Contenu du sommaire : Contrats et pratiques contractuelles. Approches pluridisciplinaires.

Olivier Favereau and Pierre Picard The economic approach to contracts : Unity or diversity ? Since the mid-1970s, neoclassical economic analysis has gradually concentrated on the contract as the prototypical form for regulating transactions. The key notions of the economic theory of contracts are presented by distinguishing between types of actors and the risks linked to asymmetrical situations with regard to information. The explanatory power of these notions is tested with examples from various fields. Several still unsettled questions limit the scope of the economic analysis of contracts : the method used, the status of time, and the way this theory incorporates the notion of organization.

Jean-Guy Belley A sociolegal typology of contracts By breaking with the restrictive normative conception of contracts, which accords a special place to both the «science» of law and an economic vision of the contract as a rational choice, the proposal is made to interpret contractual practices in context. The example of a transnational aluminum firm in Quebec serves to build a sociolegal typology of five categories of contracts : legal, regulatory, normalized, communitarian and moral. Lessons about the different forms of rationality (legal, political, economic) underlying contracts are drawn from this empirical typology.

Trust, contracts and economic cooperation This review of economists' theories about incomplete contracts (property rights, the costs of transactions or a «reputation model») shows that the defenders of orthodox economic theory do not consider the notion of trust to be a pertinent analytical category. In objection to this, an approach is proposed that places trust at the center of contractual relationships. Several empirical studies conducted by the author in labor relations have shown that incomplete contracts serve less to define binding commitments than to create a framework wherein the application of commitments can be (re)negotiated. This supposes that parties to the contract trust each other strongly enough to be ready to become involved in such a process.

Louis-Georges Soler and Hervé Tanguy Contracts, planning and management systems in the firm How to design and manage inhouse contractualization procedures in organizations ? Between the economic theory of contracts and the sociology of organizations, the difficulties of coordinating services are examined ; and a topology is proposed of both the usual ways of settling conflicts and the resulting problems. Between commitments and negotiations, the effort is made to bring to light an «informational architecture» that can serve for both coordination and planning, by resorting to the notions of : mutual prescription, interactive plan and frames of reference.

Lucien Karpik Arrangements of trust and credible commitments To act in an uncertain universe, actors resort to trust in a large number of situations (involving services, quality control or incomplete contracts). What concrete forms make it possible for trust to take root ? These forms are presented in terms of the twofold menace against the execution of a contract, namely : the opacity of the market and opportunism. By reducing ignorance, the «arrangements for judging» help deal with the first threat. In arrangements grounded in personal trust as well as impersonal arrangements (trade names, instruction manuals and the ranking of products), the central role played by "delegates" come to light. Arrangements based on promises make it possible to counter the risks of opportunism and the forementioned menace of nonexecution. They are based, in the first place, on the qualities of the persons and of the networks that have been tested and thus built up to over time. They suppose, in the second place, that norms are shared (unilateral norms for lawyers but coproduced norms in partnerships). Transactions cannot result from the mere convergence of common interests. There are prerequisites.

Pierre Lascoumes and Jérôme Valluy APCs, a new means of public policy ? The example of protecting the industrial environment A typology of APCs (activités publiques conventionnelles), which comprise public contracts, conventions, partnerships, charters, etc., is proposed by distinguishing between : informal, unpublished agreements ; informal published agreements ; and formal published agreements. This classification is based on the agreement's degree of opacity and binding force. Underlying the assertion that APCs are a new means of public intervention is the debtable hypothesis that public decision-makers are prepared to assess possible forms of public action and choose among them. Herein, it is argued that what is new about APCs has less to do with the agreements themselves than with their being made visible through the emergence of a new rationality of administrative action.

Renaud Berrivin and Christine Musselin Policies of contractualization between centralization and decentralization : The cases of higher education and public works Based on surveys carried out in higher education and public works, the contractual practices are analyzed that have developed between central administrations and local units in the public sector. The value of these contracts lies less in the documents themselves than in the processes that enter into their being drawn up and implemented. Although these contractual arrangements have helped both modify the relations between the center and the periphery and increase the autonomy of local units in both cases under study, they still fit into a rationale of vertical, centralizing leadership.