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Changes in the Party Apparatus, by Michel Tatu The appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1985 would seem to have sounded a death knell for the old guard of the Politburo and Party apparatus. They are now paying for their mistake in appointing Constantin Tchernenko one year earlier. Since the Spring, a séries of replacements have been made at different levels and the rate of change is accelerating as next year's Party Congress approaches. However, a careful examination of regional changes and of the backgrounds of the newly promoted gives an indication of the present limitations to Gorbachev's authoritv. Most notable among these limitations is the Party number two, Igor Ligatchev.

The Gorbachev Dynamic, by Georges Sokoloff A reading of Gorbachev's speeches throws light both on the man himself, as well as on his approach to Soviet economie problems. It is clear that the Secretary of the Party considers these problems of crucial importance for the future of his country, and we can discern from his style two fundamental elements of his personality. He is imbued with a sense of urgeney on the one hand, and also with great détermination to match actions with words. Gorbachev's proposed solutions for reviving the Soviet economy have a ring of genuine originality. Through the promotion of social cohésion, he believes the system can regain efficacy. He wishes to reindustrialise the USSR, through ambitious programmes of investment and modernisation. He also wishes to reorganise économie administration with less emphasis on central planning and more scope for managerial initiative. Each one of these aims will meet with criticism and it is not at ail sure that they can be moulded into an overall strategy. The issue of most importance, however, is whether the Gorbachev dynamism can pene-trate the vast, heavy layers of caste and social inertia existing in the Soviet Union.

Forty Years of Difficult Coexistence, by Adam B. Ulam After forty years of difficult relations, a durable rapprochement could be achieved between the United States and the Soviet Union were the US to develop new political and diplomatie skills and the Kremlin forget some of its old habits. However, it would be imprudent to expect the Gorbachev regime to suddenly concentrate ail its energies and resources on domestic affairs and curtail entirely its propensity to create trouble on the international scene. On the other hand, it is not unrealistic to hope that Soviet economie needs coupled with well-advised and vigilant American diplomacy could bring about a more cautious and restrained approach in the Kremlin s foreign policy.

A Look at the New Master of Soviet Diplomacy, by S. Kartveli The choice of Eduard Shevardnadze to replace Andrei Gromyko cornes as a surprise. Nothing would seem to have predisposed this provincial apparatchik to diplomacy. However, his choice is perhaps well-considered and rational. A reformist, he was already practicing Gorbachevism in his previous functions before the advent of Gorbachev. He is a confidant of Gorbachev and a man of proven talents as a negotiator and political manipulator. In a world where image and appearance are often of paramount importance, the choice of Shevardnadze is also sound. He personifies the new breed of young, strong, reformist administrator, who is also less Russian and more authentically multinational. In the Russian subconscious, the prototype of a Georgian is a mixture of seducer, hunter, brave and vengeful fighter, and stubborn highlander with the soûl of an actor. Gorbachev undoubtedly took ail these factors into account in making his choice.

France in Soviet Policy towards the West, by Marie Mendras De Gaulle succeeded in setting up a dialogue between the Soviet Union and France which satisfied a desire on both sides to develop a privileged relationship in the opposite camp. Through its relations with France, the USSR was in fact seeking a general detente with the West and with the United States in particular. The Soviet Union achieved its principal objectives with the realization of détente in the early seventies and France became simply one among other Western partners. It thereby lost much of its importance as a tool of Soviet foreign policy. The détérioration of US-Soviet relations over recent years and in the general climate of East-West dealings could have led to renewal of political coopération between Paris and Moscow. The French socialist leadership, however, adopted an uncompromising stance towards the USSR, reiterating France's solidarity with the Atlantic Alliance and its European partners. The Soviets have denounced this policy of « europeanism » and « atlanticism » as detrimental to French independence and to detente. They would have preferred to see France playing once more a disruptive role within the Atlantic Alliance. The renewal of summit dialogue since 1984 is more of a diplomatie exercise than a return to the situation of the sixties.

Myths and Realities of the Soviet Military Menace, by Yves Boyer In France, more than in any other country, there is a tendency to make too close a link between the ideological and military aspects of the Soviet menace. It is a dangerous error considering the very different nature of the minds and laws which formulate and govern ideology and strategy. Trying to assimilate the two leads to mistaken conceptions of the potential enemy. The challenge which the West must face is the Soviet mastery of contemporary strategy rather than their quantitative superiority in terms of men and military material.

Soviet Ballistic Missile Défense and NATO, by David S. Yost The Soviet potential for « breakout » or « creepout » from the cons-traints of the ABM Treaty has grown, owing to the expansion and upgrading of the Moscow System, the development of potentially BMD-capable surface-to-air missiles, the construction of new large phased-array radars, and investments in exotic advanced technologies. A large unilateral expansion of Soviet BMD capabilities could pose grave implications for the Atlantic Alliance in contingencies of crisis and war, and increase the possible vulnerability of the West to Soviet blackmail. Owing to the uncertain prospects of arms control solutions (especially in light of apparent Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty and the Soviet dedication to strategie defenses), the Alliance must be prepared to penetrate Soviet défenses and to develop similar defenses in order to maintain stable deterrence.

Soviet Military Aid to the Third World, by Moshe Efrat The price of Soviet arms is much higher than is generally believed in the West. Soviet pricing policy is different of the two main categories of military equipment. The price list quoted for the arms themselves is very favourable, whilst the prices for complementary Systems are usually much doser to international market prices. It follows therefore that foreign military expenditure is either much greater, or goods purchased by the Third World fewer, than has commonly been thought. The actual cost of conventional armaments supplied by the Soviet Union could be more than double the amount normally estima-ted by Western observers.

Yugoslavia. Europe's Soft Underbelly, by Nora Beloff Nora Beloff suggests that, in the context of the East West ideological confrontation, Yugoslavia is poised to become the first country ever to break away from « Marxist-Leninism » : that is one party rule, a collectivized economy and attempted imposition of totalitarian thought-control. Yugoslavia is shown to be in an advanced state of disintegration and Nora Beloff traces the s tory of how the West, particularly England, helped Tito seize power and have continued to give his successors indispensable political and material support. As long as no effort is made to draw Yugoslavia into the Western military complex, Nora Beloff dismisses the fear that the Russians might intervene to present the peaceful passage of Yugoslavia's international régime from heterodox Communism to Western style democraty. The many Yugoslavs, at home and in exile, who favour this change deserve Western support. Their success would constitute a message to the outside world that the future does not necessarily lie with what Moscou calls the forces of progress.