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Reconciliation and the United Nations, by Giandomenico Picco Reconciliation could be a necessary step in world governance. Is it possible to acbieve it within the existing international System ? To this end, must the concept of the enemy be altered, or rather, should the role of the enemy be changed ? If we wish to reach reconciliation, it will not suffice to appease intolerance. Instead, reconciliation can be achieved only if a common denomi-nator of values is disseminated among international actors. The structure of the United Nations could be useful in this dissemination provided that the specifie role of its different organs be maintained, and above ail, that the Security Council and the Secretary General be used as separate but comple- mentary instruments. Over time, confusion could render these two instruments less effective, and might signal the end of the weaker of the two, that is, the Secretary General. A more adequate role for the Secretary General might be that of moral and intellectual, rather than political leader, especially given that such new role might be the only way to maintain the Secretary General's distinctiveness from the Security Council. In short, it is impossible to reach reconciliation without leaders who are capable of governing without an enemy.

French-Algerian Relations 1962-1992. Reconciliation or Conciliation ?, by Jean-François Daguzan Franco-Algerian relations have always been exceptional. Unable to achieve integration, the French instead embraced a quest for decolonisation, which indelibly marked relations between the two countries. As a resuit of that quest, there was never any risk of irredeemable clash during the various cycles of crisis and reconciliation. Certainly, however, there were problems. Algeria always sought to weaken French presence which it found oppressive, and France, during Giscard d'Estaing's presidency, began to place greater emphasis on Tunisia and Morocco, both countries long ignored. During François Mitterrand's first mandate, Franco-Algerian relations became an excellent example of mutual cooperation ; although the relationship was ultimately unable to withstand the tests of economie and political realities. Today, Franco-Algerian relations are at a tuming point. Their future dépends on Algeria's ability to resolve the Islamic question and France willingness to maintain close links. However, a fundamental question remains : will France maintain close ties with Algeria only if the type of government in Algeria is compatible with French interests, or will France continue to maintain links no matter what of Algerian government is in power ?

German Reconciliation ?, by Robert Picht Four years after the fall of the Wall, Germany appears more divided than ever. The current German crisis goes deeper than the problems of economie recession that was aggravated by massive financial transfers to the East. The psychological and cultural difficulties are considérable. The two former German states and their societies developed in opposite directions. On the one hand, the East-Germans must undergo a double frustration. They have to reject their past as a failure ; and they must accept that the dream of a brilliant capitalistic future is illusory. On the other hand, the West-Germans have problems justifying their policy of European integration as well as their former cooperation with the communist regimes. In this double crisis of national identity - one that raises old questions about German history and, in particular, about the nature of Nazism - it is more appropriate to consider the birth of the new Germany as unification than as reunification.

NATO and the Continuing Greco-Turkish Conflict, by Argyrios K. Pisiotis Many scbolars have comparee, the tumultuous relations and « inherited enmity » between Greeks and Turks with the older Franco-German antago-nism, and ask why the former have not reconciled, as the French and Germans did, considering that ail four countries are NATO members. This comparison is particularly characteristic of the Anglo-saxon school of analysis which, focusing on institutional frameworks and regimes, fails to see that the two conflicts are not comparable. At the root of each conflict are different sets of issues, such as the balance of military-political-economic power, demographics, historical circumstances, differing conceptions of war and peace, opposing perceptions of common threats, and the consequences of West European integration. Only a diplomatie policy which works with instead of around the particular realities of the Greco-Turkish conflict can produce positive results.

Beyond War in ex-Yugoslavia : Reconciliation After the Conflict, by Ivan Djuric According to the author, principles without which solution to the Yugoslav crisis makes no sense are the following : a Yugoslav space, recognition of former frontiers between the ex-Yugoslav reput lies, and the search for a universal solution in Belgrade (between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia). It is also necessary to take into account that no one is innocent in this conflict. Before implementing any proposed solution, fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina must stop. At the military level, the role of the United States is decisive ; while at the political level, that of the EC will be very significant, not to mention the importance of Russia. It is essential to liberate Sarajevo, Tuzla and Mostar, three cities symbolic of the successes and failures of the belligerents. Solution lies in territorial and personal autonomy for the Serbs in Croatia and in the refederalisation of the Serbian Republic. Regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina it should embrace institutional rather than geographic federalisation, which would include two-chambered parliament and veto rights for each national delegation (Muslim, Serb, Croat, etc.)

A Peace Process in Ireland, by Bruce Arnold Resolving the crisis in Northern Ireland has correctly focused on terrorism and endemie violence, but with the necessary political balance which respects democracy, and guarantees the position of minorities, within Northern Ireland, and within the whole island of Ireland. The Downing Street Déclaration, made by John Major and Albert Reynolds, prime ministers respectively of Britain and the Republic of Ireland, has carried this process further than any previous initiative, and promises to end the Provisional IRA campaign of violence, bringing its political wing, Sinn Fein, back into the democratie process. Bruce Arnold, in this article, examines the background, the motives for a change of direction by the terrorists, and the responses of politicians from all sides. All the responses are motivated, he believes, not by a yearning for peace, widely expressed by ail communities, but by realpolitik. Terrorist violence has not worked, it is time to give democracy a less fettered chance than has been possible for quarter of a century.

Reconciliation After the American Civil War, by William Pfaff Reconciliation of the American North and South after the Civil War (1861-1865) was a prolonged and difficult process, the conciliatory policies of the (Andrew) Johnson Administration (1865-1869), thwarted by Congress. A period of Northern military occupation of the South (the « Reconstruction ») was followed in the 1870s and 1880s by the reimposition of « white supre-macy » in the Southern states. White reconciliation began in the prosperity and new nationalism of the later 19th century, above au in the war with Spain, but Southern resentments persisted until the Second World War largely ended American regionalism. American Blacks and Whites have yet to find a true reconciliation, although the Civil Rights legislation of the (Lyndon) Johnson Administration in the 1960s finally removed the last of the legal disabilities imposed upon black Americans.

Franco-German Reconciliation : Dialogue Between de Gaulle and Adenauer, by Maurice Vaïsse Franco-German reconciliation was not the resuit of de Gaulle and Adenauer alone. It began just after World War II Even so, the Personal rapport between de Gaulle and Adenauer did give it a decisive impulse. But Franco-German reconciliation also depended on the development of relations between the two men, which was far from consistent. Haraly exempt from ambiguity, misunderstanding and sometimes anger, the entente between the two leaders resulted from mutual political desire to contribute to European unity and from a constant dialogue which allowed them to deal with problems arising from differing viewpoints and approaches to the international situation.

France/Germany : Agreement and Disagreement, by Hans Stark 1993 was marked by « objective difficultés » in Franco-German relations which were tainted by three crises : monetary (interest rates), commercial (GATT) and political (ex-Yugoslavia). However Franco-German cooperation is considerably important for the European Union. So indispensable is agreement between them that Bonn and Paris are condemned to compromise and hence apply short-term policies to recurrent problems. In such a context, crisis, attacks of mutual distrust and reconciliations reoccur regularly. However if Franco-German différences exist, they arise more from contradictory analyses of their own and their partner's role in the new Europe rather than an upheaval in their complementary relations.

A Permanent Seat at the Security Council. Who Needs Who ? Do the Germans need a Permanent Membership or Does the Security Council Need the Germans ?, by Wolfgang Wagner Both the German Federal Government and the German public take it almost for granted that Germany will become a permanent member of the Security Council once the United Nations are reformed. They underestimate the problems which stand in the way of this explicit goal of German foreign policy. An enlargement of the present circle of permanent members by Japan and Germany will not be accepted by the Third World unless three or four developing countries are granted the same status. But with ten or more permanent members with veto power, the Security Council is threatened by an incapacity to act. In addition, other nations in other continents find it difficult to accept why Europe should have three (including Russia even four) permanent members, even though the member states of the European Union have committed themselves to a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Becoming a Permanent Member of the Security Council : A Legitimate Goal of New German Foreign Policy, by Karl Kaiser Given the nature of international developments following the end of the Cold War, it is necessary that Germany become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Growing instability and conflict require an augmented role for the United Nations ; But such a rôle is possible only if the UN is accorded greater legitimacy and capacity for action. It is thus advisable to consider extending the Security Council's membership body beyond that established in 1945 and to bring in big states such as Germany. This would not simply serve German interests, but those of Europeans generally. A permanent seat for Germany would carry ail the responsibilities, including German military engagement in multilateral opérations, with no exemptions. German refusal to participate in any such operation could threaten the UN's legitimate use of force in the future.

Pax Economica ? Economie Aspects of the Peace Settlement in the Middle East, by Hervé Gaymard The spectacular nature of the treaty of 13 September 1993 hetween Israel and the PLO, and the importance of its political and sociological dimensions, must not mask the overwhelming significance of the underlying forces, particularly économie, that paved the way for progress towards peace. By reexamining the economie and financial context of recent events (the Intifaddah of 1987, the rupture of relations hetween Jordan and West Bank in 1988, Soviet Jewish émigration to Israel, the Gulf War, the « affair » over American financial guarantees to Israel, and Israel's Labour victory in 1992), this article hopes to shed greater light on the peace process unaerway today. First written in autumn 1992 in an effort to contemplate potential negotiation strategies of Israël, the PLO and Jordan, this piece bas now been updated with a postcript that takes into account the most recent available information.

Globalism as Foreign Policy : Can Korea Afford it ?, by Han Sung-Joo The most important trend in the post-Cold War world is growing interdependence among states and the consequent globalization of issues. Given this trend and political and economie changes within Korea, Seoul's diplomacy needs to pay more attention to universal values and assume more global responsibitities. Korea should place greater emphasis on diversification of diplomatie actors and issues and on regional cooperation to complement globalism. Globalism is also relevant in the efforts to seek a solution to the inter-Korean question in that Pyongyang should now be induced to end its isolation and participate in the global order. For this, however, a solution of the North Korean nuclear issue is essential. Against this background, Korea's new diplomacy based on globalism was born. Domestically, the new policy is also aimed at contributing to the internationalization of Korean sodety.

To Finish With Yugoslavia, by Nicole Gnesotto The end of the Cold War signifies, for Europe, the beginning of real wars. How have all the Western democrades become caught up in this trap ? The collapse of the Yugoslav Fédération and the recognition of the new States have shown up ail the weaknesses of democracy : the defidendes in international law (the légal non-existence of minorities), the intervention of the UN in the domestic affairs of a State, the weakness of collective security institutions such as NATO, CSCE, WEU and the lack of a long-term strategy because of short-lived governments. The end of communism bas reawoken the conflict (frozen for forty years by the nuclear terror) between ethics and strategy, and shows how difficult it is to make commonplace the use of a peventive force which is the natural extension of diplomatie pressure.