Contenu du sommaire

Revue Economie et prévision Mir@bel
Numéro no 132-133, 1998/1-2
Texte intégral en ligne Accessible sur l'internet
  • L'impact des incitations financières au travail sur les comportements individuels : une estimation pour le cas français - Thomas Piketty p. 1-35 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
    Impact of Financial Incentives to Work on Individual Behaviour: An Estimation for France by Thomas Piketty Does making low-paid jobs more financially attractive for the jobless have a significant positive impact on employment levels in France? Various reforms introduced in France's social transfers system between 1982 and 1996 have changed the financial incentives to work for various categories of population, depending on the number of dependent children, family structure and other factors. We use individual data from the INSEE employment surveys conducted from 1982 to 1997 (involving some 150,000 observations each year) to see if the new incentives introduced by these reforms, such as the income support benefit (RMI) and first job allowance (APE), have led to adjustments in the differential employment levels of these various population groups, all other (observable) things being equal. This methodology has recently been used for the American Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Survey and in natural experiments in Canada. In principle, it enables us to make an unbiased estimate of the elasticity of labour force participation and job-seeking behaviour in relation to financial incentives. The findings suggest that elasticity is relatively greater for women (with or without dependent children). On the other hand, the data used do not enable us to show any significant effect of financial incentives to work on men's transition from non-employment to employment.
  • L'impact du déficit public sur la vitesse de convergence des économies européennes - Christophe Tavera, Isabelle Cadoret p. 37-48 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
    The Impact of Government Deficits on European Economic Convergence Rates by Isabelle Cadoret and Christophe Tavera This paper is a theoretical and empirical examination of the consequences of the government deficit criterion contained in the Maastricht Treaty on economic convergence rates in Europe. We use a Solow growth model that explicitly accounts for government deficits. Theoretical analysis shows a multiplicity of equilibria, as well as bifurcation equilibria. A simulation using the model shows that application of the government deficit criterion leads to more rapid and more uniform convergence rates in European countries.
  • Pacte de stabilité, crédibilité et stabilisation dans l'union monétaire européenne - Dominique Bureau p. 49-57 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
    The Growth and Stability Pact: Stabilisation, Credibility and the EMU Fiscal Criteria by Dominique Bureau The monetary credibility versus regional stabilisation dilemma that underlies discussions about EMU fiscal criteria can be illustrated using a simple model, in which opting for an independent European Central Bank is assumed to solve monetary credibility problems, but the Member States are also assumed to maintain a strong capacity for fiscal stabilisation to cope with demand shocks. We show how, in this context, the trade-off between anti-inflation credibility and stabilisation after asymmetric shocks is a delicate issue, since the central bank does not have a simple means of curbing fiscal authorities' expansionary bias. As monetary policy is a public good in a certain way, national governments should free ride on it. Our model does not highlight the intrinsic externalities between the Member States' fiscal policies through imports or interest rates. Instead it puts the accent on the externality arising from a single monetary policy. This means we can regard the introduction of mechanisms, such as those called for in the Growth and Stability Pact, as an additional instrument aimed at alleviating the credibility/stabilisation dilemma. This would enable fiscal authorities to remain autonomous, but make them accountable, as long as sanctions are perceived as being relatively automatic.
  • Le problème de la qualité du café indonésien : une interprétation micro-économique - Chantai Le Mouël, Catherine Benjamin p. 59-71 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
    The Indonesian Coffee Quality Problem: A Microeconomic Explanation by Catherine Benjamin and Chantai Le Mouël The Indonesian government aims to improve the quality of coffee produced in the country. Coffee growers often harvest their crops before the beans are ripe, which results in poor quality. Two reasons explain the growers' behaviour: they are not aware of the government's national policy to improve quality; and there are imperfections in the capital market. We use a household model that reveals the explanatory factors for Indonesian coffee growers' microeconomic harvesting behaviour. Econometric estimations are used to quantify the effects of the various factors and to show how important credit is in determining harvesting behaviour.
  • Théorie et applications des mécanismes d'enchères

    • Présentation générale - Florence Naegelen, Michel Mougeot p. 73-82 accès libre
    • Enchères et externalités - Philippe Jehiel p. 83-92 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
      Auctions and Externalities by Philippe Jehiel We consider the sales of a good that produces external effects between the buyers in that an individual buyer is not indifferent as to whether or not the good is sold or whether it comes to be owned by a competitor. This paper reviews several articles dealing with this topic and shows how externalities can explain such phenomena as buyers' strategic behaviour at auctions, the seller's ability to get money from agents who will not buy the good and stalling in negotiations. We also deal briefly with cases where the good being acquired may be resold.
    • Un modèle d'enchères de bois sur pied - Patrice Loisel, Bernard Elyakime p. 93-101 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
      Modelling Standing Timber Auctions by Bernard Elyakime and Patrice Loisel In France, standing timber is often sold by auction with a secret reservation price and vaguely defined quantities. We propose two models in which there is an independent private value and different buyers' and sellers' estimates of quantities: one with a known reservation price and then one with a secret reservation price. We study the buyers' and sellers' strategies for working out the seller's expected revenues with and without a secret reserve price. The seller does better in an auction with a secret reservation price under certain market conditions.
    • L'attribution des marchés en fonction de l'offre économiquement la plus avantageuse - Florence Naegelen p. 103-120 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
      Awarding Contracts According to the Best Bids in Economic Terms by Florence Naegelen This article examines problems arising from the criterion for determining the best bids in tenders where the quality of products can be observed. The optimum procedure is one where bidders can provide all levels of quality and where the quality provided by each bidder is a publicly known exogenous variable. Then we describe tender procedures that make it possible to implement optimum rules and we conclude by assuming that bidders' efforts can influence the cost of supplying quality.
    • Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères - Jean-Jacques Laffont p. 121-137 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
      Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data by Jean- Jacques Laffont The paper is a survey of applied work with auction data. We review the main distribution free predictions of the three major game theoretic models, the identification of their stochastic structure, and their confrontation with data. We study successively, the symmetric common value model, the independent private values model, and the asymmetric value model. Conditional upon being in one of these models, game theoretic restrictions can be tested. A major conclusion is that predictions are highly dependent on the unobservable restrictions on the distributions of charactristics. The paper concludes with a suggestion to develop structural econometrics of auction data with only a few restrictions on these distributions.
    • La décroissance des prix au cours d'enchères séquentielles : sources et mesures - Stéphanie Vincent, Olivier Chanel p. 139-157 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
      Decreasing Prices in Sequential Auctions: Sources and Measurement by Olivier Chanel and Stéphanie Vincent Price trends in sequential auctions are a major issue for all players concerned: buyers, sellers and auctioneers. When price trends no longer follow a random walk pattern, they reveal missed opportunities and therefore constitute an "anomaly." First we consider the explanations provided by auction theory for the decreasing prices revealed by some empirical studies. These explanations relate to assumptions about the buyers' preferences and constraints, as well as to the institutional rules and the organisation of the auction per se. Then, we look at the various techniques for measuring price trends in sequential auctions. Finally, we use simulated samples and data from wine auctions to verify their ability to aggregate individual price variations correctly. Resampling techniques enable us to analyse statistical properties and construct tests.
    • Valeurs affiliées et comportements d'offre : analyse théorique et application aux exportations de céréales européennes - Yves Le Roux, Jean-Marc Bourgeon p. 159-177 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
      Affiliated Values and Supply Behaviour: Theoretical Analysis and Application to European Grain Exports by Jean-Marc Bourgeon and Yves Le Roux We have modelled supply behaviour in first-price, seal-bid auctions with private value and common value assumptions using a multivariate distribution showing weak correlation due to Gouriéroux and Jouneaux (1994). We then generalise the estimation procedure developed in Bourgeon and Le Roux (1995) in the common-value case and we apply it to European grain exports.
    • Équilibre approximatif et règle intuitive : une application aux appels d'offres dans l'industrie spatiale - Jean-François Richard, Jean-Pierre Florens, Olivier Armantier p. 179-190 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
      Approximate Equilibrium and an Intuitive Rule: An Application to Bid Tenders in the Space Industry by Olivier Armantier, Jean- Pierre Florens and Jean-François Richard In this article, we adopt the notion of approximate equilibrium obtained from an "intuitive rule." The notion is based on the idea that, instead of complex Nash equilibrium strategies, agents use simple decision-making rules based on intuition and common sense. We apply this concept to data on the space industry and we come up with two main findings: (1) the equilibrium obtained with our "intuitive rule" provides a good approximation of the Nash equilibrium; (2) an "intuitive rule" enables us to approximate the Nash equilibrium with an unknown structural form in a complex game.
  • Méthodes

    • Méthodes d'estimation de l'exposant de Hurst. Application aux rentabilités boursières - Valérie Mignon p. 193-214 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
      Methods for Estimating the Hurst Exponent: Application to Stock Market Returns by Valérie Mignon This paper analyses whether long memory is a characteristic of stock returns. It starts by defining the main long memory processes, such as fractional Gaussian noise and ARFJJVIA processes, which are characterised by a parameter called the Hurst exponent. We then review various methods for estimating this exponent. Finally, we apply these procedures to time series of weekly stock returns. Our findings suggest that Italian and Japanese stock returns display long memory persistence. Since long memory is directly related to the issue of market efficiency, these findings raise questions about the efficiency of Italian and Japanese capital markets.
  • Résumés - Summaries - p. 216-221 accès libre