Contenu du sommaire : Le monde arabe

Hérodote is one of the most singular intellectual adventures of French geography in the recent times. Founded by Yves Lacoste in 1976, this journal, widely read out of the academic community of geographers, even by simple educated people, refounded geopolitics after the Second World War, tabou since that time. More or less ideologist, close to the ideas of the Communist Party when he was young, Lacoste and his team turned to pragmatism observing and interpretating reality. For him, geography is a complex field far from laws applicable in any place or any time. That's why Hérodote is a liberty corner.

History and geography play a specific and incredibly important role in the French education system. Since the start of The French Third Republic in 1870, history and geography have contributed to the political construction of the state, nation, republic system, and democracy. In the 1980's, geography taught in schools and universities underwent a scientific and epistemological revolution which tremendously increased the breadth and relevance of the discipline. Geopolitics played an important role in this development due to the work of Yves Lacoste and the authors of the « Hérodote » review. The enormous changes in how geography has been taught since the 2000's created space for geopolitics to be positioned as a crucial element of the discipline. Questions of geopolitics are incorporated into the curriculum in France at every stage along the path to academia or a career in teaching History or Geography. The most obvious of these being ; at the point of entry into higher education, again in highly competitive exams taken to enter the most prestigious institutions (eg. HEC), and finally after the completion of postgraduate education to gain accreditation in the field.

Hérodote is 40 years old. It was only fitting that an eyewitness to its birth, who has been a loyal reader ever since, should bear personal testimony to the journal's unrelenting endeavours to accomplish its original, twofold objective : to reintroduce political reflection into a field of learning that had previously rejected it, and to assert the utility of geography. The new journal came into being at a time when the prospects of geography in higher education were unclear. The small team that ran it had very limited financial resources but, thanks to the unwavering support of the original editor François Maspero and his successor François Gèze, their gamble paid off. They successfully imposed an original geopolitical approach and put no limits on the topics they addressed and the areas they investigated, their goal being to clarify regional power relations and the conflicting portrayals of them, and to throw light on the rivalry between states, regions, military, economic, religious and political forces, and dominant and minority groups at local and global level. The author describes the main stages in the development of Hérodote, all of which were marked by the powerful personality of its founder.

Choosing the Arab World as a theme almost came as an evidence to celebrate the anniversary of a magazine dealing with geography and geopolitics. Indeed, the oldest and most numerous conflicts take place in that part of the world, and we are directly affected by them, as the recent terrorist attacks on the 7th of January and the 13th of November reminded us. Before dealing with Hérodote's approach of the Arab World, we must determine what we mean by Arab World. Nowadays, The Arab Nations are united only when they vote against Israel during United Nations sessions, for the disagreements which characterize the Arab World undermine any hope of political unity between these nations. Looking back, and after reading again the articles dealing with the Arab conflicts published by Hérodote, I realized the two following facts : on the one hand, the Arab conflicts are one of the main themes of the magazine. On the other hand, the themes we chose often were against the spirit of times and predicted future crises. Many times Hérodote dealt with one or several characteristics of the geopolitical situations in the Arab World, so let's go back to the different editions to recount the story of Hérodote and the Arab World.

Informed by recent developments, and fed by a deep knowledge of the history of Arab movements, from the expected renaissance (nadha) to the collapse of Pan-Arabism and the failure of most of the democratic revolutions launched from 2011, Gilles Kepel analyses here the complex chessboard where fitna, the war within Islam, is today conducted, not only between Sunnis and Shias, but also between radicals and reformists, between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, between the Saudi Wahhabis and Daech, the new threat. Classes and clans, States and non-state actors are at play, along with regional non-Arab powers (Iran, Turkey) and external powersthe US, Russia and European States. This context of turmoil generates massive movements of refugees going to Europe, which is seen by Daech as the soft belly of the West, and an easy target for home born terrorists. For the time being, no strong mobilisation project seems to emerge for getting out of the impasse, be it in the Middle East, as the Syrian chaos testifies to, or in Europe itself, where Islamophobia is more and more mobilised by populist parties, for electoral gains.

Since the mid 1970's, Egypt entered a new era, between economic liberalization and diplomatic steam lining with the West. A first step, under the leadership of Anwar al Sadat, was the peace treaty with Israël and the so-called « infitah » (economic opening), linked with the boom of oil producing countries in the Arabic peninsula and Libya. This orientation, symbolized by the the critics against the Aswan High Dam, legacy of Nasser and the Egypt-Soviet friendship, boosted the urban growth of the country, the mass migration of the youth toward the wealthy neighboring countries, and a political re-islamization, triggering an intense terrorist activity. After the assassination of Anwar al Sadat in October 1981, his successor Hosni Mubarak, follows the same policy. Surfing on a rentier prosperity, he reinforces the socio-spatial rift of the country, through his move to insert Egypt in the globalization process. Therefore, he focuses economic development out of the delta and the Valley, in new towns built in the desert, away from the countryside and the urban chaos of big metropolises, aswell as along the Suez canal and the Mediterranean and Red Sea shores. Faced with the growing resistance of the majority of the population, he maintains an authoritarian and repressive regime. On the 25 of January, 2011 bursts an upheaval of the urban youth which, with the support of the Army, ends up with the fall of the regime. But this democratic outcome will be short lived, since the majority represented by the Muslim Brotherhood will prove unable to solve as expected the plagues of Egypt, poverty and unemployment. Under the guidance of General Abdelfattah al Sissi, the Army, being an economic as much as a military actor, swiftly took back the lead of the country. Egypt now seeks its salvation in a close alliance with its financial backers of the Gulf, which are concerned by an alarming regional context.

In 2011, everybody agreed on the fact that Bachar El Assad's regime was about to fall apart after a few months of contestation, and that the Syrian revolution was a pacific, non-religious and democratic one. Everybody believed there were no risk of radicalization, for Syrian civil society was supposed to be opposed to any kind of drift. Comunautarianism, which is structuring Syrian society, was completely denied by the researchers in social sciences, and so was the Salafist re islamization of the Syrian society that began in the 90's. Moreover, it was clear that from 2011, Bachar El Assad was going to benefit from a total support from Russia and Iran, which would allow him to resist an insurrection backed by Iran's enemies. A de facto partition of the territory appears. The aim of the Syrian army is not taking the control over the country anymore, but to restore security by eliminating the rebel areas. In the end, there is no good scenario for Syria, and the worst might be still to come for no one seems to be able to control the Daech situation.

At a time when the war against the Islamic State continues, this article analyses the tribal factor in Iraq by querying its capacity to stabilize, or not, this country. The issue of tribalism, through both its past and present manifestations, indeed remains unknown. Since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in the spring 2003, the tribes, however, have occupied a central place in the post-Baathist socio-political and military landscape, of which they reflect the ambiguities and contradictions. Sometimes peaceful, on the sidelines of the armed uprising, sometimes leant on some jihadist groups such as the Islamic State, the tribes cannot be kept on the margins of the analysis; an assessment all the more obvious that, between 2006 and 2008, the tribes took up arms alongside the United States. In the context of an offensive in whole parts of the Iraqi and Syrian territories, and of a global military response struggling to coordinate with field players, is the “tribal awakening” strategy (Sahwa) reproducible in order to defeat the Islamic State? Depending on which terms, which prospects for success but also which risks?

The Yemen, formerly called “Arabia felix” (“happy Arabia”) would today deserve the reversed name of “Arabia infelix” (“unfortunate Arabia”). This ancient country by its history, fails to appear to be a real “State”. The structural centrifugal forces which enfeebled the central power, which was always structurally weak, appears today more and more a “failed” State with a north-south division which updated. It is henceforth plunged into the torments of a conflict, ever more confessional, between the “houtie” militant clan of Shiite “zaïdite” obedience, allegedly supported by Tehran, against a legitimate power embodied by the president Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, following the stormy transition of 2012. He hoped now to be able to reinstall in the capital Sanaa that he had been forced to flee due to the houthie pressure. He could but solicit an Arab-Sunni military coalition, explicitly anti-houthie constituted by Saudi Arabia, A chaotic situation which benefits inevitably the Sunni extremist sphere of influence of AQPA (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as well as the “Islamic State” (ISIS).

By succeeding his half-brother Abdullah, King Salman inherited a kingdom facing many threats. The thrust of the Iranian-supported Huthi rebels in Yemen ; the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program which appear about to conclude in spite of stiff opposition on the part of Riyadh ; the progression in Iraq and Syria of the Islamic State which now openly challenges the Saudi regime and the persistent fall in oil prices. Despite his advanced age -79- and his frail health, the new king has made surprisingly bold moves by sidelining officials close to his predecessor and by giving carte blanche to his youngest son Muhammad bin Salman, who, from March 2015 onwards, has led a war in Yemen against the Huthis. However, the uncertain outcome of this war, the agreement reached in July between Iran and the Western powers, the ongoing fall of oil prices and the absence of apparent support for Muhammad bin Salman within the al-Saud family suggest that, at the dawn of 2016, the situation of the kingdom is fraught with far more peril than just a year earlier when Salman acceded to the throne.

The succession issue in Saudi Arabia is of great significance to al-Saud and also to their American ally. This Issue was by the past the reason of rivalries and struggles for power within Saudi Royal Family. The Death of King Abdallah in january 23, 2015 and the real « takeover » made by Salman Ibn Abdul Aziz just after becaming to the Saudi Throne, had marked the come back of Soudeiri Clan. A come back wich had been illustrated by a concentration of powers between the hands of this Clan and a « neutralization » of the rival Clans. This Transition happened in time of great Geopolitical upheavels, wich occured in the Middle East, would be problematical and might exarcerbate infighting within al-Saud. This relaunched the debate about the succession issue and power game within al-Saud.

Every terrorist act needs media coverage to exist, and every media needs to cover the news to exist. From this equation, the couple “terrorism and media” is born, product of a forced marriage. Daech, or ISIS, even though more autonomous through social media, still needs its media coverage to obtain “credibility” of the threat it presents. The group seems to implement a very well calculated strategy to impose its own content on media. Media outlets, from their end, seem to face a management crisis when it comes to dealing with ISIS' own content.

ISIS has developed a brilliant strategy to exploit the resources of cyberspace in order to deliver its propaganda to huge masses, control the media agenda, recruit new fighters and organize and coordinate its actions. The organization uses the dark corners of cyberspace, its technological resources and legal loopholes in order to escape law enforcement and armed forces with an impressive savoir-faire. This paper explores the extreme complexities of the fight against ISIS through cyberspace and offers an experimental methodology for a spatial analysis of its online propaganda.

For over a century, the situation of Christian Arabs has been a revealer of the Middle East dynamics. At the turn of the 19th century, they engaged in the cultural movement of Arab renaissance that was an emancipation vector after several centuries of Ottoman rule. Subsequently, they were very active in political formations, Nationalism and Socialism, that were a way to overcome the communitarian divisions. However, the political failures of nationalist and socialist powers have given way to the gradual assertion of Islamism in its diverse formulations which are more or less aggressive towards Christians or Muslims deviant. This article discusses the representations of Christians among certain Islamists that threaten their integration in Arab societies, even survival in some cases. It also discusses the political dynamic insertion of Christians that preceded the rise of Islamism and finally it analyzes their current situation.

In the 20th century, Lebanon was a haven for people from neighboring countries : Armenians, Palestinians, Egyptians, Syrians and Iraqis. Since March 2012, Lebanon received a constant flow of Syrian and Iraqi refugees. In 2015, they represent nearly half of the Lebanese population (estimated at 4 million). The Lebanese authorities, scalded by previous Palestinian nabka, did not want to build camps, like in Turkey and Jordan, to welcome them. They entrusted the management of this problem to NGOs and international organizations which are helping as much as they can, with the help of the UNHCR, to improve the living conditions of these refugees. The conflict in Syria seems to last and Lebanese legislation on migration and asylum, is obsolete. The extent and duration of refugees in the country causes a problem to the government and threatens social peace. The situation is dividing Lebanese communities and political parties whose alliances are following the evolution of Syrian's situation. Nowadays, Lebanon is facing political divisions, a major economy crisis, violence in the streets...

Among the political responsibilities she has endorsed, Leila Shahid was representative of the Palestinian Authority in France and Belgium. Having reached the end of her career as a diplomat, she analyses the Arab world and its special ties with the Palestinian cause. For Leila Shahid, the Arab world exists today, notably through the vitality of its civil societies whose uprisings are experiencing mixed fortunes. Historically, these societies have been very oriented towards the Palestinian cause, which constituted a unifying factor for them, beyond inter-state rivalries that divide the Arab region. Leila Shahid talks about the origins of this attachment that stem inter alia from the spiritual value of the Holy Land and the Palestinian national struggle. For their part, Arab States have attempted to exploit this cause to establish their legitimacy, but without serving Palestinian nationalism because the popularity and the autonomy of Palestinian leaders have long worried them. Beyond this dichotomy between the States and the peoples, Leila Shahid emphasizes on the vitality of the international dynamics towards Palestine : that which comes from the diaspora and that of the internationalist movement attached to the Justice of the Palestinian cause. She also demonstrates the need for a solution to pave the way for peace in the region.

The pacification process, which is in fact buried for a dozen years, doesn't seem to get the attention of the international community anymore. Yet, the “Knives of Jerusalem” have drawn the world's attention back on the Israelian capital and some people think we are on the verge of a “new Intifada”. In order to understand this phenomenon, the first part of this article will deal with the chronology of the Palestinian struggles against Israel and show their inefficiency, because of the Palestinians' incapacity to produce efficient ways to fight Israel, and of their inability to place themselves in a clear political strategy. All this reflects how the Palestinian society is despaired, and at the same time, how the Palestinian people's image is damaged, for their use of violence is seen as a “brutal” reaction. Today, Palestine, home of historical tensions in the Middle East, seems to be relegated to a position of secondary importance by the revolts and the civil wars in this region. Indeed, the Palestinian question is marginalized ; yet, the radicalization and polarization processes witnessed in the Middle East are affecting this nation.

Because of an almost centenarian conflict between Israel and before its creation the zionist movement on the one hand, the Arab and middle-eastern groups and states on the other hand, we too often tend to believe that the relations between the two have always been absolutely hostile and unsolvable.However, the Jewish nationalism at its beginnings was both east-European, non-military, secular and progressive. It didn't know a clue about the Arab aspirations and Islam within the ottoman Palestine and elsewhere. The first frictions during the 1920's and the 1930's and the high intensity wars of the following decades guided the Israeli perceptions towards more hostility. Those wars were various and reflect the diversity of the Arab camp : the Druses, the Maronites of Lebanon and the Beduins of the Negev and Galilee are seen as different from the majority of Arab Muslims. Moreover, the peace agreements with Egypt, Jordan and to a lesser extent the Palestinian Authority have more or less eased the so-called “Massada complex” of total and definitive isolation of Israel.Since a few years the perception of an Arab enemy turned into a Muslim enemy: this religious and essential development fits exactly into the development of the region as a whole.

This article deals with the representations used by Turcs and Turkey from the end of the Ottoman Empire till today to think about the Arab world. The imaginary developed about it depends on the identity paradigm Turks have about themselves. This paper tries to show how the status and place of Arabs shifts alongside the evolution of this paradigm. It shows how from the distance Turkey has with Europe derives its pro-occidental or pro-oriental orientation. In the years that fallow 2007-2008 Sarkozy's France and Merkel's Germany multiplied declarations against Turkey's ambition to join the EU. Turkey's will to belong to the Islamic world and hopefully be considered as a major player took shape at that time. Does this mean that Turkey has crossed a secular and pro occidental century that led it from “Ottoman orientalism” to “Turkish orientalism”.

The rivalry between Iranians and Arabs or the Sunni/Shiite opposition is often given as a major factor in the geopolitics of the Middle East. The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), was the first direct confrontation between Iran and its Arab neighbors since the seventh century. The Iranian and Arab populations maintain good relations in the Persian Gulf (Dubai) or Iraq (Najaf). From Maghreb to Oman, relations between states are diverse and based on politics. Iran, fearing to be surrounded, always wanted to have a zone of influence beyond its borders. Since the 1979 revolution Iran is marginalized, but the states of the Arabian Peninsula became the new dominant players in the region, the new “Gendarmes of the Gulf.” The rivalry is not ethno-religious, between Iran and the Arab world, but much global, between two emerging powers, the Republic of Iran and the oil monarchies.

Since Ben Ali's departure on January the 14th, 2011, women's rights in Tunisia, as reckoned and guaranteed in the personal status' code, have been questionned by some public figures, especially the leaders and partisans of Ennahda, an islamist movement. But civil society reacted to every single attempts from them and deployed a strong opposition. Parity, one of the main revendications of feminist movements all around the world, appeared to have many defensors during the first elections for the Constituent National Assembly in October 2011 and was then applied, but at the same time, a strong opposition restricted its positive effects. Ennahda, The Islamist Party, achieved majority at the Constituent National Assembly : women then feared to lose their rights, which encouraged them to be permanently watchful concerning the institutionalization of these very rights. The latter were ratified by the 2014's constitution, a victorious ending for this secular fight.

Fayçal Metaoui reminds us how much Algeria belongs to the Arab-Muslim world. Therefore, after the Independence was won, this new Nation backed Abdel Nasser's pan-Arabism on the base of a socialist ideology, and decided to proceed to the arabization of the country. Algeria is an active member of the Arab League, and on the diplomatic level, this Nation tries to reinforce its relationships with every country in North Africa and the Middle East. As for the amazigh condition of Algeria, it was denied during two decades by the Boumediène's military regime, but since the last decade, tamazight has been considered as one of the national languages. As for the radical Islamist movements, they found a strong opposition in Kabylia and several other regions.

Since the Kadhafi's regime fall, Libya dropped down in a deep chaos due to the failure to establish a valid national unit plan. Two large tribal blocks emerged and solidified through political institutions. Two parliaments and two governments warred against each other and try to control the two main oilfields. Those two alliances are fragile. They compete to take control of the south of the country where Tuaregs and Tubus are in conflict. The scission and the fragmentation of the country pave the way to ISIS, which settled in the interface of the two territories. This involves a major risk of dissemination to all the neighboring countries that are low resilient to a danger of such a magnitude. To accept the scission de facto which seems to be a durable fact, may open to innovative solutions to stem the danger.