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The crisis of authority in the U.S.S.R. (1988 - July 1991). After a preliminary reference to the ideological options open to Mikhail Gorbachev, initiator of the break-up of Stalinism, and the mistrust which be inspires, both among some of his opponents as well as among right-wing conservatives, the author considers the recent evolution of the Soviet Union, from the monopoly of Party rule to the difficult birth of a pluralistic regime. He first raises the question of the Party's attitude to perestroika. Article 6 of the Constitution of 1977, which aknowledges the leading role of the Party, was reluctantly annulled by Gorbachev, but annuled it was, thus leaving the way open for pluralism. Condemnation of factionalism within the body of the Party has not prevented the emergence of various "tendencies" (particularly the democratic Platform and the marxist Platform) which find official expression. Similarly, political and social groupings, independent of authority, began to proliferate : from groupings moved by a common principle, for example tne Safeguarding of the national heritage, or the defense of the environment, they rapidly became popular fronts, lending the system a de facto pluralism which would only later enjoy a de jure existence. This spontaneous development took shape first of all in the Baltic countries, and then with increasing momentum spread to all the republics. In parallel with this, the communist Party leadership initiated a reform of the political system, which found expression in the semi-free elections of March 1989, marked by the defeat of various party and State notables. This was the beginning of a multi-party system, there having been two major opposing tendencies during the campaign for the regional elections in the spring of 1990 : the democratic Russia bloc (liberal) and the patriotic Russian bloc (conservative), surrounded by a multiplicity of organizations of the most diverse and constantly evolving tendencies. The charge levelled against them is that they have no autonomous ideas or initiative, and have only one single programme : mass rejection of the Party apparatus. Some observers are of the opinion that a deep schism will develop within the CPSU, and that this will give rise to a real multi-party system. The first stage of this development has just begun, with the movement for democratic reforms, which was launched in July 1991 by frontline reformers. The other major problem which arises is that of the preservation or the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The authority of the Center is in question, and already six republics have decided to leave the union, proclaiming their sovereignty loud and long (the three Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia). But although the right of scission is officially acknowledged, its implementation is a vast battleground (see the law of 3rd April 1990). The upsurge of centrifugal forces has led the republics, one after the other, to proclame their sovereignty (primacy of republican laws over federal laws, economic autonomy, ownership of the soil and mineral deposits, etc.) or their outright indépendance. Autonomous Republics and territories followed suit, opposing the authorities of the republics to which they belonged. Inter-ethnic conflict broke out all over. The dispute over federal authority led to a "way over laws", setting the Centre at odd with republics resolved to insist on recognition of their rights (ownership of all the ressources found on their territory, freedom to exploit these resources, etc.). In this context, the question of finance and the budget had pride of place, together with that of material and technological supplies. The entire supply system was disorganized, with the republics refusing to carry out the orders of the State, or to deliver consumers' goods outside of their frontiers, in order to avoid a worsening of their own shortages. The Soviet government tried to combat the supply problems, at least in part, by setting up commodity markets. A series of economic programms was worked out, including V. Pavlov's anti-crisis plan (April 1991) which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but it is not entirely clear how the economic responsabilities will be apportioned among the Central authorities, the republics and the lower-rank administrative bodies, and what will be the share of the state and private sectors. Also, it is not known how he proposes to overcome the present crisis, and how long this will take. Another major source of discord is the army and the police. The republics demand the right to raise armed forces, and to assume the responsability for maintaning order within their territory. Certain of them, who have been the victims of attacks by the special forces of the Ministry of Interior, the OMON, have organized militias and defense groups, wich are virtually republican armies in embryo. In the end, there was an overriding necessity for redefining the Union, and the first version of the new Union Treaty was adopted by referendum on the 17th March 1991. A slightly modified version of it was published on the 19th June, but neither the one nor the other gives a very clear idea of the respective areas of competence and the common areas of competence of the Centre and the constituent republics of the Union (and still less of the fate in store for secessionist republics). On the other hand, one can be sure that the Treaty will be the source of innumerable controversies and disputes, especially on the particularly explosive issue of the budget, taxation and the distribution of ressources. In the final part, the author ventures some thoughts on the future. He sets perestroika in the continuing context of the history of the Russian empire, recalling that the demands made (individual freedoms and democracy, self-determination and decolonization) were already those of the protagonists of the Russian democratic revolution of February-March 1917, which was "taken over" by the Bolshevik coup d'Etat. Now that the empire has fallen victim to its contradictions and weaknesses, and finally disintegrated, what will take its place ? The cure prescribed by the Union Treaty seems ill-adapted to the task, and several outcomes are possible : a resolute commitment to the way of democracy and decolonization, a return to an authoritarian régime but one establishing a market economy, the option of passivity while waiting for a solution "which will come of itself, or a return to thorough-going, tough dictatorship accompanied by a blood bath. If Gorbachev does not once more take his courage in both hands, and proceeds to decolonize the empire, however slow and piecemeal the process, others will do it for him. And in that case, we may fear the worst.

The Limits of Soviet Economie Liberalism : Perestroïka in Limbo. Western proponents of laissez-faire and their followers in the East have long argued that Soviet economic performance could be greatly enhanced by repudiating administrative-command planning in favor of a free market. All that was required to exit the treadmill of cosmetic reform was an act of political will. Since markets were assumed to be more productive than controlled economic systems, it was contended that marketization in any degree would improve economic performance, and legitimate the rapid adoption of a full fledged market regime. The Gorbachev revolution has falsified this expectation. It has demonstrated that it is far easier to unleash the forces of liberalism than it is to orchestrate an orderly transition to market socialism. Glasnost', demokratizatsiia, novoe myshlenie, and perestroika have simultaneously raised expectations, and triggered an acute economic and political crisis that shows no signs of abating. This has left the regime in limbo, drifting toward the right. Where will it end ? Will free market forces ultimately prevail, or are other outcomes more probable ? This essay explains why free market optimism is likely to be misplaced. Although the current impasse could be resolved by devising a sound program of incremental reform, or adopting a stabilization policy restoring the pre-perestroika system of administrative command planning, neither option is apt to be seized. Liberals have yet to formulate a viable plan, and Gorbachev still resists the status quo ante. As a consequence, the forces of despotism are growing, and may soon extinguish Gorbachev's capricious experiment in laissez-faire market socialism.

Restructuring Soviet agriculture : political acceleration — economic freeze and recession. In the spring of 1990, the quasi stagnation of the three previous years developed into characteristic recession, both in the agricultural sector and in the overall economy. The break-up of the old Party State hierarchical pyramid and its replacement by elected regional authorities led to the decomposition of the old system of centralized administrative allocation of food and agricultural produce, at a time when the conditions for the development of an overall regulation through the market are still a long way from being met. The result is a general fall, (drastic in certain of the peripheral republics) in plant and animal procurements and allocations, to the disadvantage of the towns, and of deficit areas. In this climate of general destabilization of the command economy, the relentless pursuit of ever more radical rules of agricultural restructuring seems to come too late. The actual application of these laws and their economic effects continue to be severely inhibited, or nullified, by growing uncertainty about the future, and, while there has been no emergence of market-money relations (the financial crisis is still waiting for a solution), by a still persistant and very marked dependence by the basic producing units on the bodies responsible for allocation of resources and production tasks. It is always possible, however, that under the mounting pressures of the food crisis, the recently-elected republican and regional authorities may actively exploit their new legal powers in the pursuit of totally new policies on structures and distribution. But it seems reasonable to conclude that in the months, and possibly the years, that lie ahead, the negative effects of the general breakdown in the command economy may nullify the productive and economic effects of such regional initiatives, in agriculture, as elsewhere... so long as there is no sign of a logical reconstitution of the system along market-money lines. However, this avenue is still blocked by the monetary and financial crisis to which a solution is yet to be found.

Privatization Now or Else. — The Impending Failure of Democracy and Freedom in Central Europe. By 1992, the Common Market may have removed all barriers to internal flow of people and goods, while raising a new Berlin Wall between it and the former East Bloc Countries. Stagnation, deteriorating economies, and lack of opportunities in Central Europe are likely to produce a massive illegal immigration. The former communist countries of central Europe are facing hard times. Their economies are saddled with bloated, inefficient enterprises. Officials in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland understand that moving to a market-based economy requires reducing the proportion of their economies owned and controlled by the state. Private ownership of the means of production is necessary in order to produce the appropriate incentives for good economic performance. The problems facing countries attempting to make the transition from a communist society, where the state owns 80 to 100 percent of all assets, to a private market economy are unprecedented. Western countries that have privatized a very small portion of their economy have had the benefit of widespread markets, stock exchanges, meaningful accounting records, labor markets, and a substantial number of individuals with extensive assets who could purchase a significant number of shares in new companies. None of these conditions exists in countries attempting to throw off Marxism. These countries envision privatizating small enterprises through an auction of such businesses. However, employees of these concerns have asserted their claim to the properties and demand that they be given priority in purchasing the assets. Privatization of large enterprises presents even more difficulties. In none of these countries does a working capital market exist. The underlying problem is that the public does not have the assets to purchase large firms. The government could sell these firms, at least the profitable ones, to foreign investors ; but this raises xenophobic feelings. Poland and Czechoslovakia have both proposed using voucher schemes to distribute ownership to their citizens. In addition government ministers plan on selling stock to locals and foreigners, selling the company in a joint venture, and using employee stock option plans. Although authorities in these countries assert the importance of moving fast in privatizing assets, these methods are likely to take years. Although all three countries project an ambitious program of privatization, only Hungary and Poland have actually begun to privatize any large firms. Most of the privatizations in Hungary has been of the spontaneous type. In Poland the first privatization took place in early January 1991 with the sale of stock in small lots of five concerns to individual Polish investors. Czechoslovakia has announced no major privatizations yet, although it finally passed legislation authorizing privatization in February 1991.

Poland has embarked upon a radical programme of currency stabilization and institutional changes, aimed at transforming its economy into a genuine market economy. The first priority had to be mastering inflation, which was growing at such a rate that the entire Polish financial system threatened to collapse. The authorities considered it both necessary and feasible to bring about this result while at the same time paving the way for institutional reform. It is this readiness to implement a global policy while at the same time, operating on seaveral different planes, which is a feature of the current reform. The first phase, the programme of short-term adjustment (1990 - March 1991), consisted of freeing 90% of prices, radically reducing budgetary subsidies (which represented more then 1/3 of total public expenditure) abolishing the State monopoly of external trade, introducing internal convertibility of the zloty and a stable rate of exchange, abolishing quantitative restrictions on imports, and establishing moderate and more uniform customs tariffs. The measures relating to the sphere of trade amounted to an opening of the Polish economy, and constituted an essential element in the "shock therapy" devised by the government. This treatement has had satisfactory but still insufficient results in the domain of inflation and particularly in the institutional sphere. A new phase in the rehabilitation plan, the mid-term economic programme (1991-1993) was therefore launched. This is intended to mark a decisive step towards the market economy, supported by credits from the IMF and the World Bank. Monetary stabilization remains the priority task, since it is a pre-condition for the creation of the market, not only in domestic context, but also in the area of international trade relations. The plan is to speed up institutional and structural change, since this is the only way to give renewed impetus to economic growth. External circumstances have proved extremely unfavorable during the period in question, but the results so far obtained give grounds for some hopes for the future outcome.

Nicaragua 1979-1989 : an Utopian programme for socialism ? An analysis of Nicaragua's economic organization, within the framework of a study of small socialist countries may seem like a contradiction in terms from two points of view : firstly, because the S.N.L.F. (the Sandinista National Liberation Front) was defeated at the elections, and secondly, because the system introduced by the S.N.L.F. (1989-1990) was not compatible with the socio-economic systems of the USSR, Eastern Europe, or even Cuba. However, the fact that the Sandinista experiment was aimed at acting as a viable counter-model to two systems of capitalist dependence operating in the region, and that it was implicitly (and indeed explicitly, according to some statements) socialist in orientation, justifies the inclusion of the Nicaraguan economic experiment in a study on socialism, including in its broadest sense of research and implementation of new systems of social organization. The study is in two parts. The first examines projects for socio-economic change, and tries to evaluate whatever elements of originality they may contain for example, how fitted they are to engendering change, and in what way they resemble other socialist projects. The second part is concerned with the results that have been obtained, and how far these diverge from the initial projects. We are able to identify external and internal causes of these divergences and which are doubtless, in the final analysis, responsible for the electoral defeat.