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He order of 18 July 2011 in the case of Cambodia v Thailand is the second order indicating provisional measures made by the international court of Justice in the context of a request for interpretation of an earlier judgment. this short commentary attempts (I) to identify what this decision contributes to the question of the usual conditions to which the indication of provisional measures is subject and (II) to assess what the creation of a “ provisional demilitarized zone” by this order might mean with respect to how the court views its responsibilities in the context of emergency litigation.

Responding to a request by costa rica for the indication of provisional measures in the context of a territorial dispute with nicaragua, the international court of Justice issued an order on 8 March 2011 which is of interest both for the reasoning adopted by the court and the nature of the measures indicated : the court examined whether the rights costa rica sought to have protected were ‘ plausible', thereby explicitly enshrining a new condition for the indication of protective measures ; it also ordered both parties, and not the defendant alone, to withdraw from the disputed territory, while taking all the necessary measures to ensure the environmental protection of the disputed area.

Ruling on four preliminary objections brought by russia against Georgia, the court ended a dispute opposing the two states since August 2008. Finding it did not have jurisdiction, the court considered that Georgia failed to satisfy the procedural conditions laid down by the arbitration clause in the 1965 convention on racial discrimination on the basis of which Georgia had chosen to bring the case. in a particularly restrictive reading of the clause, coupled with excessive formalism, the court opted to deny Georgia access to the forum. In a classical solution, it declined to direct justice towards people by taking account of the specific features of the convention.

In 2011 the international court of Justice made three decisions on applications to intervene. In two judgments of 4 May it dismissed applications from Honduras and from Costa Rica to intervene in a territorial and maritime dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia, ruling that their interest of a legal nature was not at issue in the main proceedings. two months later, in an order of 4 July, it accepted Greece's application in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) on the grounds that it might consider it necessary to examine the decisions of Greek courts and tribunals in determining whether, by declaring them enforceable on italian soil, Italy violated Germany's jurisdictional immunity. In doing so, the court has not dissipated the paradoxes surrounding the institution of intervention.

Relations between science and politics, bioequity, and biosafety, those are the three salient themes in the development of international law of biological diversity. While knowledge about biodiversity is patchy and little shared, an “ intergovernmental science-Policy Platform on biodiversity and ecosystem services” (iPbes) has been formed, with the hope of becoming the equivalent of the intergovernmental Panel on climate change. While sketchy at present, it will serve as a benchmark not just in the context of the convention on biological diversity, but for other international instruments. Within the framework of the convention, two Protocols were developed in 2010. the nagoya Protocol is intended to set out the context for sharing the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources and the associated knowledge. leaving very great freedom to states parties, it is essentially procedural, and confirms the liberal economic vision of biodiversity. the supplementary Protocol to the Cartagena Protocol, known as the Kuala Lumpur Protocol, urges states to adopt rules and procedures on liability in the event of damage in connection with living modified organisms. Here again, states have an almost entirely free hand. these two instruments deal with important issues, but issues that are marginal relative to the core of the convention, the protection of biological diversity, which has barely moved forward. Rio+ 20 opens therefore in an unconvincing context.

The seabed disputes chamber of the international tribunal for the law of the sea gave its first advisory opinion on 1 february 2011. Asked to specify the obligations of states sponsoring persons and entities authorized to explore and exploit the Area's resources, pursuant to the united nations convention on the law of the sea, and to clarify the circumstances in which the responsibility of those states might be implicated, the chamber provides valuable enlightenment not only as to the law of the sea, but also environment law and the law of international responsibility. The opinion allows the chamber, at the end of a balanced approach between caution and resolve, to pave the way for its own judicial policy.

China is among the major exporters of cultural property. The chinese state is generally highly sensitive to the protection and regulation of movements of cultural property. the chinese legislative and institutional framework is comparatively complete and criminal sanctions are severe. Priority is granted to the punishment of illicit trafficking in cultural property and free trade of such property is limited. Rather than organizing any supervision of the art market, chinese law has preferred to partly prohibit the internal movement of such cultural property. these overly strict measures are an indirect incentive to illegally export cultural property via art work trafficking networks.

The euro Zone is confronted with an unprecedented debt crisis that highlights the shortcomings of economic and Monetary union and that could threaten the euro. To protect the currency, the european union institutions and Member states have been forced to intervene and to seek out international support for those euro Zone states liable to default. Alongside this, far-reaching reforms have been undertaken to ensure the longterm viability of EMU ; will they be sufficient ? The considerations that follow relate to the measures implemented or contemplated ; they confirm the difficulties the european union and its members are having in drawing all the consequences from the introduction of the single currency

France was sentenced several times by the european court of Human rights in 2010. the court considers that the french public prosecutor, who is not independent from the executive or the political parties, is not authorised by law to exercise judicial authority. consequently he cannot make judicial decisions restricting civil liberties. The french court of cassation has sided with european case law, but the recent reform of the rights of people held in custody by the police is not yet compliant with the judicial precedent of the court in Strasbourg, despite some progress.

An effective european migration law, with ever more precise substantive rules, is slowly emerging. like international migration law, it accommodates numerous informal fora where soft law is being elaborated. However, contrary to the international framework, this european migration law contains formal provisions which can be judicially controlled or implemented in order to maintain a proper balance between competing interests : territorial sovereignty and human rights. there is need for Europe, as well as for the Global north in general, to associate countries of origin to a policy of migration management (and not simply repression), and for domestic judicial control to also be efficient.