravated by a demographic deficit and a collapse in human capital. “War capitalism” is undoubtedly not viable in the long term.

Multinational companies present in Ukraine and Russia felt the full force of the consequences of the Russian invasion of February 2022. They first had to urgently ensure the safety of their employees and facilities. Next came the question of whether they would continue to operate, especially given Western sanctions against Moscow. The war in Ukraine has also shown the strategic role that can be played by some private actors.

In the run-up to a presidential election whose outcome is in no real doubt, Egypt is mired in a major economic crisis. There are many contributing factors to this crisis: the impact of Covid-19 on tourism, consequences of the war in Ukraine, measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund, regional clientelism, etc. The country is increasingly dependent on the Gulf monarchies, but their help comes with strings attached. Egypt's future looks dark indeed.

After three decades of low inflation in Western Europe and in the United States, prices started to increase again at the time of the Covid-19 crisis and then especially after the start of the war in Ukraine. The causes of inflation are not identical on the two sides of the Atlantic. There are however, to a greater or lesser extent, some common drivers, such as the consequences of being entangled in global value chains, the explosion in energy prices, and tensions in the job market.

India is expected to become the third largest world economic power by 2027. The Indian economy is not without its weaknesses, however. Its industrial sector, for example, is inadequately developed, but might benefit from the West's derisking strategy with regard to China. India's geo-economic confidence can also be seen in its desire to attract foreign capital and to make greater use of the rupee in international transactions.

Although Iran was opposed to the first Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, politico-diplomatic pragmatism has dominated since the return of the Taliban in summer 2021. Although an international war seems unlikely given that it is not in the interests of either state, the increase in tensions shows the critical significance water now has as a natural resource. Beyond the quarrel over the Helmand River, the emergence of struggles over water may come to be a new factor in Middle East conflict more generally.