Contenu du sommaire : L'ennemi

Unless we consider with the idealists that a world without war among men is possible, we must agree to “construct” an opponent. This is for our own protection and also to achieve fixed political goals for the benefit of the very community that soldiers commit their lives to. This is also because, as paradoxical as it may seem, outside knowledge is the foundation for a journey of recognition, even if it does not reach the final stage of mutual recognition, it at least allows us to preserve the tragically destructive risk of essentialisation.

“Impressions on the enemy” – the military commander sets out in this paragraph at the top of the orders given to his subordinates. After conducting a thorough study of both science and art, he agrees to the risk of surrendering despite partial and biased knowledge of the enemy. Similar to somebody who is engaged and sets out to get married, he intentionally makes a bet on the other, the enemy, before committing to the long-term relationship that is war.

How can you define an enemy, your enemy? How can you take them into account, confront them, block them and finally defeat them? Whoever they are and wherever they are, we should always consider them differently to how we may imagine them. In Mali, we found that little by little who we were fighting. Sometimes impressed by their capabilities in a phase of the operation, we finally realised that they were not strong enough to fight us. They had many faces. Their image changed as we headed north, but we eventually managed to surround them.

In the background, on the horizon of battle, beliefs and propaganda give the enemy a stereotypical, demeaning and terrifying face. But in war zones, depending on the era, the attitudes, the types of conflict and, depending to the situation, the face of the enemy and soldiers' relationships with those they face transform. They become variable and they evolve. Heightened hostility turns the enemy into a human target in the fervour of gunfire. Yet face-to-face, they become devoid of hostility. This leads us to recognise another human being, to even feel empathy, because after all, we are all going through this larger than life experience.

The leaders of movements that are fighting or have fought against the French army in Afghanistan, Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic have analysed their strengths and weaknesses in order to adapt their own strategies and tactics. Thus, it is worth trying to understand what sort of enemy the French army is for them. In identifying what their main weaknesses are, we discover that they are more closely linked to societal changes in the Western world than to the resources allocated to the defence forces.

The enemy is a determining factor for a State or nation's collective commitment against a violent force threatening their interests, values and even survival. However, have politicians abandoned their responsibility to clearly indicate what could threaten the national community? Does what appears to be a lack of choice reach the expectations of citizens who elected the authority to protect them? Knowing how to name the enemy is a major political liability that can determine citizen mobilisation, national defence strategies and ultimately a budget for defence and military forces that are prepared to respond to threats.

What criteria were used by the French revolutionary assemblies to define the “enemy”? Beyond reading the body of laws and alongside protagonists' declarations, the enemy has been more representative of a foreign power than “the enemy of the people”. Categories of deeply-rooted thought in the defence of the nation and the search for “natural” borders, already in effect prior to 1789, acted as a basis for the country's official policy, without mixing up the revolutionaries, immigrants and other “royal brigands” with France's “enemy”. This distinction, which was more or less upheld, meant the Revolution could be likened to the Nation and the soldiers of Year II could be the soldiers of European expansion then of imperial France, and they rooted the Revolution in a national tradition rather than in divisive arguments that were another main aspect of the period.

For decades, right up to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world, France's defence system was marked by seamless consistency based on a doctrine on nuclear deterrence and an organisation of forces, their equipment and tactical methods which, together, echoed the “threat” to the “survival of the nation” from the “conventional enemy”. This enemy was described in detail in textbooks as a generic model. The paradox was that the effective implementation of this system was to remain virtual, unless it was to indicate the failure of deterrence. It was rare for the spirit of system to be imposed on such wide and long-term matters of defence.

In order to cope with the need for men during the First Indochina War, the French Foreign Legion was authorised to organise intensive recruitment campaigns in 1945, particularly in depots for German prisoners of war and occupied territories. These were battle-hardened soldiers from the Wehrmacht, the Kriegsmarine, the Luftwaffe and the Waffen-SS.

In autumn 1990, the 2nd Foreign Infantry Regiment, one of the regiments of the Daguet division, was facing the 45th Division of the Iraqi infantry who had already proven to be specialised in high-intensity chemical combat. How could this threat be dealt with? This is the story of General Yves Derville, the commander at the time.

Building a steadfast safety posture requires in-depth reflection on certain fundamental notions, such as threat, vulnerability and the enemy, to name a few. In the specific case of cyberspace conflicts, this reflection appears to suffer from methodological and conceptual biases that tend to take for reference a faceless enemy who can strike at will and cause irreparable loss to the most advanced and powerful nations on earth. The aim here is to revisit the face of this enemy as it emerges from the works of several specialists and highlight the distinctive features of the cyber enemy.

Since the war against terrorism has been declared, the State of exception has taken precedence over the rule of law. Mass surveillance of citizens as potential or virtual enemies has gone global, under the claim of insuring security for all. At the same time, societies, battered by neoliberal policies at the service of international finance, have become polarized by increasing inequality, leading the World Economic Forum 2014 report to state that “It's impacting social stability within countries and threatening security on a global scale”. The concepts of dangerousness and preventive action brought forth by the all encompassing security paradigm has dissolved all distinction between interior and external threats, and announces on a world scale the transformation of clausewitzian war into police-like law enforcement, in its most radical form, the man hunt by armed drones.

Weapon systems that shook the foundations of war appeared along with the use of armed drones. There is now no battle, enemy, warrior or battlefield. The limits imposed by the laws and conventions of war and international regulations were all of a sudden let go. Everything became blurred and dispersed. To combat terrorism, are we not now embodying it ourselves? Have we become, without realising it, the spectrum of what we once called the enemy?

Since the Uzbin Valley ambush (2008), the fear of prosecution of military activity has arisen. It is true that the rules of national and international law (including the principles of the law of armed conflict) that are needed in operations are most often conceived as restrictions, even though they also confer rights and guarantees. For ten years, the legislator, through successive reforms, has tried to take into account, in the code of defence, the specifications of the army profession. Recently, the military programming law (lpm) of 18 December 2013 dedicated Chapter VI to “Provisions relative to criminal justice for military affairs”. The parliament specified on this occasion, the status of death in battle as well as the notion of military operations. Moreover, this text seeks to clarify the scope of criminal excuse for the use of force established by the Act of 24 March 2005 on the general status of servicemen.

The risk of conformism weakens operational planning. The cornerstones of our army's organisation and expertise can also limit our thinking. Red teaming seeks to provide an answer. A principle of common sense, caution and critical thinking lies beneath such Anglo-Saxon barbarism. Relying on a team of experts, the aim is to screen a campaign plan for coherence and reality and to temper the convictions that usually follow tactical success. This practice is commonplace in Anglo-Saxon countries, and has long been used by government agencies and private companies, yet the principle barely reaches France's borders. It is therefore time to question the usefulness of such a concept and the possibilities of implementation.

Every year, in France, since national service was discontinued, over seven hundred thousand young French people go on a day with the armed forces – a « journée Défense et citoyenneté. » The last stage of the “path to citizenship” (“parcours de citoyenneté”) instigated by the Law of 28 October 1997, these days now constitute one of the last points of contact between the armed forces and young people aged eighteen to twenty-five. A special time for exchange between young French people and the military personnel who work to provide their security, it is an opportunity to give out strong messages on the values of the Republic that underpin the action of the armed forces. Finally, because they are one of the last citizenship appointments of a universal nature, these days are seen as a genuine time for republican socialisation. They put the spotlight on the attraction of the military institution and enable a raw look to be taken at these new generations threatened with difficulties in integrating into a society that is increasingly confronted with disintegration of social ties and with exclusion. They are currently the preferred expression of the link between the Nation and its Armed Forces.

“Impressions on the enemy” – the military commander sets out in this paragraph at the top of the orders given to his subordinates. After conducting a thorough study of both science and art, he agrees to the risk of surrendering despite partial and biased knowledge of the enemy. Similar to somebody who is engaged and sets out to get married, he intentionally makes a bet on the other, the enemy, before committing to the long-term relationship that is war.

Building a steadfast safety posture requires in-depth reflection on certain fundamental notions, such as threat, vulnerability and the enemy, to name a few. In the specific case of cyberspace conflicts, this reflection appears to suffer from methodological and conceptual biases that tend to take for reference a faceless enemy who can strike at will and cause irreparable loss to the most advanced and powerful nations on earth. The aim here is to revisit the face of this enemy as it emerges from the works of several specialists and highlight the distinctive features of the cyber enemy.