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About the Relationships between the transformations in the Religious Field and the transformations of Political Space This text is an attempt to describe the mechanism by which the crisis of the religious field gives rise to new forms by which the church makes felt its «presence» in the field of ideological production. The «opening up» of Catholic Culture (here deli-mited and objectified by the study of the inventory of a large religious bookstore) must be related to struggles which are shaking the religious field and which oppose the groups and fractions on the way out, predisposed to efforts of integration, to the rising fractions of the middle classes and of the dominant class who tend to bring to religious question practices and manners in affinnity with their ethos and their life style. Preceeding the evolution of religious tastes of the majority of Catholics (but anticipating a tendency to intellectualize belief and pratices which is related to the overall rise in the level of education and duration of school attendance) by their attempts to in-novate, the intellectual avant-garde of the lower clergy has met the expectations of an elite of the faithful and of active organizers (militants) belonging to the intelligentzia and the new petty bourgeoisie. By renewing and rejuvenating Catholic culture, the attempts of the avant-garde clerics and laymen to reconcile faith with psychoanalysis and, more recently, with Marxism, have had the effect of giving a religious coloring to that ideological mood which can be characterised as fin de siecle, as well as that of leading intellectuals back to a rene wed form of religion. The moving to the left (and to the extreme left) of progressive catholics may contribute to confusion as well as the inversion of the cardinal points of political space, by the shift to the left of ways of thinking and themes more properly the property of groups and mouvements close to the Church, situated until very recently to the right or the extreme right.

Wittgenstein and Anthropology The Remarks on 'The Golden Bough' of Frazer prepared by Wittgenstein, although they constitute nothing more than notes on his reading and were evidently not intended for publication in this form, can be considered as one of the most illuminating texts for the compréhension of what Wittgenstein called the «spirit» of his philosophy. It is equally an important document for the critical reflection on the methods and results of sociological and anthropological research. According to Wittgenstein, Frazer's error derives from his strict rationalism and his naive ethnocentricism, as well as his essentialist attitude and his desire to explain that which ought not and need not be explained : his interpretations combine the disadvantages of «scientiste» objectivism and psychologizing hermeneutics. Wittgenstein disputes the inherent explanatory qualities of the evolutionary argument, and even more generally, those of the genetic hypotheses. Evolutionary anthropology artificially establishes between «primitive» societies and our own a distance which derives essentially from a misinterpretation of the purpose and function of scientific explanation and from an erroneous appreciation of its potentialities. The real proximity which exists between Frazer's savages and ourselves is manifested not only in fact that we too have our mythology and our magic which in themselves are more than the mere survivals of archaic times. Philosophy itself furnishes remarkable examples of the use of magical procedures, and its natural attitude with respect to language derives fundamentally from mythology. Contrary to the impression which might be left by certain passages of his Remarks, Wittgenstein no more accepts the subjectivist interpretation (psychological) than the objectivist interpretation of ihe notion of «explanation» in the social sciences. Wittgenstein's originality lies in his simultaneous effort to maintain a clear eut distinction between the method of the social sciences and that of the natural sciences and to «depsychologize» radically the crucial notion of «comprehension». Anthropology and sociology, whose methodological discussions continue to be dominated largely by that which Wittgenstein's work has shown to be a false antinomy, would doubtless benefit from an increased utilisation of his celebrated reflection on the concept of «rule» and the significance of the expression «to follow a rule».

ger Wittgenstein und die Anthropologieger ger Die von Wittgenstein abgefassten Bemerkungen über Frazers 'The Golden Bough' sind einer jener Texte, die am besten darüber Aufschluss geben, was Wittgenstein den «Geist» seiner Philosophie nannte, obwohl es sich nur um Leseanmerkungen handelt, die nicht fur die Veröffentlichung bestimmt waren. Diese Bemerkungen sind auch eine wichtige Reflexion über Methoden und Ergebnisse der soziologischen und anthropologischen Forschung. Der Irrtum Frazers ist laut Wittgenstein auf dessen engen Rationalismus und seine naive Ethnozentrik zurückzuführen, auf seine essentialistische Betrachtungsweise und auf seinen Wunsch, ailes zu erklären, was nicht zu erklären ist oder nicht erklärt zu werden braucht : seine Interpretation haben sowohl die Fehler eines scientistischen Objektivismus, als auch einer psychologisierenden Hermeneutik. Wittgenstein zweifelt den Erklärungswert der entwicklungsphilosophischen und ganz allgemein der genetischen Hypothesen an. Die von der Entwicklungsanthropologieger küinstlich errichtete Entfernung zwischen den «primitiven» und unseren Gessellschaften ergibt sich aus einer falschen Interpretation des Ziels und der Funktion der wissenschaftlichen Erklärung und aus einer falschen Einschätzung ihrer Möglichkeiten. Die wahre Nähe, die zwischen Frazer's Wilden und uns besteht, zeigt sich nicht nur daran, dass auch wir unsere Mythologie und Magie haben, die nicht nur Reste aus archaischen Zeiten sind. Selbst die Philosophie liefert Beispiele der Anwendung «magis-cher» Verfahren, und ihre natürliche, Einstellung der Sprache gegentiber ist zutiefst mythologisch. Im Gegensatz zu den Eindrücken, die einige Seiten seiner Bemerkungen über Frazer vermitteln könnten, akzeptiert Wittgenstein weder die subjektivistische (psychologische) noch die objektivistische Interprétation der «Erklärung» in den Geisteswissenschaften. Seine Originalität besteht im Versuch, eine klare Trennung zwischen der Methode der Geisteswissenschaften und jeger ner der Natur-wissenschaften aufrechtzuerhalten, und daran, dass er gleichzeitig den zentralen begriff des «Verste-hens» radikal entpsychologisiert hat. Die Anthropologie und die Soziologie, deren methodologische Diskussionen weiterhin durch einen Gegensatz gekennzeichnet sind, der bei Wittgenstein implizit wie ein Pseudo-Gegensatz aufscheint, täten gut daran, die beriihmten Uberlegungen über den Begriff der «Regel» und über die Bedeutung des Satzes «eine Regel befolgen» besser auszuschöpfen.eng Wittgenstein and Anthropologyeng eng The Remarks on 'The Golden Bough' of Frazer prepared by Wittgenstein, although they constitute nothing more than notes on his reading and were evidently not intended for publication in this form, can be considered as one of the most illuminating texts for the compréhension of what Wittgenstein called the «spirit» of his philosophy. It is equally an important document for the critical reflection on the methods and results of sociological and anthropological research. According to Wittgenstein, Frazer's error derives from his strict rationalism and his naive ethnocentricism, as well as his essentialist attitude and his desire to explain that which ought not and need not be explained : his interpretations combine the disadvantages of «scientiste» objectivism and psychologizing hermeneutics. Wittgenstein disputes the inherent explanatory qualities of the evolutionary argument, and even more generally, those of the genetic hypotheses. Evolutionary anthropology artificially establishes between «preng imitive» societies and our own a distance which derives essentially from a misinterpretation of the purpose and function of scientific explanation and from an erroneous appreciation of its potentialities. The real proximity which exists between Frazer's savages and ourselves is manifested not only in fact that we too have our mythology and our magic which in themselves are more than the mere survivals of archaic times. Philosophy itself furnishes remarkable examples of the use of magical procedures, and its natural attitude with respect to language derives fundamentally from mythology. Contrary to the impression which might be left by certain passages of his Remarks, Wittgenstein no more accepts the subjectivist interpretation (psychological) than the objectivist interpretation of ihe notion of «explanation» in the social sciences. Wittgenstein's originality lies in his simultaneous effort to maintain a clear eut distinction between the method of the social sciences and that of the natural sciences aeng nd to «depsychologize» radically the crucial notion of «comprehension». Anthropology and sociology, whose methodological discussions continue to be dominated largely by that which Wittgenstein's work has shown to be a false antinomy, would doubtless benefit from an increased utilisation of his celebrated reflection on the concept of «rule» and the significance of the expression «to follow a rule».

Questions on the Political It has been known to political scientists for some time that the phenomena of electoral apathy or of failure to respond to questions on political opinion poils tend to vary in terms of sex, age, level of education, profession, place of residence and political preference. This aspect of political behavior here inspires a reflection regarding the social conditions of possibility of the production of an individual response to inquiries about politics. It is the problem, in other words, of the minimal competence needed by individuals to be able to identify their own views with those included in the complete set of preformulated opinions available to them on the «opinion market». Analyses of a mail survey on the educational System, of a survey on politics and of questionnaires compiled by public opinion pollings institutes has shown that the pro-bability that an individual will or will not have an opinion depends on their sense of whether or not they are entitled by their social status to do so or not. This feeling in turn stems from the capacity (varying with level of education) and the socially recognized need to have (or not to have) an opinion. The propensity to respond to political questions thus depends on one's status as well as one's feeling that one is invested with the abiblity -socially authorized and encouraged - to concern oneself with politics. Two practically irreconcilable conceptions of the «division of political labor» tend to be established. On the one hand, there is the notion of individuals who, lacking the real means of exercising the formai rights they possess as citizens in the abstract, admit that politics is «none of their business» ; on the other hand, that of persons who, by virtue of their monopoly of competence, feel the right to advocate a «personal opinion» or an authoritative opinion. It is not enough to describe the social conditions determining the way in which a person lays a claim to a «personal opinion» (and expresses it) and to recognize that the total delegation of individual authority to spokesmen doubtless constitutes the most realistic solution for those who are the most deprived and whose status renders them incompetent. Denouncing the inequalities of legal competence masks effectively the more fundamental question, which is the mode of production of the response. One can distinguish three very different modes of production : class ethos, the non-constituted generating principle, such as those prsented in the form of ethical or political axiomatics ; a systematic political axiomatic, a choice consciously made from clearly political principles (autogestion of political opinions) and the delegation of one's right to response to a political party (political opinion by proxy). In as much as the probability of actually laying claim to exercising one's right to what we may call a «well-founded personal opinion» is all the slighter, the more underprivileged one's position, the agents tend to find themselves reduced to the state of isolated individuals, and are all more vulnerable to the effet of allodoxia -and therefore to the distorting of the significance of their response- the more economically and politically deprived they are. Contrary to the populist mystique, which endows the proletariat with an adequate consciouness of its condition and to the pessimistic dissillusionment which reduces the working class to a state of perpetual aspiration to bourgeois status, it should be recalled that the class habitus is, in this case, one of informed ignorance, for the action of manipulation is only exercised within certain limits. If in political matters the relations between position in the social space and political opinions are less simple and direct than elsewhere, it is because in this area, the significance of the social trajectory is very great (experience of social ascension or decline). But, it is also because the moral contamination of politics does not spare the lower classes who find themselves dispossesed of the instruments of production of political opinion. These preceding critical remarks lead us to postulate entirely new terms to describe the relationship between political apparatus and the base, i.e. between the logic entirely specifie to the field of ideological production (the place of production of that ambiguous reality made up of idees forces) and the logic of the field of social classes.