Contenu du sommaire : Les négociations internationales depuis 1945 - 1

In 1954, the United States and the Associated States opposed the very idea of a negotiated peace in Indochina. France and the Viêt-Minh agreed in principle to such a peace, but both opponents strove to obtain the most favourable conditions. The present paper describes the means used by the mediating powers (China, United Kingdom, the USSR) to obtain a negotiated settlement. The mediators had to put pressure on their allies, but also to grant them concessions which made the peace agreements a very weak document.

Until the end of the 1950s, France organized its relations with its colonies according to organic structures of a multilateral type. But, whatever the institutional ups and downs of these successive organizations, Paris dominated and steered the set. At the time of the independences, these structures, inherited from an imperial management of Franco-African relations, were no longer wanted because they were considered too « penalizing » in terms of the international image of a nation which henceforth wanted to be done with the image of a colonial power. From the debris of the Community, General de Gaulle's France set up, in a empirical way, a new framework for its relations with its African ex-colonies soon qualified as a « policy of cooperation ». The modalities of Franco-African dialogue were from then on based quasi-exclusively on bilateralism, which allowed France to maintain a considerable part of its influence.

The signature of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, on the third of September 1971, was one of the first successful results of Détente in Europe in the early 1970s. The turning points of the negotiation between the USA, Britain, France and the USSR that made this signature possible are well known. This article focuses particularly on the way the Federal Republic of Germany was involved in the negotiation from the Western side, through an informal structure, the « Bonn group ». This group of diplomats was responsible for coordinating the daily strategy of the Western powers in the negotiation, taking into account the views of the agents of the Federal Republic. Its remarkable efficiency enabled it to be the true « operational » level of the negotiation on the Western side. We will question the impact of this group on the final results of the negotiation.

This article discusses the secret American-North Vietnamese negotiations which led to the signing of the January 1973 Paris Agreements. The author contends that secret diplomacy does not alone explain the dismal (from the American viewpoint) outcome. Ultimately, the Kissinger-Tho talks were but a forum for making the decisions that were actually dictated by the events on the ground in Vietnam and the hectic diplomatic activity that Kissinger was engaged in elsewhere. The central argument is that the negotiations in Paris failed to produce a durable peace for Vietnam, not due to poor negotiation skills but because both sides ultimately viewed the agreements as a temporary reprieve rather than a permanent solution.

This paper deals with US foreign policy in the Middle East during the years 1973 and 1974. These two years were a turning point both for US foreign policy and the peace process. To the surprise of the US and Israel, the outbreak of the October War dramatically changed the outlook for peace. It broke the blockages of the previous years and led to a re-evaluation of priorities within American foreign policy. Due to the irreconcilable differences between the parties (the USA, the USSR, Israel, the Arab and European states), Henry A. Kissinger had so far conducted a so-called « standstill » or even obstructionist diplomacy in the wake of the failure of the peace plans of William Rogers, his predecessor. After the war, Kissinger embarked on the hectic pace of what was known from the beginning of 1974 as « shuttle diplomacy ». Taking advantage of the new balance of power, both military and psychological, he intended to impress on the parties the need to move forward « step by step » towards peace. « Step by step » meant that no final settlement was planned in advance. No one knew where the final step would lead. Kissinger's primary goal was to build a momentum rather than to reach out for a utopian final settlement. That is the reason why the very expression « peace process » was crafted at this time, seemingly by Harold Saunders, one of Kissinger's closest aides in the National Security Council.

At Camp David, Israeli negotiators succeeded in getting both the opposing party, Egypt, and the US mediator to substantially change their original positions. Based on the memoirs of those involved, the article seeks to clarify the negotiation methods and practices underlying the Israeli team's success. Menachem Begin and his negotiators drew upon a universal repertoire of negotiation techniques in order to bolster an ideologically rigid position. The key to their success lay in their ability to use these techniques intensively, through a judicious interpretation of both the limits and opportunities posed by the political systems of the three states involved and of the degree of steadfastness of the decision-makers of the opposing party and the mediator.

The author begins by describing briefly but precisely the various negotiations or facilitations he had to handle during his career for the United Nations or as French ambassador : Nigeria, Guinea (with the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Holy See, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Israel...), Morocco and the Western Sahara, Senegal (relations with the Gambia and the question of the Cazsamance region). He then tries to draw some lessons for principles of negotiation taken from his own experience, of course also very much determined by his own personality, but which could be generalized if adapted to specific circumstances. He considers luck as an important factor, but stresses mainly a perfect knowledge of the file, of the personality and priorities of the negotiating partner ; the fact of being alone in charge of the process ; the necessity of building and maintaining confident relations with families of hostages or detainees, NGOs, opponents and journalists ; the choice of words and critical moments ; to be ready to react immediately to unforeseen events ; and the need not to lose time in implementation once the agreement is reached, as the hawks are always lying in wait to act faster than the doves.