Contenu du sommaire : Manifeste de philosophie sceptique

This paper consists of a commentary on Section 4 of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. It has three aims: to explain the structure of the skeptical argument by which Hume deconstructs the rationality of causal inference, to shed light on the text by putting it into historical perspective (by opposing Hume to Locke, in particular), and to highlight the gesture of deepening empiricism that is at work here: the skeptical theory of causal reasoning can only be reached by going beyond the ordinary and immediate experience that one has of one's understanding.

(1) Although Hume distinguishes several sorts of propositions, we explain why he focuses on causal inferences when he examines the nature of belief. (2) After considering the answers that Hume rejects concerning the nature of belief, we discuss his solution. (3) We highlight certain implications of Hume's conception of the nature of belief, which is implicitly directed against Descartes's theory of judgment. (4) We suggest an interpretation of the asymmetric role of belief in relation to passions and to action. (5) Hume's position seems to meet with a difficulty: it seems ill-suited to account for the nature of negative existential beliefs.

How does Hume's skepticism concerning necessary connections allow for his solution to the question of liberty and necessity? First, we claim that an epistemological (rather than semantical) reading of this skepticism is sufficient to allow for the necessitarian element of the solution. Then, we claim that the compatibilist element of it depends on Hume's naturalistic explanation of the inference of the mind from actions to motives. Because this naturalist explanation is itself skeptical in nature, we finally qualify Hume's overall answer to the problem of liberty and necessity as a reconciling skeptical solution.

In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume argues that religion does not possess any epistemic authority; therefore, it should not dictate our moral principles. But Hume also observes that religion has an impact on human behavior, which is why it may indeed have some moral authority. The Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals aims to show the secular origin of morality and to emphasize that religion doesn't play any role in it. At the same time, Hume introduces religious metaphors and analogies when addressing the moral authority of social institutions. In this article I discuss Hume's stance toward the moral authority of religion by examining his theory of moral duty and interpreting his use of religious vocabulary in the context of his secular moral philosophy.

In Section XII of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume examines the meaning and absurdity of skepticism, distinguishing different species of skepticism. In this article, we consider the intelligibility of each species, which may be semantic, pragmatic, or practical in nature, and specify which type of intelligibility is lacking in each species. Hume's early essay on chivalry proves to be unexpectedly helpful. We then offer an interpretation of the two forms of “mitigated skepticism” by analyzing their characteristic features: intellectual modesty and critical taste. This analysis enables us to give our own answer to a question under discussion: Is mitigated skepticism moderate? Though intellectual modesty and critical taste are calm passions, they have radical effects. Thus, we show how Section XII can shine a new light on the question of what to do with skepticism, though it does not provide any epistemological answer to skeptical vertigo.

Despite Leibniz's interest in Huygens's physics, their 1692–1695 correspondence contains several disagreements, which reveal two different ontological conceptions of bodies. According to Leibniz, Kepler's laws can be explained by a harmonic circulation, while for Huygens the explanation lies in the intrinsic heaviness of bodies. Moreover, for Huygens, there is an extension that has no body but that is nonetheless material, an opinion incompatible with Leibniz's metaphysics. Finally, Huygens explains bodily cohesion by absolutely hard atoms; Leibniz rejects such entities, but completes the laws of relative motion by a substantial level beyond extension.

For Lagneau, philosophy and metaphysics are one and the same. By making such a claim, Lagneau defends the view that fundamental philosophical thinking is, and ought to be, independent of all political commitment. Conversely, this paper argues that there should be room for a critical materialist reading of the history of metaphysics. It therefore construes Lagneau's cosmological, psychological, and theological ideas so as to make explicit their connection with his naturalistic, conservative, paternalistic, and anti-democratic positioning.