Contenu du sommaire : La pacification : une autre forme de guerre ?

This article concerns all pacification wars, not only in the past during the decolonisation conflicts in the second half of the XXth century, but also in more recent conflicts, namely in Vietnam, Afghanistan or even Iraq. The purpose is to show how the doctrines in these pacification wars are based on a recent colonial past and directly inspired by XIXth century Western and Japanese imperialism. The intention is also to highlight the French “pacification” doctrine, that history usually attributes to Gallieni and Lyautey, but whose real thinker was Théophile Pennequin. This doctrine lived on through the first World War with modifications and spread across imperial states and nations.

Most visions of the First Indochina War appear to be inaccurate. Indeed, elite units such as the legionaries and the paratroopers are constantly at the forefront of the narrative, as well as the major military operations they played a role in, notably the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Yet, these large-scale operations remained fairly uncommon, and we can argue that the War in Indochina was first and foremost a war for combat outposts. As a rule, a broad definition of “outpost” encompasses relatively heterogeneous realities, such as defense towers, larger forward operating bases for more than a hundred men, or so-called “kilometric outposts” and bunkers built along the general de Lattre Line. Each of these fortifications contributed to the “pacification” policy implemented by the French high command. However, this plan failed – a major difference with the previous pacification campaigns, during the colonial era (under generals Gallieni and Pennequin). Due to the ability of the Viet Minh to exercise its authority and ideological ascendancy over the local populations, the French steadily lost their influence.

All along the 20th century, the auxiliary forces brought an essential contribution to the army in Indochina. Mainly recruited among ethnic and religious minorities, they took part in all the actions on the field, like the preservation of order and later, they engaged in the counter-revolutionary war. Thanks to their involvement, the French Army was supplied with men, perfectly adapted to the Indochinese environment, and above all, did not have to send costly recruits from France. For all these reasons, the auxiliary forces were a key element in the pacification of Vietnam from 1902 to 1954.

This article provides a reflection on pacification methods used on the Cambodian theatre during Indochina war. It is in line with the studies carried out on the war “among the populations” by analyzing the singularity in Khmer, Vietnamese, and French approaches. It describes the successive experiments undertaken to get control on the populations, and focuses on regrouping methods, self-defence organization and propaganda actions. It attempts to show the importance of the complementarity between political and military factors, and its consequences in terms of psychological action. Thus, the experience gained on the Cambodian theater shall inspire the principles of the French doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare.

In Kenya and Malaysia, it was initially difficult for the British troops to counter the unconventional warfare of their enemies, but lessons were learnt from one military campaign to the next. So they managed to neutralize them by changing tactics at all levels, in the chain of command and intelligence services, on the fields, not only in combat but also by controlling populations through restrictions and counter-propaganda.The purpose of this study is to examine the successful operations that led to pacification in both conflicts and comprehend the traditional ways of sharing ideas between different fields of action, as well as questioning the so-called existence of “timeless” counter-insurrectional elements.

At the beginning of 1952 the French expeditionary corps in the Far East was in a deadlock. North Vietnam, considered as the “lock of Southeast Asia”, was suffering from the blows inflicted by the Vietminh elements infiltrated in the delta. The pacification policy implemented until then did not allow the Franco-Vietnamese authorities to regain control. It was in this context that General de Linarès, commander of the French troops in Tonkin, implemented a new pacification plan. He was supported in his approach by the team of Jean Letourneau who took office in the spring. The plan, which was to last 18 months, combined military operations with administrative and political action by the Vietnamese authorities. The Vietnamisation of the war became a reality and there were many innovations: GAMO, regional militias, light battalions… At the same time, the French forces set up a psychological warfare office and liaison organisations with the Vietnamese authorities. They began a new cycle in which France changed its role: it was no longer at the centre of the political game and had to make way for a new actor, the Vietnamese national government. But this was not without difficulty…

The involvement of the French army in Afghanistan is synonymous with the return of high intensity fighting in a context of an allied coalition. Between 2001 and 2014, 70 000 soldiers were deployed: creating the next generation of combat proven soldiers after that of the Algerian war. Within ten years the missions devoted to the French army evolved towards more and more violent fighting. Deployed within the International Assistance and Security Force (ISAF), the French army rediscovered the counterinsurgency, between 2009 and 2011. It developed a population-centered approach to pacification between 2009 and 2010, before turning into high-intensity fighting, which was a prelude to withdrawal.

In February 1940, Germany had nearly run out of metals to meet the Wehrmacht's demand for munitions. From May to June 1940, specially trained “economic commando” teams followed German troops into Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France with the objective of requisitioning metal reserves, either for shipment to Germany or for use in local factories. Hermann Goering and Georg Thomas decided how to allocate this plunder. Should they take the raw metals from factories or take what they produced, or, figuratively, should they “kill or milk the cow”? This case study of the plunder of western European metal reserves shows how a policy emerged in the summer of 1940 that did both.

Through the study of autobiographical sources, the article analyzes the complexity of the war experience lived by the Italian legionnaires employed in Indochina. The awareness of the novelty and uniqueness of the experience of war, as well as nostalgia for distant affections, led some legionnaires to write letters, diaries and memoirs. The individual stories will allow us to access the memories and help us to understand the centrality of this experience in the lives of the soldiers, constituting for those who narrate as well as for their families a real turning point. It is therefore a question of reflecting on individual paths that are relevant, not only for their subjective aspects, but also for their inclusion in the broader context of the social and political changes in post-war Italian and French history.