Contenu du sommaire : La défense européenne revisitée

The European defense debate is stepping away from the classical opposition between zealots of “Europe of Defense” and supporters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Budget issues and geopolitical evolutions alike are pushing Europeans toward partial alliances and agreements between smaller groups of countries, “minilateral” relationships which avoid, for a period at least, the processes of large multilateral organizations. A new element for debates in coming years.

Differentiated integration, which brings some member states together on common means and strategies, appears to be the only route possible to circumvent obstructions to a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) for the 28 member states. On an institutional level, it is possible. But its power to create a political domino effect and its ability to bolster existing means of action, remain rather unconvincing. The return of partial integration frameworks into the CSDP as a whole is the only way that will allow the entire process to move pass a juxtaposition of national interests.

Multilateralism has played a significant role in international cooperation. Yet in terms of European defense, there are signs of incontestable fatigue across the larger institutions (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union). “Minilateral” cooperation agreements, which are more limited and between a restricted number of states, are likely to offer a promising dynamic within Europe, despite the many difficulties they face.

The framework nations concept, elaborated in Germany, was endorsed at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Wales in 2014. It attempts to organize defense cooperation between a limited number of countries which share a certain cultural proximity. However, the concept does not help to clearly distinguish between objectives for long-term development capacity and short-term operational deployment. The concept is nevertheless poised to play an important role in future debate.

Relations between London and the European construct are founded on a misunderstanding: for mainland Europeans, it represents a global political project, whereas for the British, the European Union is just one international institution among others. The UK's exit from the EU would be problematic, not least for the British. But progress of the European construction will not be possible unless Europeans finally come to an agreement on common policies, which they urgently need.

The United Kingdom's relationship with the European project could be nothing but complex given its long historical legacy and the implications of political, social and value systems that are often divergent. It remains that London has, for forty years, played a significant role in Europe's evolution. If separation must come to pass, it will engender a profound effect on the European Union, especially in its relationships with the rest of the world.

Afghanistan's transition has been, politically speaking, slower than first expected; militarily, it has been difficult with the Taliban increasing its attacks in many provinces, compromising the possibility of dialogue with the new power; and a diplomatic transition in which partners and neighbors have moved slowly from dialogue to action. We must not forget Afghanistan at a time when Afghans are taking a more decisive role than ever before in the efforts to stabilize their country.

Having reportedly helped topple Ben Ali, the Tunisian Armed Forces enjoy substantial support from the population. However, it has to confront a number of problems: relationships with other security institutions, the consequences of Libyan collapse, and jihadist threats, among others. The Tunisian Army is reorganized and re-equipped, and should now play a decisive role in confirming the democratic transition, as well as in the fight against an ever-increasing terrorist threat.

New configurations in Asia suggest to Canberra, as a middle-size power, that it should employ its external strategy as a means to bolster its security and regional stability. A new policy is underway to ensure Australia's prominent place in the region: a redefinition of priority partnerships (China, United States, etc.), closer ties with neighboring powers (Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, etc.) and a reinforcement of its means of intervention and defense.

The alliance born of the Korean War trades the assurance of security for Seoul with a certain alignment with Washington. It is currently one of the strongest alliances in the Word, but it is fraught with tensions essentially linked to the difficult relationship between Japan and South Korea, and the balance that Seoul endeavors to maintain with Beijing. To ensure its longevity, though under no threat in the short-term, this alliance will have to adapt to a new regional context.

At the beginning of 2014, Japan experienced the deadliest volcanic eruption on its territory in over a century. The unpredictable nature of the event reignited fears of the risks of nuclear power plants. Natural disasters cannot be prevented, but the risks associated with nuclear power can be reduced through human action. As such Japanese scientists and politicians are adopting a strategy centering on prediction and prevention, in order to avoid another Fukushima.

After denying Russian intervention in Crimea, President Putin ultimately recognized that it indeed happened and then used fallacious arguments to justify it. In contradiction to what Russian propaganda purports — disseminated by different extreme-right parties in Western Europe —, the de facto annexation is illegal and comparisons with Kosovo are unfounded. A year after its fait accompli in Crimea, the Kremlin is pursuing its strategy of carving up Ukraine.

The process of European enlargement has been officially suspended for five years. Yet in the western Balkans it is rapprochement with Europe that publicly underpins the majority of political policy. But beneath this official line lie worrying localized trends coupled with a certain European laxity and, in reality, a lack of strategy from EU institutions. The EU would, however, have a lot to lose by becoming marginalized in the region.