Contenu du sommaire : Mutations et invariants. Partie II

In the early years of the new millennium, faced with events occurring on the Ibar Bridge in Kosovo, the army decided to set up special crowd control units. As this idea was further developed, it was also decided to train all units of the army in managing hostile crowds. Indeed, a close quarter or support unit can easily find itself caught up by a sudden crowd movement. A concept combining an official policy with suitable equipment was therefore drafted by the Army's headquarters. The skills of crowd control have been strictly managed in order to ensure that the soldier does not lose his primary function, which is to wage war. This capacity of military leaders to escalate the use of force by means of a wide range of weaponry (from non-lethal weapons up to heavy weapons) is fully compatible with our main mission, which is to defend our country and its interests through the use of arms.

At a time when we are witnessing growing uncertainty concerning the respective roles of the police forces and the armed forces, it is important to give careful thought to the logic underpinning these two institutions. When we go by simple appearances, what actually differentiates them is the use of force. In a situation of moral symmetry, to all intents and purposes the soldier uses a form of collective violence, the ultimate aim of which is to negotiate with the enemy. However, there is always an idea of guilt behind any use of force by a police officer, which has the effect of personalising it while at the same time limiting its intensity, without however compromising or diluting the letter of the law. Although the situations requiring the use of one or other of these two forms of logic are today somewhat blurred, in each case it nevertheless remains necessary to choose the solution best adapted to the situation in order to preserve our sovereignty externally, and the cohesion of our community at home.

When we look beyond the symbolism of the event, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the spheres of influence have resulted in a serious challenge to the world order. In the North, the South, the East and the West, since the dawn of humanity we have never before witnessed so much movement, trade and prosperity, against the backdrop of a market economy. In this world, which we could today truly describe as being « global », those that we call terrorists can now strike at any point on earth. They can now hit the very heart of our system, obliging us to restrict global movement. No country can now consider itself safe from this type of aggression. To protect the freedom of movement so vital to our democracies, security strategies must now be applied globally. However, although both military and civil forces keep the peace around the world in order to preserve global mobility, can we really leave everything to the specialists in a struggle which concerns us all?

The convergence of positioning and digitisation technologies lies at the very heart of the technological revolution sweeping through our armies at an ever-increasing pace. In addition to being a valuable indicator of power, high technology provides us with the opportunity to adapt our armies to the new framework governing military action, which has undergone significant change in the European democracies. Despite its high initial acquisition costs, it also provides a means to improve the yield from military forces and resources, against a backdrop of increasingly stringent manpower and spending constraints. The technological revolution therefore paves the way for a change in the “business model” of armies. Two questions nevertheless remain : what sort of war must we be ready to fight ? And with what sort of men ? High technology is not restricted to high-intensity wars between traditional enemies. It also has an impact on the capabilities of forces involved in long and difficult stabilisation operations, where a high degree of manpower needs to be deployed in high risk, heavily populated areas. The human question goes beyond the simple relationship between the individual and machines. It concerns our capacity to maintain a wide range of skills. It also involves cultural aspects, as a result of the changes it is likely to bring in the highly structured world of the military and its traditions. Finally, through the organisational flexibility which it engenders, it may also have significant consequences concerning the nature of hierarchy and command structures.

The digital revolution is bringing about rapid changes in many fields, which can significantly modify a combatant's view of the battlefield when applied to military equipment. Although the consequences of this change in our scope for tactical activity are today still difficult to assess in detail, we can already foresee their impact on the behaviour of combatants. Behaviour which needs to be anticipated well in advance. As an example, changes in weapons systems will lead to the combatant carrying out his role further away from the battlefield. In order to avoid undesirable behaviour and to ensure that the combatant remains fully aware of the consequences of his acts, support and awareness building measures should accompany the introduction of this new technology.

Soldiers have always been keen to use the very latest technology available, but the proliferation of technology coupled with the constraints inherent to land-based warfare have today led to doubts being raised by the military concerning the value of high technology for their operations. This reticence, even if justified, should not lead us to lose sight of the key issue : technological progress has become vital for land forces. Consequently, we need to actively seek progress, to tame it for our own ends, while at the same time being fully aware of its risks.

After a decade of promoting the idea of a would-be disruption in the course of military history provoked by the information technology developments—the revolution in military affairs and its organizational child, the Transformation concept, the United States defense community had to face, as a consequence of the long war—a telling new name for the “war on terror” a brutal delusion on the unwarranted expectations of this revolution which was promising a near complete and integral view on the “battlefield”. A generation of officers, educated in the unlimited potential of western technology had to face perennial military problems for which they, and their organization was unprepared. A more pragmatic view of the necessary doctrinal and organizational needs is now prevailing. But western armies, and singularly, the french armed forces, failed to take heed of this “counter-revolution in military affairs”. It is all the more regrettable that the lessons learned by the us military are actually emphasizing traditional, engrained qualities of the french soldie: humanism, ability to put the role of the military in a broader context, and a common sense born by an emphasis on general knowledge and culture in the education of soldiers and officers. It is thus high time to realize the modernity of our military culture, and to share it with our allies, rather than to follow the path of their unfulfilled expectations.

High technology has now found its way into the field of medical practice. To what extent has it done so on the battlefield too, thanks to the latest generation of hi-tech weapons? Is there a risk that soldiers are today becoming nothing more than slaves to technology?

This text debunks the myth so often portrayed in the world of science fiction comic books, in which the use of totalitarian power always seems to go hand-in-hand with the technological possibilities provided by science. The violence of savage, mechanised warfare is always coupled with a notable underlying factor: the defeat of the resistance.