Contenu du sommaire : Mutations et invariants. Partie III - Humanitaire et militaire, nouveaux mercenariats

While the mutual suspicion and divergent approaches remain, at bottom, quite real between humanitarian workers and soldiers, the values for which they act are held in common and are complementary. The recognition of the “responsibility to protect”, accepted in 2005 by the UN and the Security Council, now imposes the necessity of finding concrete means to synthesize the obligations and ambitions of the humanitarian actors, be they political or military. The important issue is indeed to respond as effectively as possible to the needs of populations.

Based on his experience as ground commander of French military forces deployed to Sumatra to assist the victims of the tsunami in December 2004, colonel Grammatico casts light on the reasons that lead to closer cooperation between soldiers and humanitarian workers. This rapprochement, which should stimulate both serious reflection and ethical debate, could lead to the standard use of both soldiers and humanitarian workers as a tool for managing crises.

Recent disasters and conflicts have allowed participants in emergencies to move considerably closer to one another. Soldiers, humanitarian workers, diplomats, international officials and journalists have lived and worked together in exceptional situations. While they now form a complete community, confusion over roles gives rise to contention within that community. Soldiers are accused of sliding into the humanitarian sphere, a certain political temptation motivates the ngo world and the principal backers influence the direction of international aid.

The stabilization phase of a conflict, notably the beginning of the transition between the crisis and the return to calm, characterized by neither peace nor war, is most often a period of intense humanitarian activities. Soldiers and humanitarian workers alike participate in these activities, carrying out actions of a similar nature, which sometimes leads to duplications, tensions and incidents. However, it appears that in post-conflict theaters, the motivations of both the soldiers and the humanitarian workers in the end come from the same policy and the same desired objective: restoring a society's vital functions. By returning to the imperatives and constraints affecting both soldiers and humanitarian workers, this article responds to the question of the “competition” or “complementarity” between these two post-conflict actors. Without denying the ambiguity of their interventions, it shows how soldiers and humanitarian workers are, in the end, complementary to one another in the stabilization phase.

Today, in French theaters of operation, the “Groupement interarmées des actions civilo-militaires” (glamc–Joint Service Group for Civilian-Military Actions) deploys teams to carry out actions in favor of the population and encourage a positive perception of soldiers. These projects, which resemble those carried out by humanitarian workers, give rise to the question: are there actions that would be both humanitarian and military ? An account of an acm (Civilian-Military Actions) team leader during four months in the Ivory Coast, this article demonstrates that military humanitarian work does not exist. A comparison of the structures, modes of action and objectives of ngos and acms easily leads to the realization that this is not a question of a semantic game. The diversity, independence and altruism of the humanitarian world is in contrast with the unique structure of the acms, attached to the armed forces staff, whose objective is not to come to the aid of the population but, indeed, to support the action of French units. There cannot be, then, any confusion or competition between civilian-military and humanitarian actions because the intended goals are so different and the means not equivalent. On the other hand, if each actor is conscious of his role and does not seek to challenge the purpose and mode of action of the other, a beneficial cohabitation is possible.

Very much behind the Anglo-Saxon countries, France still wonders about how justified private military companies are. That is why it is important to outline the types of activities and services they are able to carry out. These can be summarized as ongoing activities of cooperation and influence that aim to promote a national foreign policy, which are strategic in nature, and activities of prevention, assistance and crisis resolution, which are operational in nature. All of these activities are carried out for very diverse clients and in fundamentally different contexts. So, if France indeed sees any significance in private military companies for its foreign policy, defense and economy, it needs to think about how to control them, while acknowledging that, for the moment, the law on mercenary forces has not dealt with the problem.

For several years, the Anglo-Saxon countries have seen the rise of so-called private military (a contradiction!) companies that have generated significant income from activities up to now reserved to armed forces or security forces. At the same time, international regulations treat mercenary forces as one of the causes of conflicts or at least of prolonging them. Each country has also adopted its own legislation on a similar foundation: respect for business activities, but control of excesses. This article studies the way in which France has attempted to resolve this problem with a law that cracks down on the activities of mercenary forces, but with special regulations for security activities and control over arms exports. Despite all that, it should be acknowledged that the problem of private military companies has not really been handled: what status, what legitimacy, to do what, what services? The problem is posed, but no solution appears: are private military companies justified, legitimate, and legal?

At a time when a certain type of privatization of war has reappeared, it is appropriate to examine the consequences of private military companies appearing on the battlefield. Delegating the monopoly of legitimate violence calls into question one of the sovereign functions of the State. The French position in this area remains very prudent. Even if French ground forces have not yet been tempted by the lure of private military companies, they ought to reflect today on the type of relationship to establish with this new actor.

There is, in France, a deeply rooted, age-old mistrust of the mercenary that prevents any nuanced approach to understanding different forms of private armed forces. In Anglo-Saxon societies, on the other hand, the rising power of private military companies, above all since the 1990's, and their strong involvement in current geopolitical questions, demonstrates the constructive thinking that can be carried out concerning the art of war, its transformations as well as the multiple approaches to it. Admittedly, this is not without harm to ideas of ethics and morality in relation to the laws of war. While praising force, specifically its military forms, is common to mercenaries, private military companies and paramilitary contractors, the logic of use and the import of the undertakings are not homogeneous. This is an invitation to a voyage into History, which ends with the recent changes in a turbulent world in which geopolitical antagonisms contribute to the privatization of military forces.

The response to the question of knowing who is a combatant, according to the laws of war in force, leads to the following legal typology. According to the criterion of regularity (ratione modi), one can distinguish regular combatants (soldiers and, if need be, volunteers and mercenaries) and irregular combatants (irregulars, resistance fighters, guerillas, rebels and, if need be, volunteers and mercenaries). According to the criterion of conflict (ratione contexti), one can distinguish the combatants in international conflicts (soldiers, irregulars, resistance fighters, guerillas and, if need be, volunteers and mercenaries) and combatants in non-international conflicts (soldiers, rebels and, if need be, volunteers and mercenaries). According to the criterion of party to the conflict (ratione auctoritatis), one can distinguish combatants linked to a State (soldiers, irregulars, resistance fighters and, if need be, volunteers and mercenaries) and combatants linked to an insurgent organization (guerrillas, rebels and, if need be, volunteers and mercenaries). According to the criterion of legality (ratione legi), one can distinguish legal combatants (regular combatants, except for mercenaries, irregular combatants in an international conflict who respect established conventional stipulations, irregular combatants in a non-international conflict if there is a recognition of belligerence) and illegal combatants (mercenaries, irregular combatants in an international conflict who do not respect established stipulations, irregular combatants in a non-international conflict if there is no recognition of belligerence).