Contenu du sommaire : L'allié

From Noah to the patriarchs and Moses, the alliances, or “covenants”, made with God concerned all the children of Israel, as a means of instilling in them the guiding principles of conduct contributing to the establishment of the Hebrew world. In this sense, the Ark of the Covenant symbolizes a pact, a promise and an alliance between God and humanity, paving the way for the reception of the divine word. The Ten Commandments, which were kept in the Ark, are principles of hope, generosity and happiness. Obedience to them forms the foundations for the flourishing and happiness of humankind.

Roman expansion and domination relied as much on alliances and diplomacy as on military victory. For Rome, there was only a thin boundary between the ally and the vanquished. Rome dealt with each ally individually, and sometimes unilaterally. At the service of Rome, allies had to contribute to its military power. However, Rome could also provide them with considerable military support, and the perspective of integration into the Roman world assured the cohesion of the empire. However, at the end of Antiquity, relations with the barbarian peoples were much less favourable to Rome.

Neither noble sentiments nor the ideals exalted by La Fayette impelled the commercial, political and military alliance in 1778 between the American “Insurgents” and the French monarchy, who could not be otherwise more mutually opposed: instead it was a sense of their common interests. Congress knew that its cause was vain without the aid of the French, while Vergennes seized on this unhoped-for opportunity to avenge the humiliation suffered in 1763 with the Treaty of Paris. So, by 1775, a King Tobacco Diplomacy was established, by which the French minister hoped to deprive England of the monopoly of the tobacco trade from Chesapeake, the only commodity of real value from the colonies in revolt, and, more broadly, to undermine England's economic control of the North Atlantic. It ended in failure.

Recommending the recourse to force only as a last resort, the “ultima ratio”, or “final argument”, instead of using it in line with conventional strategic theory as a preliminary tactic to “gain ground” prior to negotiation, the Lyautey method is based on a principle of conquering the economy and on the need, once combat has ceased, to organize territories within a framework that is peaceful and reassuring for the local populations. In that light, the search for alliances appears to be one of the obligatory steps in a colonial war.

What constituted a good ally, in the opinion of the French soldiers on the Western Front? A study of their letters and of the periodic summaries provided by the postal inspection authorities provides indications of key turning points and some evocative highs and lows, especially in relation to the four main allies—Russians, British, Italians and Americans.

For a century, coalitions have become an increasingly important reality for France. While coalitions used to be temporary until 1945, they have become the norm for a country that cannot conceive its security in a solely national context. And yet, this reality has proven difficult to accept in some regards, and even today. By definition indeed, the Grande Nation does not fit easily into a coalition framework, which has actually been developed between the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 19th century against French imperialism. If the latter has since ceased to represent a threat in Europe, the persistent affirmation of French national independence remains, and has even been given a new dimension by the nuclear dissuasion for more than half a century. Hence, the question of coalitions is central to the tensions and balances that have been structuring national defense to this day, both necessarily integrated and yet irreducibly autonomous. Consequently, there is indeed a French way of coalition warfare, a lesser-known but powerful tenet of national identity in terms of defense.

This article starts by providing a definition of the word “ally”, with the originality of including non-state entities in the concept. The article then proposes a typology based on the analogy of a pack of cards, identifying four types of ally—the ally of spades, with whom entities form an alliance because they are afraid of it, the ally of clubs, chosen because it is needed, the ally of hearts, with whom the entity has shared values, and the ally of diamonds, with whom allies are bound by legal constraint, for example by treaty. In the second part, the article investigates the winning combinations that distinguish a “good” ally and thereby determine the effectiveness of an alliance.

The question of knowing who our main allies are and what to expect of them has long been given a relatively simple answer. Until the Second World War, France was one of the main players in a game of frequently shifting alliances aimed at guaranteeing the balance of power between the major powers on the European continent. In the post-war period, dominated by the hostile confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, France naturally joined the North Atlantic alliance. And, while the “parenthesis of peace” enabled France to cement its place in the Western camp, the emergence of the csdp opened the perspective of establishing a new pole of closer alliance with the member states of the European Union. However, recent developments in the strategic situation seem to augur a period of major realignment of alliances, as yet with no certain outcome, and justify perseverance in maintaining joint defence capabilities.

The motives that prompt states to form an alliance are many and varied, deriving from military necessity and the convergence of political and cultural views. The relative significance of these motives explains why an alliance formed out of need in wartime can sometimes be institutionalized and perpetuated during peacetime. The example of nato is revealing in examining these dynamics and the tensions associated with the collective use of military force.

Naval forces, which are highly integrated by construction, frequently deploy their action in a multinational framework, employing tactical and technical cooperative methods inherited from the Atlantic Alliance. This foundation of interoperability, which also enables action in other political frameworks, is an unrecognized treasure that it is essential to preserve. But, whether on the seas or elsewhere, the strength of alliances and coalitions depends on the convergence of government leaders concerning the aims and frameworks of the use of force.

Today, the engagements of the French army are generally conducted with allies or in multinational coalition. The army's capability to train and operate in coordination and integration with foreign partners is therefore an essential condition for attaining the operational objectives assigned to it For this purpose, the organization, doctrines, procedures, equipment and human relations must be compatible.

In nato, France occupies only 80% of the posts assigned to it. If this inability to honour its engagement can partly be explained by limited resources, in terms of both personnel and budget, the role of cultural reticence, which can partly be explained by history, should not be ignored. In fact, French military personnel have only been occupying inter-allied posts since 2009, representing only three staff-rotation periods. So, the question is still relatively new, unfamiliar or little-understood, and is the object of many prejudices, preconceived ideas and clichés. No, it is not compulsory to have a “badge” of expertise in international relations to serve in inter-allied command. No, it does not mean a well-paid holiday. No, nato is not a convoluted mess that only churns out bureaucracy and regulations.

At the heart of every relation between allies we find the founding notion of reciprocity. To ask how we are perceived by our allies implies focusing our study on feelings and impressions, enabling us to understand that France is seen as both a difficult and a very credible ally, so that it is desired as an ally despite its faults, which are ascribed to our national character. An awareness of this and the attempt to understand it, including through humour, is essential to the effective operation of our alliances.

In the particularly complex world of today, characterized in particular by the large number of players both in diplomacy and in the military domain, the ability to influence your ally is a necessary precondition to implementing any strategy aimed at victory, in whatever domain concerned. Knowledge of the many techniques that can be used to serve the higher interest must be part of the training of elites, regardless of the power they may have. Freedom of thought and the margin for manœuvre to influence any negotiation will depend on this training, with the aim of gaining the desired support of our allies in what should ideally be perceived as the common interest.

Betrayal is a military and political reality that has marked our history. In the 20th century, the attack on Mers-el-Kébir by the British was seen as a betrayal by the French, while the occupation of the “zone libre” (free zone) in 1942 constituted a violation of the armistice conventions of 1940. The blindness and absolute discipline of a large part of the officer corps of the Vichy army led to a fiasco. In 1956, the Suez crisis, even if it did not constitute a betrayal, marked a political abandonment by Washington. This time, the French political and military leaders were able to draw the appropriate conclusions.

The risks of disintegration of the European Union will accentuate if we do not demonstrate that we are able to restore meaning to our project of a European alliance, by regenerating the idea and the will to build a social and political community. The redefinition of the public goods that we wish to share will demand a new humanism in a Europe open to the world. In the past, Europe's alliances have been based on a Eurocentric vision of the world and on dominance. Now they will have to be based on acceptance of the world's plurality and must embody new forms of cooperation and solidarity. This will be a Copernican revolution. To demonstrate that the continent is capable of renewing the Kantian idea of perpetual peace, Europe must face up to how it is viewed by others and join with them in establishing bonds between equals. To progress towards a peaceful and socially conscious world order, we will have to advance towards a much vaster alliance between peoples than is possible solely on the European scale, and this alliance will be without centre and without periphery.

For five years, without hesitating or stopping, without ever weakening or letting up, everywhere in the country, from the most modest villages to the capital, thousands of talks, conferences, exhibitions, artistic and cultural events and educational projects have composed a long memorial liturgy to the accompanying drumbeat of the large-scale institutional ceremonies. Today, one thing is clear, even to the naysayers who expressed their strong doubts and to the proponents of hypercritical post-modernism, who will be irritated by the fact: the Centenary of the Great War was exemplary, and the commemoration a success. We must now establish the reasons for this success, which was simultaneously historic, political and civic.

In every city, town and village of France, monuments to the victims of the Great War pay homage to the heroism and sacrifice of those who were killed. Seen from afar, these frescoes and statues appear martial and resolute. But when you look closer, the monuments sometimes whisper another story, that of pain, protest, incomprehension and refusal. That is what we find on browsing through Petits Soldats, the photographic collection produced by Jean-François Dars and Anne Papillault, published on the occasion of the Centenary.

Relations between the historian and the novelist are anything but simple. Both complementary and conflictual, these relations pose a number of questions regarding the construction of knowledge and the practice of writing between these two corporations, and also concerning the impregnation of society by these different forms of knowledge. A study, with an example from the Great War.

This article starts by providing a definition of the word “ally”, with the originality of including non-state entities in the concept. The article then proposes a typology based on the analogy of a pack of cards, identifying four types of ally—the ally of spades, with whom entities form an alliance because they are afraid of it, the ally of clubs, chosen because it is needed, the ally of hearts, with whom the entity has shared values, and the ally of diamonds, with whom allies are bound by legal constraint, for example by treaty. In the second part, the article investigates the winning combinations that distinguish a “good” ally and thereby determine the effectiveness of an alliance.