Contenu du sommaire : Le contrôle parlementaire

This article analyses the relationship the legislature and the executive, focusing on the capacity of the legislature to scrutinise and constrain the executive. It defines a legislature and the constitutional features that determine the type of political system and the basic relationship between legislature and executive. It draws out the capacity of the legislature to scrutinise and constrain the executive through identifying and assessing the different forms of opposition that may exist to the executive. The multi-faceted nature of opposition reveals the extent to which legislatures remain significant political actors.

The parliamentary regime emerged through the shift from an ordinary control procedure of the Executive to a procedure leading to a sanction of its political responsibility which is deliberately excluded in a presidential regime. This a priori rejection has led to the development of an ordinary control procedure that is both more elaborated and more efficient. Today, a certain fading away of political responsibility is leading to a convergence between the two regimes, with the emergence of more efficient forms of ordinary control in parliamentary regimes.

Given the stranglehold of the Executive on the drafting of law under the Fifth Republic, the control function of parliament should have exerted itself fully. Following the many changes in its rules the National Assembly has in fact given MPs the means to fulfill their mission. Yet, on a daily basis, one cannot but notice that these means are either “diverted” from their initial goal, or minimized by MPs who are overburdened by the multiple elected positions they hold.

Since the passage, in 2001, of the Organic Law regarding the budget system (lolf), one can notice a fragile renewal of the parliamentary procedure of budget control based on a new cooperation with a rather independent Court of Auditors and the emergence of Auditor MPs who can draw the consequences of their enquiries and incorporate them in financial bills. More than a legal revolution the Organic Law represents rather a major occasion to restore a certain taste for control among MPs. The tools exist and MPs must now dare to use them. Control over public finance is an essential duty without which the functions of parliament cannot be really fulfilled. As this control represents a tenet of democracy, Parliament should not be under the illusion that its action could be replaced by the development of other forms of control in other arenas, however professional these may be.

Aware of the fact that institutions are a democratic imperative that aims to create a strong and trusting relationship between the people and its leaders, from the very beginning of his term Nicolas Sarkozy has wanted to launch an important reform of our institutional system. The Constitutional law passed on 23 July 2008 has strengthened the role of Parliament in particular with regard to its control functions. Until then, control had focused on the activity of the government as such, but it has now been broadened to the evaluation of the efficiency of public policies. To the “classic” control has been added a new mission of evaluation that could be called an “extraordinary control”.

As opposed to its legislative function, the control function of Parliament has few legal limits and constraints. The constitutional rules regulating it are very scarce. While the executive, either with or without the approval of its majority, may oppose some legal arguments to the action of the assemblies in order to limit their investigative powers, MPs can ignore them without being punished. Such a freedom, which is characteristic of a naturally adaptable parliamentary law, must be exerted while respecting the basic balance of power established by the Fifth Republic. In this respect, the majority has a particular responsibility.

Law-making and control are the two pillars of parliamentary activity. Confronted with the degradation of public finances, the law appears powerless to restore an unsustainable budgetary situation. On the contrary, the procedures of control and evaluation of public policies recognized by the 23 July 2008 constitutional revision represent a powerful lever of change at the disposal of MPs. The body of work resulting from the control activity contributes to the pedagogy necessary to demonstrate the urgency of structural reforms that have been postponed for too long.

The Court of Auditors is an independent jurisdiction whose work sheds an objective and piercing light on public policy management. The reports it publishes, such as the annual public report or various thematic reports, are invaluable sources of information for the citizen and even more for his representatives in the National Assembly and the Senate. In addition, as established by the Constitution and the 1st August 2001 Organic Law regarding the budget system, MPs can benefit from the “assistance” of the Court which complements the works specifically submitted to their attention. The work of Parliament is thereby clarified, in particular with regards to the budgetary procedure. The possible evolution of the missions and organization of financial jurisdictions will further improve the Court's role in evaluating public policies in collaboration with parliament.

By explicitly granting parliamentary assemblies the power to control the government, the revision of the Constitution sanctions an evolution of control procedures decided by the MPs themselves. It prompts them to adopt significant changes in several directions ; a collective internal reflection about the meaning of this control function and the way it can be articulated with the function of evaluating public policies, the necessary programming of the actions it triggers, and its affirmation as a competence shared between the opposition and the majority. It also invites them to reconsider procedures in order to adapt them to the public debate, to restrict the distance between public session and committee work, and to pay attention to their transparency and efficiency. By affirming this function, the Constitutional revision forces the assemblies to demonstrate their creativity and to proceed to a radical change in the way they operate. The moment of control, which is exercised in the name of the citizens to whom Parliament lends its means and weapons, should be a moment when MPs are attentive to citizens and allow their participation.

A meticulous assessment of the effects of parliamentary control in general is impossible because they cannot all be measured. Apart from the fact that a quantitative approach is limited and does not account for the quality of control – which can only be assessed on a case by case basis, country by country, sector by sector –, it should also be noted that parliamentary control, in particular in systems of parliamentary government, sometimes follows informal procedures, especially when the majority tries to orient the action of the government that it supports in principle. The real extent of control, which tends to be confronted with similar difficulties everywhere, may vary according to the type of government system and the national specificities of parliaments.