Contenu du sommaire : La réforme perpétuelle

From the 17th century to the early days of the 5th Republic, there has been more than one government minister responsible for organising military matters (functional logic, setting and geography) in France. There is a War Department dealing primarily with the first aspect, but the priorities are reversed in the Navy Department and in that for the Air Force. In February 1932, a Minister of Defence was appointed for the first time, marking a clear break from the past, and functional logic seemed to be the winner. It needed nearly three decades of non-stop reforms (the “tumultuous 30 years”), however, before the new approach had finally taken hold. On 5April 1961, a volley of 22 Orders broke the old organisational arrangements in the ministries dealing with the armed forces. It is revealing that unification of governmental supervision in the military field came between the end of the 3rd Republic and the early days of the 5th, just when republican institutions were experiencing upheavals of an extent unprecedented since 1870. This coincidence was not at all fortuitous, given that politico-military developments symbolised maturity of the democratic system.

However painful they are, the reforms are coming thick and fast, showing society's incredible ability to accept disturbances. The success of these changes results from a real act of will at all levels. When disorder occurs, fear produces an instinctive defensive withdrawal to a rational logic, free of all subjectivity, with the sole purpose of returning to an ordered state. This being the case, abandonment of the moral dimension in this purely intellectual endeavour is not without consequences; a loss of direction replaces the chaos. A real will to survive results, and a counter-reform begins. Solidarity takes hold, responses and adjustments move in the same direction, through voluntary and previously adopted adherence to a common identity. A form of regeneration operates, disorder having caused a salutary questioning of the system. Collective and individual wills respond to each other, with swings between reform and counter-reform.

Following France's defeat in 1871, the army was reorganised, partly modelled on that of Germany, together with France's own experience from the Franco-Prussian War. Restoration of the country's defence system, carried out jointly by the high command, the government and Parliament, was intended to make it sufficiently strong to forestall any new aggression, revanchism being primarily a matter of rhetoric. This sweeping reform was, firstly, organisational, involving laws on recruitment (1872, including mandatory and personal conscription), internal organisation of the army (1873) and officers (1875). It also created a new defence instrument, based on renewed military thinking, new weapons systems and developing camps and barracks. In addition, it was one of the means by which the country affirmed its republicanism and national identity.

Since France's (political) revolution, at the end of the 18th century, and the country's experience of the industrial revolution, some years later, change has become a constant and natural state for the French army. Periodic (re)definition of the relationship between the country's defence needs and the resources available is now the first consideration in protecting the nation's vital interests.

References to “change” express, however consciously or unconsciously, the idea of a chaotic world contemptuous of anthropological and historical theory that accords developments a significant role. They are symptomatic of “postmodern management”, which doesn't bother reflecting about ultimate purposes. The rhetoric of change relates to a critical period, when democratic societies cut themselves off from history, influenced by the development of a consumer society, the impossible legacy of the May 1968 “events” and the ending of the 30-year postwar economic boom. Can we say that the hardship imposed by the reality of a crisis period, the development of an “emerging countries” phenomenon, and conflicts throughout the world mark the end of a phase in history? Reconstruction work implies depending on the legacy of what has been achieved, and tracing out a vision of the future where the country can again find its role. That is a necessary precondition for regaining self-esteem and once again having significance in world affairs.

As the opium of the present, reform seems to act as a gentle tranquiliser for a population that is anxious and stressed, and as a powerful stimulant for politicians seeking popularity. It is true that inflated discourse is not a trivial matter and that it testifies to an undeniable convergence of desires to break with everyday experience which is considered unsatisfactory. However, analysing this constant call for change as a historical process presents its own worries. Reform in France is not well. Whether we are talking about its relationship to a specific time (the moment chosen for it to occur) or to a period of time (during which it is carried out), reform is subject to manipulation – conscious or unconscious – which profoundly distorts the process. Like the word, which while indicating everything no longer indicates anything, it has lost in reality what it has gained in popularity. Reform should remain extraordinary, with the word reserved for major changes that profoundly change society. Maybe it is time to reform reform!

This article restores the decision-making process of military reform in France in 1996, focusing on the move to a professional army and abandonment of military service. After reviewing the professionalisation of armed forces in 1995, marked by a political and administrative consensus represented by an armed force of both sexes, selective conscription and devotion to the idea of a professional army, the analysis shows the decisive role played by Jacques Chirac as President of France in bringing about the move to a professional army. The author shows that this sovereign decision-making process relied on Chirac's authority in getting his viewpoint accepted and on the Ministry of Defence's expertise in formulating solutions for 2015-model armed forces.

Far from the clichés that see France's armed forces, and in particular the army, as an archetypal conservative institution, no other State body has undergone such far-reaching restructuring and transformations, almost non-stop during the past half-century. The two geostrategic about-turns of 1962 – withdrawing from conflict in Algeria to the French mainland – and 1989-91 – implosion of the communist system and the end of the two-superpower world – were followed by necessary periods of adjustment that were sometimes chaotic, still involving the fervent desire for an armed-forces model with overall consistency. During this half-century, the army was to change in nature, certainly by becoming professional, but also by henceforth being restricted to the single function of a fighting instrument, whereas historically it had been responsible for an enormous “national military fabric” on behalf of the whole Ministry of Defence. What light does this throw on the current far-reaching transformations? This retrospective examination aims to assist with the analysis.

How should an ambitious public-sector reform be conducted? How can we modernise an administrative body that has progressively become stratified, without taking account of developments in society and in our requirements? Probably by providing the resources to emerge from a comfort zone where we have too often taken refuge. And how do we do that? By waging war against waste and poor quality, and by battling for an improved public sector. We need to put ideas of efficiency and performance at the heart of governmental policies and State functioning, persuade the government of its own ability to undergo reform, be able to take the risk of changing and of facing new ways of doing things and of being and working, and give ourselves the chance to do better. There, basically, is the direction that must be taken by a great programme of State modernisation.

Under the two influences of lolf and rgpp (France's “Organic law relating to the finance laws” and “General revision of public policies”) the State has instituted a substantial reform. The Ministry of Defence has not escaped from the requirement for reorganisation of its structure and functions, which could involve various routes, particularly outsourcing and the merging and sharing of resources and facilities. The latter is primarily aimed at taking advantage of economies of scale, while also being indirectly involved in establishing networks and in the professionalisation of some functions that were previously dispersed. Implementing this governmental organisation procedure has been accomplished by establishing defence bases that produce consistency and facilitate sharing of resources between the army, navy, air force and gendarmerie. These complex reforms are not an end in themselves, but a step in a process yet to be completed.

Unlike what is thought in civilian circles, the military has always fostered an unusual ability to undertake reform. The institution's natural plasticity is based on a combination of factors that together ensure the responsiveness necessary for a body of people dealing with the rapid changes seen in the world. However, this ability also carries the seeds of certain contradictions that should not be under-estimated if the armed forces are to be ready for the great reforms to come.

This article asks about the introduction and establishment of a certain managerial rationality through the ini (Institution Nationale des Invalides), as a health establishment, recently signing up for the transformation of France's hospital system. Managerial rationality, as interpreted at the INI, shows that the hospital is increasingly aware of ideas of cost, effectiveness and quality of care. In fact, activity there is increasingly influenced by the dissemination of hospital managerial standards aimed at making the most of the results. How was it possible to apparently avoid resistance when combining the conditions facilitating extended membership, in a reform seen as positive and necessary?

While it happens, albeit rarely, that reform is undertaken to transform some social system, most often reform is a pretext. Society's systems tend to be stable, held up by solid main beams, and only rarely are they touched. As citizens have contradictory desires, however, such as wanting to increase the cover provided by their health insurance, without affecting the contributions they pay, politicians claim they are “reforming”. To do that, they invoke mythical animals such as unicorns which do not stand up to the harsh light of day, or they revive old idea that, like zombies, survive, no matter how many times they are killed off. People accordingly claim they are “reforming” to make others think they are taking action, and society's systems survive the “reforms”. This article draws illustrations of this proposition from health systems.

The main factor at stake when considering in-depth developments in State education is the necessary contribution it makes to the nation's cohesion through its two roles of instruction in social life and assurance of equal opportunities. A second factor is the country's collective development, involving training for a larger number than currently of engineers and scientists in the disciplines with prospects for future invention and innovation; this requires improving the procedures that guide young people into particular occupation streams, and ensuring their education is suited to technological changes. A third factor at stake is the blossoming of individual pupils, and access to a diversity of cultural phenomena.

The current reform has really shaken up the regimental structure, while commanding officers have lost some of their prerogatives, which are now held by a defence base. It is neither the first nor, no doubt, the last major reform, but it has not altered the ultimate purpose of army units. A regiment's rationale is always to be prepared for and to commit itself to operations either in the home country or outside the country's borders. Adjustments and reforms of greater or lesser extent thus occur, whereas the direction pursued does not change, even if some challenges have to be met. The example of the 5th RHC (helicopter gunship regiment) provides a good illustration of this. While it is deployed for relief purposes in Afghanistan and Africa, it is accommodating both the current major reform of the army and more limited reforms and adaptations that nevertheless affect most of its activities.

Illness connected with psychological stress at work has greatly increased since the 1970s. Waves of suicides within a firm, extensively covered in the media, appear to be the result of forced changes in working practices. Reforms and changes also affect the armed forces. Yet stress at work is not inevitable. This article looks at the role played by changes that affect recruits in the military institution, and at their reactions.

The word is fashionable, and everyone uses it, but nobody defines it. This is because uncertainty is one of those terms that refers to something whose meaning can be pinned down only negatively, by saying what is not. The first approach involves “counter-thinking”, thinking as closely as possible, in order to approach a reality without hoping to discover everything implied by the term: thinking in opposition to, in order to reduce the area as far as possible, without hoping to eliminate it completely. Defining what is involved makes no sense unless, in the final analysis, it serves to work out practical action. At the end of this study, ten “commandments” are offered to the reader, not so much in order that uncertainty can be tolerated as something inevitable but, on the contrary, to grasp it as an opportunity. Opening a breach in the pessimistic determinism of a science convinced that the time of a finished world has begun, uncertainty could on the contrary be a hopeful response to the world's disillusion.

The La Relève policy in France from June 1942 to July 1943 marked a turning point for the image of prisoners of war. The Germans called for manpower, and Pierre Laval saw, in that unequal exchange—one prisoner for three workers—a means of backing up the collaboration policy. There were nine poster campaigns, two brochures, radio broadcasts and incitements from ministers for Frenchmen to relieve the prisoners. The French were not fooled by this policy, however, as noted by the government from the autumn of 1942 onwards, and recourse to sto, or Mandatory Labour Service, proved necessary. La Relève was again mentioned during Marshal Pétain's trial, and it also made it possible to measure the response of prisoners of war to the accusations made some months after their return to France that they were guilty of collaboration.

When the United States entered the war, numerous black volunteers joined up, to the extent that it was soon possible to raise two infantry divisions (the 92nd and 93rd) of non-white soldiers. Pershing, who was commanding the American expeditionary force, was concerned to retain his independence of action from the French; yet he didn't hesitate to transfer the infantry regiments from those divisions to a French army that was eager to have reinforcements, a decision that betrayed his unfavourable preconceptions about the fighting quality of non-white soldiers. And yet, when equipped and trained by the French, the 369th, 370th, 371st and 372nd regiments were to fight bravely until the armistice. But then, none of them took part in the Victory parade. Even worse: when they returned home, the veterans—in some cases responsible for valiant feats of arms—were powerless to get rid of the discriminatory measures that would long continue to burden black Americans.

Unlike what is thought in civilian circles, the military has always fostered an unusual ability to undertake reform. The institution's natural plasticity is based on a combination of factors that together ensure the responsiveness necessary for a body of people dealing with the rapid changes seen in the world. However, this ability also carries the seeds of certain contradictions that should not be under-estimated if the armed forces are to be ready for the great reforms to come.