Contenu du sommaire : Vaincre

As the universe unfolds, the resulting evolutionary process is shaped by a random interplay of violent forces. Thus, the very existence of living creatures and, therefore, of human beings takes on a war-like quality. As a desirous animal, humankind has a need for victory; one that is particularly acute, but that also invites us to master its inner workings by learning to renounce our thirst for domination.

Much like wars, epidemics constitute a moment of truth for the societies they affect. Epidemics kill, massively and indiscriminately. Their brutal onslaught halts the course of ordinary life, challenges beliefs with knowledge and tests the resilience of political, social, moral, cultural and economic structures. What's more, they demand a collective response. Above all, epidemics pose an essential question: how can they be defeated? The plague that ravaged Marseille and Provence between 1720 and 1722 constitutes a poignant example.

The three major monotheistic religions formalize the means of securing victory in rather different ways: in Judaism, these means are profoundly ethical; in Christianity, they are necessarily spiritual; and in Islam, they are multifaceted. Yet each of these religious movements has adapted – and sometimes betrayed – its sacred texts in response to historical circumstances, without ever losing sight of the notion that all victory is, in all time and history, invariably incomplete.

Four Allied generals, who sit side by side on nato's Military Committee, engaged in a rather unique exercise: to define the word “defeating”. Their analysis is far removed from academic definitions, yet reveals the profoundly paradoxical nature of this concept. After all, what does defeating truly mean?

By desecrating Hector's corpse after defeating him in single combat, Achilles committed a terrible act that precipitated Greeks and Trojans into an escalation of violence – one that could only end in the annihilation of one of the two sides. Philosopher Simone Weil demonstrated that heroes are in fact vessels through which force is enacted; a type of force that subjugates victors and vanquished alike, one that transforms “others” into mere “things”; a type of force that can lead to dangerous extremes and thereby implies the ability to prevent oneself from acting.

Following its victories over the Axis powers in 1945, the United States became a global hegemon that posed as the guardian of the world's freedom. Yet, according to Gramsci, hegemony is invariably “protected by the armor of coercion”. Today, America is no longer fighting and winning major wars. Instead, the Pentagon relies on “strategic communication”, a cognitive battlefield designed to claim victory both on the ground and in the eyes of the public.

There is a question that divided colonial France in the early 20th century: how to conquer Morocco and integrate it into the empire that the Third Republic was in the process of building? Should France adopt a tribal policy, by crushing one tribe after the next and exclusively resorting to military force? Or, as diplomats and financiers argued, should it proceed from the top down, i.e. by marginalizing the Moroccan state and relying on the sultan's still-embryonic state apparatus, in a process similar to the Tunisian protectorate established in 1881?

How did Charles VII manage to defeat the English? At the start of 1429, the outcome of the war was entirely uncertain. Yet, while Joan of Arc tipped the balance in favor of Charles VII, it is indeed possible that France would still have emerged victorious without her. Perhaps the final victory enjoyed by French royalty did not only play out on the battlefield. To expand upon this, let us analyze two different personalities, both of whom embodied a form of unfortunate courage in their own way: John II of France and Joan of Arc.

The year 1435 was marked by the signing of the Treaty of Arras, which put an end to the conflict between Charles VII, King of France, and Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy. By ending French military operations against Burgundy, the treaty left many warriors unemployed. To survive, the latter engaged in all manner of plundering throughout the kingdom of France and its surroundings, leading them to become known as the Écorcheurs (flayers). The military reform of 1445 finally put an end to this trend, through the creation of a standing army dubbed the “ compagnies d'ordonnance”. After a complex process fraught with obstacles, the era of the Écorcheurs ultimately enabled Charles VII to reassert and reinforce his authority, not only over the warriors and their captains, but also over fractious princes.

The customs of war, such as honoring the defeated, seem to be dying out. Should we accept the disappearance of these practices, under the pretense that the battlefield has changed and is getting increasingly more complex? Here, the aim is to show that our soldiers, if they are to emerge victorious, must continue to make these practices their own.

Is it possible to win without humiliating? The law of force, which pushes others to either measure up or disappear, is barbaric. What's more, the victors will eventually find themselves on the receiving end of this law. How, then, can we wage war while knowing that we will not always be victorious, and in such a way that peace is still possible in the aftermath? Victorious force is both overwhelming and devastating due to the terrific types of passion it unleashes; for we hate those we have wronged, and the powers of vengeance are insatiable. Here, the aim is to understand the conditions under which these forces can be appeased.

How to deal with defeated enemy soldiers? This question must be considered at two key stages: during and after the war. During combat, they must be disarmed and neutralized without slowing down the ongoing offensive or mobilizing too many men to stand guard – a principle that applies throughout history. They can also be utilized in order to obtain information, ransoms or as labor. Thus, the defeated are rarely executed. After the conflict, the aim is to transform military victory into a political victory and peace, the durability of which mainly depends on the degree of severity and humiliation imposed upon the defeated.

The famous motto of Saint-Cyr Military Academy translates as: “They learn to win”. The school has now trained army officer cadets for no-less than two centuries. Let us give the academy a well-deserved closer look. In this article, Colonel Erbland, who is now Head of Saint-Cyr's First Battalion, does just that. He and his two deputies are in charge – among other things – of conveying a concept that can hardly be described in a list of training specifications: military righteousness. This essential, yet difficultly definable facet of military life forges the spirit that enables one to go all the way and claim victory.

In a soldier's mind, the sole objective of both their commitment and preparation is victory. Over the course of their career, they may be brought to experience victory in several forms: victory on the front, and victory in the rear. Though the former may be more emblematic, as it is the final accomplishment of military undertakings, it is only made possible through planning and the organic procedures that take place in the silence of the barracks and headquarters. What's more, victory in arms is only possible if leaders enjoy solid support from their men. What, then, does victory truly entail? An answer can be found in the success of France's “Operation Serval”.

Two-time Olympic sabre champion Jean-François Lamour shares his vision of what victory truly means to a top athlete. He gives us his insight on the reality of preparation, one that is often unknown to the public. He talks about his own state of mind, as well as the training, hard work, perseverance and humility required to strengthen one's will in view of overcoming one's opponent and, above all, oneself on the road to victory.

On April 19, 1961, the mission to liberate the island of Cuba, dubbed “Operation Zapata”, ended in disaster. Worse still, President Kennedy was compelled to acknowledge the United States' full responsibility for the failed invasion. Fingers were soon pointed at errors in America's tactical planning and the CIA's flawed methods. Could it be that this failure was in fact rooted in the conditions that surrounded the decision-making process?

In Hellenic polytheism, “war” is a concept partly attributed to Athena. She shared this realm with Ares, yet Athena was more of a strategist, possessing the cunning intelligence known as metis – a notion often confused with wisdom. In reality, studies on Greek religion tend not to pay much attention to the goddess' martial role. This aspect deserves to be examined in light of all available data – be it literary, epigraphic or archaeological. This will allow us to determine Athena's modi operandi as a war-waging deity of Antiquity, from the Archaic Period to the Age of Imperialism.

The concept of military orchestras is as recent as 1766. Since then, these musical ensembles have played a major role in French and international cultural life, constituting what could be called a “tool of influence” for France. To this day, military orchestras – and particularly that of France's Republican Guard – represent the nation as a whole during state ceremonies and beyond. Let us look back on this great cultural epic.