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East-West : Counter Currents, by Denis Delbourg Looking back over the past four years, there seem to have been two major attainments in French policy towards the East West blocs. The boundaries of French national independence needed to be restated through reaffirmation of traditional French positions in the changing context of East West relations. It was also necessary to widen Europe's margin for independent action, and to increase its capacity for self-assertion instead of leaving it jammed between two blocs. These objectives have been achieved. The basis for long-term action along similar Unes is now laid for a period of cautious confrontation and prolongea négociation between the two Superpowers. It will be a period of « cold peace » as Regis Debray wrote it, during which it may be recognised that « we will not escape Yalta without enlightening the European mind and freeing it from the false notion that there exist only two alternatives ― America or Russia ― and from the vicious circle of fear of the one and the need for protection by the other which has existed for forty years ».

France and the Third World or How to Win the South Without Losing the North, by Marie-Claude Smouts France's ambitious policy intentions towards the Third World are based on high moral principe. In Mexico, François Mitterrand clearly stated the aims. These include a refusai to accept that whenever conflicts arise in the « South », thèse should automatically play a role in East West competition ; support for peoples struggling for liberty and social justice ; a conviction that the désunies of « North » and « South » are linked and that no international equilibrium can be achieved without the development of Third World countries. However, France has limited means at Us disposai for the implementation of these policies. In particular, no realistic alternative can be offered to those countries who wish to free themselves from the tutelage of either one of the superpowers, be they in Southern Africa, Indochina or Central America. France's actions are limited to pronouncing what is right and providing an intellectual framework within which solutions to these regional conflicts may be sought. On the other hand in traditional sphere of influence especially in Africa, continuity has prevailed over change. The spirit of cooperation has flourished, but the necessary means have not been provided and France has not actually equipped itself with the appropriate tools. The ambitious Ministry of Development envisaged at the beginning of the Presidential term has not materialised.

«... I had a dream... » Président François Mitterrand, Builder of European Union, by Philippe Moreau Defarges In 1981 Président François Mitterrand attempted to impose his socialist vision on Europe, but he was swiftly forced to bow to the traditional constraints of French diplomacy, such as ties with the Federal Republic, and the need to remain compétitive. Between 1981 and 1983 a debate started which has never been totally closed. It was thought that for the period of économie and social experiment, France should discharge itself temporarily from Community discipline. In fact, it was decided to stick to the rules of the game. At this time France needed to regain its European credibility. During the first half of 1984, Président Mitterrand resolved the knotty problems of budget déficit. However, the greatest challenges remain, i.e. the entry of Spain and Portugal and the industrial transformation which will entail severe upheaval for the Community system. And France must forge another role for itself within a new heterogeneous entity, beset by inconsistencies.

External Security and Defence : Change and Continuity, by François Heisbourg Since 1981, there have been important innovations in French defence policy. The reforms have however been introduced progressively and have not therefore been spectacular. The administration has helped to build up the already existing consensus on defence questions, which has eased the implementation of the changes which most closely concern the army and the mobility of its forces. On the level of personnel, the changes have consisted of the introduction of voluntary prolongation of military service, a force réduction by 22 000 without cutting down the number of officers and the transfer of certain operational tasks of territorial defence from the police. At the same time the framework of military organisation has been modified to create a Rapid Action Force, to strengthen the Third Army Corps and the French Forces in Germany. There has also been a séparation of the prestrategic surface nuclear force from the battle fleet. Though it is not yet possible to assess the impact of the reforms undertaken, there would appear to be a tendency towards greater solidarity with our allies without loss of freedom of decision.

1981-1985 : The Readjustment of French Policy in Lebanon, by Bass-ma Kodmani-Darwish In Lebanon, the Socialist Government had started by reaffirming its committment to the traditional principles of French policy. Since 1982, faced with a crisis of international dimensions, it must assume its responsibilities. But the means France has accepted to commit are serving an essentially American policy with which Paris is in disagreement. France fears of being accused to « let down » Lebanon. But France cannot abandon her Western partners and is prisoner of a policy that is not hers. Some mistakes could hâve been avoided and would have spared French lives. But our failure in Lebanon mainly reveals the limits of French role in a situation polarized between East and West. France's return to a specifically French policy since 1984 allows her to regain its traditional role in Lebanon, one which is accepted by ail parties.

France's Role in the Chadian Crisis of August 1983 : Letting the Side Dovvn in Africa, by Elce and Hesse Throughout the 1983 confrontation over Chad between France and Libya, a combination of analytic error and lack of decision-making ability were at the root of France's failure to meet its historie obligations in Africa. Between 1981 and 1983, French foreign policy makers seemed to have forgotten the basic geographie and historie faetors at play in the Chadian crisis. They wanted to see it as the resuit of a local clash between progressive and conservative forces in the continuing emancipation process of a Third World country. In August 1983, the news of Libya's invasion threw the French authorities into a state of confusion, which partially explains the reluctance to intervene. It would appear today as though Paris has resigned itself to Chad's loss of territorial integrity. Such an attitude will bring with it a considérable lowering of France's international esteem.

The Outlook for French Overseas Territories, by Jean-Pierre Gomane It had been assumed that the character and status of the French overseas territories and departments had been permanently established by the 1958 Constitution. It would appear however that the trends of the modem world have now prevailed. Certain small territories have already obtained their independence, while others are experiencing difficult or even critical situations which point towards an eventual change in their status. What do the DOMITOM (Overseas Departments and Territories) represent for France ? Is it the position of prestige in the world which they confer ? Is it their economie resources which can be exploited and developped, or, do they owe their importance to stratégie factors ? Who will influence events either to accelerate or slow down the pace of change ? Will it be the populations actually concerned, or the authorities and public opinion of the métropole, or perhaps the international community ? In what direction and at what rythm will the evolution occur ? One possibility could be some measure of deceleration if not actual freezing of the process of change. Another possibility could be brutal rupture from the parent country. Then again negotiations could be initiated with a view to mollifying the political personalities of the DOMITOM and preserving their historical solidarity with France. The fate of nearly 2 million overseas French citizens as well as the future extent of overseas France dépends on the answer to these questions.