Contenu du sommaire : Le moral et la dynamique de l'action

Beyond the resemblance, how can "morale" and "morality," be linked?
When addressing the topic of "moral force," this is the question asked here, raised by a measure of reticence from some who are often foreign to the military world. The first link observed may seem paradoxical: on the first level, morale resulting from high consistency between the values referenced and the action that will be taken, fits better with amorality—that of cynical pragmatism, the path of immorality, for example, Nazism—than our ethical references of civilization. You must, nonetheless, go farther: the objectively antagonistic demands of military effectiveness and humanist moral references can only be rendered by a morality—itself demanding—of the exercise of the profession of arms. It is the responsibility of the leaders to live it, promote it, and thus, beyond emotions, nourish morale in their subordinates.

The operational capacity of a military unit is as much a function of the moral force of a unit's people as the level of performance of technical factors. This reality forms the basis on which leaders place the preparation of moral force on the same level as that of technical effectiveness. The task is difficult because moral force depends on ethical, psychological, sociological, and physiological determinants that you cannot strictly separate given the fundamental wholeness of the human being. You must, therefore, develop these determinants to a degree compatible with the extraordinary demands of military confrontation that are inherent in all military activity. This preparation takes place through a wide palette of actions whose goals are to simultaneously strengthen the individual and the group through the positive experience of collection action. Once these actions are accomplished, there is the question of measuring the morale achieved, with its technological and ethical limits: the relevant instruments exist, but their use is delicate.

In order to adapt to socio-cultural changes and respond to the challenges of decentralized and complex engagements, the collective dimensions of morale take on as much importance to military personnel as the modern trend of command that stresses cohesion under duress. Having superseded the primacy of discipline as a response to the basic paradoxes of the use of force, the morale of military units is a psychological alchemy difficult to quantify. It is based, nonetheless, mainly on a realist culture of collective identities and the assumed use of the original professional diversity of the French army, down to the lowest echelons.

On May 26, 1995, like all the interlinked observation posts on Bosnian Serb territory, the Krupac post, located near Sarajevo, had to face the offensive of Serb forces who set out to storm it in an effort to seize hostages. Following the refusal of the initial ultimatum by the lieutenant commander, the 12 men of the post had to brave a 17-day siege, in complete isolation. The recollection of the incident provides exceptional conditions for the observation of individual behavior and group dynamics.

The temptation of death, of suicide, is most often a response to suffering and despair. It does not spare military personnel who, like everyone, can be the victims of family conflict, financial troubles, intolerable work pressure, and the deaths of loved ones. Moreover, members of the military have access to arms, an aggravating factor, and are over-represented in the age bracket most statistically at risk. But beyond the attention the military command gives to these dangers, doesn't suicide raise a collective issue, that of a world too selfish? Wouldn't the only answer to the problem be "I am my brother's keeper"?

A combatant's morale builds on itself.
The selection and training of marine commandos at the École des Fusiliers de Lorient convincingly demonstrates this point. With regard to army soldiers, this demonstration of the construction of morale is singular in two ways : It shows how these elite infantry soldiers, who call themselves marine commandos, have adopted a "marine culture".It reveals, in the midst of these decidedly French units, hints, also deeply cultural, of their British origins.

All military institutions experience the necessity of producing documents that will inspire and guide behaviour. This is true of the most significant powers such as Germany, the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and even, in its heyday, of the Soviet Union. A comparative analysis of some reference texts from each of their armies is particularly revealing. Even when taking into account a disparity in form, a quick glance will highlight a true “American exception” in its focus on absolute victory, as opposed to a recurring notion prevailing among Europeans of “mastery of force”.

All military institutions experience the necessity of producing documents that will inspire and guide behaviour. This is true of the most significant powers such as Germany, the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and even, in its heyday, of the Soviet Union. A comparative analysis of some reference texts from each of their armies is particularly revealing. Even when taking into account a disparity in form, a quick glance will highlight a true “American exception” in its focus on absolute victory, as opposed to a recurring notion prevailing among Europeans of “mastery of force”.